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Abstract 
 
The massive value destruction for the acquiring firm shareholders found in recent 
studies on M&A performance puts a big question mark over M&A as a corporate growth 
strategy. However, not all M&A destroy value, which makes identification of the deal and 
firm characteristics that affect value creation and destruction in M&A a major issue in 
corporate strategy. This dissertation focuses on three such characteristics: (1) type of M&A 
(technological or non-technological), (2) ownership (private equity or industrial acquirer), and 
(3) the origin of the focal firms (cross-border M&A or domestic M&A). Particularly, I 
suggest that technology commercialization and leveraging of the innovation capabilities of the 
acquiring firm are two sources of value creation that are only available in technological M&A 
and have different value to different acquirers, which results in higher potential for value 
creation in technological M&A relative to non-technological ones. Further, I argue that 
industrial acquirers are better positioned to create value in technological M&A than private 
equity firms due to the availability of complementary production, marketing and distribution 
assets necessary for profitable technology commercialization. At the same time, strong 
managerial incentives and restructuring undertaken by private equity firms fits better non-
technological targets. Finally, I suggest that acquirers gain more in technological cross-border 
M&A than in non-technological cross-border M&A and in technological domestic M&A 
because of the higher potential to gain from internally exploiting the technology assets of the 
target firm in a foreign setting, access to a larger and more diverse pool of technology assets 
and local knowledge spillovers. The obtained results support the arguments and are robust to 
alternative explanations. 
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Introduction 
 
 Over the last decade we have witnessed a merger wave reaching its peak in 2007 at the 
announced M&A volume of US$ 4.5 trillion worldwide. This surge was followed by a 
collapse in 2008-2009, and a restored growth in 2009-2012 with the worldwide M&A volume 
reaching US$ 2.6 trillion in 2012 (Primack, 2013). This amount of investment in M&A is 
difficult to reconcile with the empirical finding that the acquiring firm shareholders lost on 
average 12 cents per dollar invested in M&A in 1998-2001 (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 
2005). 
 One answer can be that not all M&A destroy value. Consistent with this line of 
reasoning, a substantial body of literature has focused on different acquirer, target and deal 
characteristics to explain the variance in M&A performance (for an extensive review see 
Zollo & Meier, 2008). The three most commonly used explanatory variables are relatedness 
(Chatterjee, 1986; Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Gretland, 1991; Anand & 
Singh, 1997), experience (Lubatkin, 1983; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Bruton, Oviatt & White, 
1994; Hayward, 2002; Kim & Finkelstein, 2009), and the method of payment (Travlos, 1987; 
Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 2001; Heron & Lie, 2002; Savor & Lu, 2009) . However, a 
meta-analysis done by King and colleagues (2004) has shown that none of these variables are 
significantly related to M&A performance on average. 
 Another stream of literature focuses on the specific sources of gains in M&A and 
conditions under which firms can actually benefit from them.  Anand and Singh (1997) argue, 
for instance, that generally scarce opportunities to achieve economies of scale through M&A 
become substantial in declining industries. Seth and colleagues (2002) show that acquirers 
gain predominantly from the reverse internalization of the acquired intangible assets in cross-
border M&A. Sapienza (2002) reports the evidence of gains from the increased market power 
in M&A involving banks with substantial local market share, while studies with samples 
encompassing different industries do not find significant gains to the acquiring firm from the 
increased market power (Eckbo, 1983; Fee & Thomas, 2004).  
In this dissertation I follow the latter approach by distinguishing technological M&A 
as a type of M&A with two mechanisms for value creation that (1) are unavailable in non-
technological M&A and (2) allow avoiding symmetrically competitive bidding process. These 
mechanisms are leveraging the innovation capabilities of the acquiring firm (Ranft & Lord, 
2002; Graebner, 2004; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Makri et al., 2010) and commercializing 
the target’s technology (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999; Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 2006). They 
are unavailable in non-technological M&A because such transactions do not provide 
technology inputs for the acquiring firm (Ahuja & Katila, 2001) and they allow avoiding the 
symmetrically competitive bidding because their value to different acquirers depends on the 
degree of asset complementarity. 
Following this reasoning, I attempt to answer the question to what extent the type of 
M&A (technological or non-technological) explains the variance in the M&A performance of 
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the acquiring firm. Doing this, I contribute not only to the broad literature on M&A 
performance discussed above but also to the growing body of literature on technological 
M&A (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Ranft & Lord, 2002; Graebner, 2004; Cassiman et al., 2005; 
Kapoor & Lim, 2007; etc.). The latter has traditionally viewed technological M&A as an 
R&D strategy and focused on their innovation outcomes. By contrast, this study focuses on 
the shareholder value creation and contrasts performance outcomes of technological and non-
technological M&A as transactions with fundamentally different mechanisms for value 
creation. 
Next, I consider the role of ownership in M&A performance. Prior literature considers 
the impact of the public or private ownership of the acquiring and target firms on M&A 
performance from the perspective of the associated agency costs (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 
2002; Bargeron et al., 2008; Goranova et al., 2010). In this dissertation, I focus on the relative 
parenting advantages (Campbell et al., 1995) of different types of acquirers instead, i.e. I try 
to find out what kind of acquirers have better opportunities to create value in M&A in general 
and in technological vs. non-technological M&A in particular. Doing this, I consider two 
kinds of acquirers: private equity firms and industrial companies. Earlier literature in finance 
argues that private equity firms have lower agency problems and are less likely to engage in 
value-destroying M&A (Jensen, 1986) and finds substantial returns to private equity firms 
(for a review see Cumming et al., 2007). I suggest a boundary condition for this agency costs 
argument. Particularly, I argue that industrial companies are superior acquirers in 
technological M&A. One reason is that profitable commercialization of the technology 
developed by the target firm requires complementary production, marketing, and distribution 
assets (Teece, 1986; Reve, 1990), which private equity firms have less access to. Another 
reason is that high leverage used by private equity firms has a negative impact on innovation, 
a key value driver in technological M&A (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). 
Finally, I consider the impact of the origin of the acquiring and target firms (cross-
border M&A or domestic M&A) on M&A performance. Doing this, I draw on three streams 
of international business literature. The first stream argues that market imperfections between 
countries allow foreign acquirers to extract rents by internally exploiting valuable firm-
specific assets of the acquiring firm (Hennart, 1982; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; Markides & 
Ittner, 1994; Teece, 2000) or the target firm (Seth et al., 2002) in a foreign setting. The second 
stream argues that the opportunities for such internal exploitation of firm-specific assets are 
limited due to the institutional differences (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Jandik & Kali, 2009; 
Dikova et al., 2010) and the geographical distance (Kang & Kim, 2010) between locations. 
The third stream of literature argues that institutional differences can be a source of 
competitive advantage for a foreign acquirer (Morosini et al., 1998; Schneider et al., 2010). 
This dissertation contributes to this literature in two ways. First, it tests the alternative 
arguments empirically by contrasting M&A performance of US acquirers in cross-border and 
domestic M&A. Second, it attempts to identify the boundary conditions for the above 
arguments. Particularly, I argue that acquirers gain more in cross-border technological M&A 
than acquirers in cross-border non-technological M&A and domestic technological M&A. 
The reasons are advantages of internal exploitation of intangible technology assets (Hennart, 
1982), access to more diverse repertoires related to new product development (Morosini et al., 
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1998), and opportunities to benefit form the local knowledge spillovers (Schneider et al, 2010; 
Reve, 2011). 
The core of this dissertation are three self-contained empirical parts (Sections 3, 4, and 
5). In Section 3, I focus on the role of technology in M&A performance, develop and test the 
hypotheses on the impact of the type of M&A (technological or non-technological) on the 
performance of the acquiring firm, present the empirical findings, discuss their implications 
for research and practice, limitations and areas for future research.  Section 4 is devoted to the 
role of ownership (industrial acquirers or private equity firms) in M&A performance in 
general and when taking into account the type of M&A (technological or non-technological) 
in particular. In Section 5, I address the impact of origin (cross-border or domestic M&A) and 
the interactions between the origin and the type of M&A on the performance of the acquiring 
firm. The structure of analysis in Sections 4 and 5 are similar to that in Section 3. In the next 
part (Section 2), I establish the common theoretical background for the following empirical 
analyses by discussing the generic sources of value creation and value destruction in M&A 
and presenting the conceptual model. Section 6 concludes the dissertation. 
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1. Theoretical background and conceptual model 
 
1.1. How can the acquiring firms create value for their shareholders in M&A? 
The managers of acquiring firms create value in M&A if the associated synergy effects 
are greater than the premium paid for the target firm. Thus, identification of potential 
synergies and the extent to which acquirers can actually benefit from them is the first step of 
this analysis. Prior literature considers three major groups of synergies that the acquiring firm 
may achieve: (1) improved productive efficiency (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Seth, 
1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991; Singh & Montgomery, 1987), (2) increased market power 
(Eckbo, 1983; Shahrur, 2005; Stigler, 1964) and (3) purely financial synergies (Amit & 
Livnat, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003; Williamson, 1975). We discuss these in detail below. 
Productive efficiency  
The acquiring firm can create value in M&A by improving its productive efficiency. 
Prior literature identifies two major mechanisms behind such improvements: (1) economies of 
scale (Eckbo, 1983; Eckbo & Wier, 1985; Fee & Thomas, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991) 
and (2) economies of scope (Barney, 2011; Penrose, 1959; Porter, 1998; Teece, 1982; 
Williamson, 1979). Achieving a more efficient scale of operations allows the firm to reduce 
its average costs of production, R&D, marketing, distribution, etc. Economies of scope arise 
due to the opportunity to share indivisible resources, firm specific assets and activities across 
a larger number of projects.  
However, the opportunities to create and capture value in M&A by realizing 
economies of scale and economies of scope are limited. Particularly, strategic management 
literature suggests that scale economies are generally scarce (Anand & Singh, 1997), difficult 
to realize because of the integration problems (Seth, 1990), and disappear quickly as the 
environment changes (Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998). If present, the economies of 
scale should result in improved premerger- and industry-adjusted operating performance of 
the acquiring firm. Many studies report no significant changes in the operating performance 
of the acquiring firm (Ghosh, 2001; Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 
1987). Other do find significant operating improvements (Fee & Thomas, 2004; Healy, 
Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; Heron & Lie, 2002). But Fee and Thomas (2004) show that the 
value created by the productivity gains is captured almost entirely by the target firm’s 
shareholders as a result of the bargaining and bidding. Thus, the available empirical evidence 
does not allow us to conclude that acquirers generally benefit significantly from the 
economies of scale. 
Potential economies of scope exist only in related M&A (Christensen, Berg, & Salter, 
1976; Kim & Finkelstein, 2009; Porter, 1980; Rumelt, 1974, 1979; Williamson, 1985). 
Depending on the theoretical perspective, related M&A can be defined in several ways. From 
the resource-based view, M&A are related if the acquiring and target firms possess similar or 
complementary resources (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009). However, financial economics literature 
(Walker, 2000), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985), and activity perspective 
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(Porter, 1998) define relatedness based on the industry-level vertical and horizontal linkages 
between the acquiring and target firms. It is worth noting that the present analysis follows the 
latter approach. In addition to the potential economies of scope, related M&A are 
characterized by a better strategic fit between the two firms that leads to an asymmetrically 
competitive bidding and thus higher ability of the acquirer to capture the value potential of the 
deal (Christensen et al., 1976; Porter, 1980; Rumelt, 1974, 1979). However, if acquirers in 
related M&A actually gained from economies of scope, we would expect a significant 
positive relationship between relatedness and M&A performance other things being equal. 
While some researchers (Anand & Singh, 1997; Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; 
Walker, 2000) provide evidence supporting the positive relationship, others fail to do so 
(Chatterjee, 1986; Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992; Matsusaka, 1993; Seth, 
1990). The meta-analysis of King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004) reveals no significant 
correlation of relatedness with abnormal announcement returns to the acquiring firm. These 
imply that “relatedness may be a necessary but not sufficient requirement for superior 
performance” (Zollo & Singh, 2004) or, in other words, the potential gains from the 
economies of scope are also limited. An implication is that it is possible to better explain the 
variance in the acquiring firm performance by identifying specific types of transactions where 
the acquiring firm is relatively better positioned to realize and capture economies of scale and 
scope. 
Market power  
A horizontal merger of two large companies can potentially create synergies through 
the increased market power of the combined firm (Eckbo, 1983; Eckbo & Wier, 1985; Fee & 
Thomas, 2004; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Kim & Singal, 1993; Palich et al., 2000; Sapienza, 
2002; Seth, 1990; Shahrur, 2005; Stigler, 1964). The increased market power allows the 
combined firm to coordinate the reduction in industry output and increase in the product 
prices to customers as well as to bargain more effectively with the suppliers to lower input 
prices (Fee & Thomas, 2004). 
Though Kim and Singal (1993) report the increased fares by the merged airlines and 
Sapienza (2002) shows that target banks with substantial local market share do not decrease 
interest rates following the merger despite the possibility to do this due to the increased 
efficiency, generally empirical research has not found evidence of the increased market power 
following horizontal M&A (Eckbo, 1983; Eckbo & Wier, 1985; Fee & Thomas, 2004; Seth, 
1990; Shahrur, 2005). These findings are not particularly surprising given the antitrust 
regulations that preclude horizontal deals resulting in significant reduction of the competition 
in the market. They indicate that the opportunities to gain in M&A from the increased market 
power is limited to the cases when it is challenging for regulators to precisely delineate the 
appropriate market boundaries and evaluate the consequences of the transaction for the 
competition accordingly. 
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Financial benefits   
M&A can offer purely financial synergies in the form of efficient diversification, tax 
shields, and exploitation of the capital market relative mispricing. 
Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985) suggests that 
unrelated M&A may create benefits of internal capital markets as the central office can 
allocate resources more efficiently than the capital market due to information asymmetry 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). However, Lang and Stulz (1994) show that diversified firms 
significantly underperform non-diversified ones in terms of Tobin’s Q and Berger and Ofek 
(1995) report existence of significant diversification discount. 
M&A can allow the acquiring firm to utilize tax shields created by the target’s net 
operating loss carry forward, unused tax credits, increased leverage and higher depreciation 
expense (Amit & Livnat, 1988; Hayn, 1989; Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Hayn (1989), in fact, 
reports evidence that merger gains are related to the tax characteristics of the target firm. 
Following Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), 
Savor and Lu (2009) argue that rational managers may time a market to buy the relatively 
undervalued targets at the effective discount and thus create value for the acquirer’s 
shareholders. They find that unsuccessful stock acquirers significantly underperform the 
successful ones, though both experience negative long-run returns. 
This brief review of the sources of synergies in M&A leads to two important 
conclusions. First, the upside potential for the value-creation by the acquiring firms is on 
average limited. This is perfectly consistent with the non-significant average announcement 
returns to the acquiring firm shareholders (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Moeller, Schlingemann, 
& Stulz, 2005). Second, some studies identify particular contexts where the acquiring firm is 
better positioned to benefit from the economies of scale (Anand & Singh, 1997), economies 
of scope (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009; Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2002), market power (Kim & Singal, 
1993; Sapienza, 2002), tax shields (Hayn, 1989) and market timing (Savor & Lu, 2009). This 
calls for identifying types of M&A where acquirers have higher potential synergies. This 
work argues that technological M&A are one type of such high-potential deals. But, to remain 
systematic, we should first consider why many acquirers overpay in M&A and what other 
factors may negatively impact M&A performance.  
1.2. Why do many M&A fail? 
 Prior literature explains overpayment in M&A and the associated value re-distribution 
from the acquiring to the target firm shareholders by either (1) the agency problems of free 
cash flows (Jensen, 1986) or (2) biased decision-making by the managers of acquiring firms 
(Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Roll, 1986). In addition, negative abnormal stock performance of 
the acquiring firm is often attributed to (3) the stock price adjustment to the information about 
the inherent value of the acquiring firm conveyed by the chosen method of payment (Heron & 
Lie, 2002; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Travlos, 1987) and (4) merger arbitrage pressure (Mitchell, 
Pulvino, & Stafford, 2004). Finally, extensive literature in strategic management (Cording, 
Christmann, & King, 2008; Datta, 1991; Zollo & Singh, 2004) focuses on (5) the pitfalls of 
the post-merger integration and their detrimental impact on the M&A performance. Though it 
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is an important argument, post-merger integration process is outside the scope of the present 
analysis. Hence, the following review focuses on the first four mechanisms for value-
destruction in M&A. 
Free cash flow hypothesis  
The managers of firms that generate cash in excess of its needs to support operations 
and have no positive-NPV investment opportunities have incentives to use these free cash 
flows for value-destroying M&A rather than to distribute them among the shareholders who 
then could invest them more productively. These incentives include empire building motives 
or risk reduction through the diversification of the earnings streams (Jensen, 1986).  
Following the free cash flow hypothesis, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) argue that 
firms with Tobin’s q lower than 1 are unlikely to have positive-NPV projects and thus should 
pay out the free cash flows to the shareholders instead of engaging in the wealth-destroying 
acquisitions. Consistently, they find significant negative returns to such bidders in tender 
offers with the magnitude of the effect increasing with the free cash flows generated by the 
bidder. Servaes (1991) reports similar findings for a sample of M&A consisting of both tender 
offers and M&A. 
Leverage can reduce the propensity of managers to invest in value-destroying M&A as  
obligatory payments associated with debt effectively reduce the free cash flows under the 
managerial control, make the managerial investment decisions subject to the scrutiny of the 
capital markets where they have to raise the capital (Jensen, 1986, 1989; Maloney, 
McCormick, & Mitchell, 1993). 
Alternatively, blockholders are better positioned and have higher incentives to monitor 
management than owners with insignificant stake and thus can reduce the agency problems in 
M&A. Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008) find substantial differences in the 
target premiums  paid by public companies (46.5%), private operating companies (40.9%) and 
private equity firms (28.5%). Bargeron et al. (2008) suggest that private bidders tend to pay 
less for the similar companies in similar deals because the are less reluctant to quit the 
negotiations and face less agency problems. Goranova, Dharwadkar, and Brandes (2010) 
consider overlapping ownership and argue that portfolio considerations of the institutional 
owners with stakes in both the acquirer and target firms lead to compromised monitoring and 
increase agency problems adversely affecting the acquirer’s performance. 
Biased decision-making in M&A  
Prior literature argues that irrational M&A decisions by the management of the 
acquiring company can be a major reason for value-destruction in such deals. Particularly, the 
hubris hypothesis suggests that managers overestimate their ability to manage M&A (Roll, 
1986). Rau and Vermaelen (1998) present evidence suggesting that the long-run 
underperformance of acquiring firms is driven by the poor performance of the “glamour” low 
book-to-market acquirers due to the over-extrapolation of the past performance on the ability 
to extract value of the focal acquisition contrasting with the more prudent deal assessment for 
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the firms with worse track records. However, Seth et al. (2002) report that managerial hubris 
does not have significant impact on acquirers’ expected performance.  
Alternatively, Jemison and Sitkin (1986) and Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) argue 
that the inherent characteristics of the M&A process – activity segmentation, momentum 
escalation, expectational ambiguity  – can lead to overbidding and thus destroy value in M&A. 
Two mechanisms that can mitigate the negative impact of these factors are learning-by-doing 
and learning-by-observing. 
Based on the learning curve argument (Alchian, 1963; Arrow, 1962), a number of 
researchers (Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Johnson, & Moesel, 1993; Lubatkin, 1983) propose that prior acquisition experience improves 
target selection and negotiation skills that positively impact acquiring firms’ performance.  
An alternative mechanism that enables acquirers to better execute the deal and 
integration process is learning-by-observing. Beckman and Haunschild (2002) suggest that 
firms learn in networks by sampling the experiences of their partners. Similarly, Delong and 
Deyoung (2007) find that as the number of acquisitions made in a particular industry 
increases, information generation and spillover occur, which results in better deal valuation 
and execution and, hence, performance. 
However, empirical findings do not show on average significant positive correlation 
between M&A experience and the performance of acquiring firms (King et al., 2004). 
Moreover, experience can also have a detrimental impact on the combined firm performance 
depending on the deal similarity, time span and prior M&A performance (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Kim & Finkelstein, 2009; McDonald, Westphal, & 
Graebner, 2008). 
Signalling effects and merger arbitrage pressure  
Stock-financed M&A combine essentially two transactions: stock issue and 
acquisition. The stock issue conveys a negative signal regarding the acquirer’s value to the 
stock market (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Consistently, prior literature finds significantly 
negative announcement returns to the acquirer in stock-financed M&A (Andrade, Mitchell, & 
Stafford, 2001; Travlos, 1987; Walker, 2000). Several studies also report significant long-run 
underperformance of the stock-financed M&A (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Heron & 
Lie, 2002; Loughran & Vijh, 1997).  
Chang (1998) finds the opposite results for stock-financed takeovers of privately 
owned targets. The owners of the latter face less information asymmetry and their acceptance 
of the bid sends a positive signal to the capital market. Consistently with the signalling and 
monitoring hypotheses, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find a “hierarchy” of the 
bidders’ announcement returns with the highest for the stock-financed acquisitions of 
privately-held firms or subsidiaries, the lowest for the stock-financed acquisitions of public 
targets and the intermediate for the cash-financed acquisitions.  
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However, Mitchell et al. (2004) show that about half of the negative abnormal 
announcement returns in stock-financed M&A is attributable to the merger arbitrage pressure 
on the acquirer’s stock price. This can be another mechanism for value-destruction in M&A. 
To summarize, managers can undertake M&A that are detrimental for their 
shareholders’ value to get personal benefits or because they overestimate the potential of the 
deal (see Figure 1). In addition, the negative M&A performance of the acquiring firm can be 
the result of the capital market reaction as it attempts to gauge the acquirer’s intrinsic value or 
to benefit from the merger arbitrage opportunity. These are important factors that we control 
for in this analysis. 
 
Figure 1 A summary of M&A performance drivers discussed by prior literature 
1.3. Conceptual model 
Prior literature on M&A performance discussed in previous section identifies major 
sources of gains and losses in such transactions. On the one hand, potential synergies in the 
Drivers of value 
creation 
Drivers of value 
destruction 
• Improved 
productive 
efficiency 
(Rumelt, 1974; 
Porter,1980; 
Williamson, 1985, 
Anand & Singh, 1997; 
Heron & Lie, 2002; etc.) 
• Increased market 
power 
(Stigler, 1964; Eckbo, 
1983; Fee & Thomas, 
2004; Shahrur, 2005; 
etc.) 
• Financial benefits 
(Williamson, 1975; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 
1991; Berger & Ofek, 
1995; Amit & Livnat, 
1988; Savor & Lu, 
2009; etc.) 
 
• Agency costs of free 
cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986; Lang, 
Stulz, and Walking, 
1991; Maloney et al., 
1993; Bargeron et al., 
2008; etc.) 
• Biased decision-
making 
(Roll, 1986; Jemison & 
Sitkin, 1986; 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
1991; etc.) 
• Signalling effects & 
merger arbitrage 
(Travlos, 1987; Agrawal 
et al., 1992; Loughran & 
Vijh, 1997; Chang, 
1998; Fuller et al., 2002; 
Mitchell et al., 2004; 
etc.) 
 
M&A performance 
Po
te
nt
ia
l s
yn
er
gi
es
 
O
ve
rp
ay
m
en
t 
C
ap
ita
l m
ar
ke
t 
re
ac
tio
n 
7 
 
forms of improved productive efficiency, increased market power, and purely financial 
benefits have a positive impact on M&A performance. On the other hand, overpayment 
resultant from agency problems and biased decision-making as well as the negative capital 
market reaction driven by either the adjustment to the information conveyed by the chosen 
method of payment or the merger arbitrage pressure have a negative impact on M&A 
performance (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Conceptual model 
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Other factors: 
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This work builds on and extends the prior literature by considering the impact of the 
type of M&A (technological or non-technological), ownership (industrial acquirer or private 
equity acquirer) and the origin of the focal firms (cross-border M&A or domestic M&A) on 
M&A performance.  
Type of M&A (technological or non-technological M&A) affects M&A performance in 
two ways (marked “A” and “B” on Figure 2) that I will discuss in detail in section 3 of this 
dissertation (“3.Technological vs. non-technological M&A”). At this point, I will present only 
the major reasoning for the relationships that is necessary to convey the logic behind the 
proposed conceptual model. 
Arrow A. Following prior research (Ahuja & Katila, 2001), I define technological 
M&A as those where technology is a part of the acquired assets. Earlier studies (Dosi, 1982; 
Teece, 1986; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010) identify three major groups of 
technology assets: (1) applied research embedded in products, (2) technology embodied in 
processes, and (3) the technical knowledge of inventors. These assets are developed through 
R&D projects with specific commercial objectives regarding either products or processes 
(Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010) and manifest often in patents (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Kapoor & 
Lim, 2007, Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010). Unpatented technology is 
sometimes revealed in the M&A rationale provided by the management team (Ahuja & Katila, 
2001). The acquired technology assets can be used in three ways. First, the acquiring firm can 
combine them with its complementary technology assets and in this way leverage its 
innovation capabilities by achieving the economies of scale and scope in R&D (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001; Ranft & Lord, 2002; Graebner, 2004; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Makri, 
Hitt, & Lane 2010). Second, the acquiring firm can achieve economies of scope by profitably 
commercializing the technology developed by the target firm through its combination with the 
complementary production, distribution, marketing and financial assets of the acquiring firm 
(Teece, 1986; Graebner, 2004; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). 
Moreover, if the acquiring firm decides to keep the target as a relatively autonomous R&D 
engine, such economies of scope can be realized on continuous basis. Third, the acquiring 
firm can simply run the competing acquired technology to the grave and thus increase its 
market power. Since non-technological M&A do not provide technology assets, the above 
mechanisms for value creation are not available in such transactions (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). 
By contrast, technological M&A can benefit from synergies available in non-technological 
transactions. Hence, the type of M&A is associated with potential synergies offered by the 
transaction and in this way affects M&A performance. 
Arrow B. The potential to both leverage the innovation capabilities of the acquiring 
firms and add value by commercializing the target’s technology depend, as it will be 
discussed in more detail in section 3, on the asset complementarity (Teece, 1986; Reve, 1990; 
Makri, Hitt & Lane, 2010). Since the degree of asset complementarity varies across the 
bidding firms, the bidding process in technological M&A is likely to be asymmetrically 
competitive, i.e. the value of the target’s technology assets will vary for the different bidding 
firms. This reduces the likelihood of overpayment in such transactions and should result in 
their better performance. 
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Ownership. Unlike prior literature that considers whether the acquiring and target firm 
are private or public, this dissertation focuses on the distinction between industrial acquirers 
and private equity acquirers. They differ in terms of their strategic core (Reve, 1990; Gretland, 
1991) and owner influence (Connelly et al., 2010), which results in different effects on M&A 
performance.  
Reve (1990) defines the strategic core of a firm as the combination of specialized 
assets and incentives. The strategic core of private equity firms consists of specialized 
managerial competence and strong performance incentives given by a significant managerial 
equity stake and high financial leverage. By contrast, the strategic core of industrial acquirers 
can be characterized by specialized assets related to procurement, R&D, production, 
marketing and distribution. 
Arrow C. These differences in the strategic core lead to different influence strategies 
available for industrial and private equity acquirers. Industrial acquirers can create value by 
realizing the synergies in the different parts of the value chain stemming from the 
combination of the two firms. By contrast, private equity firms can add value to the target 
firm through its restructuring and removing inefficiencies on the stand-alone basis (Connelly 
et al., 2010). The difference in the value creation potential of these two owner influence 
strategies should lead to different M&A performance. 
Arrow D. Significant managerial equity stakes and high leverage are associated with a 
lower likelihood of overpayment by private equity acquirers relative to industrial ones and 
thus should lead to better M&A performance (Jensen, 1986). 
Arrow E. Profitable technology development and commercialization requires 
complementary technological, production, marketing and distribution assets (Teece, 1986) 
that industrial acquirers possess. In addition, the short-term orientation and high leverage used 
by private equity firms are associated with reliance on financial controls, higher managerial 
risk-aversion and decreased R&D funding and thus have a negative impact on the innovation 
performance (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). These factors can create parenting advantages for 
industrial acquirers in technological M&A, while strong performance incentives and 
restructuring undertaken by private equity firms may be a superior strategy for adding value 
to targets in non-technological M&A. These arguments are discussed in more detail and 
developed into hypotheses in section 4 of this dissertation. 
The origin of the focal firms (cross-border M&A or domestic M&A) can impact M&A 
performance in three ways represented by relationships “6”, “7” and “8” on Figure 2. 
Arrow F. Abundant literature in international business argues that market 
imperfections that exist between countries create relative advantages for foreign acquirers, 
which should positively affect M&A performance (Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; Markides & 
Ittner, 1994; Seth, Song, & Petit, 2002; Conn et al., 2005). 
Arrow G. Some authors (Jandik & Kali, 2009; Kang & Kim, 2010) argue that cultural 
distance between countries aggravates the adverse selection problem for foreign acquirers 
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relative to domestic ones. This may result in the higher likelihood of overbidding by foreign 
acquirers and thus negatively impact their M&A performance. 
Arrow H. Other researchers suggest that cultural distance allows foreign acquirers to 
benefit from a more diverse pool of complementary capabilities, especially those related to 
new product development (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998), and local knowledge spillovers 
(Reve, 2011). Such advantages are likely to be more valuable for technological M&A rather 
than non-technological ones. Hence, we can expect different M&A performance of foreign 
and domestic acquirers in technological and non-technological M&A. I focus on the impact of 
the origin of the focal firms on M&A performance and develop the arguments in section 5 of 
this dissertation. 
In addition, prior literature identifies some factors (“other factors” in Figure 2) that are 
associated with potential synergies, overpayment and capital market reaction and thus affect 
M&A performance. These factors include relatedness, experience, method of payment, 
relative size and leverage. Relatedness is a prerequisite for the economies of scope associated 
with improved productive efficiency and thus it is predicted to have a positive impact on 
M&A performance (Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Anand & Singh, 1997; 
Walker, 2000). Experience is argued to improve target selection, valuation and negotiation 
capabilities that are negatively related to the propensity to overpay and thus have a positive 
impact on M&A performance (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994; 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Kim & Finkelstein, 2009). The chosen 
method of payment may convey among other things the beliefs of the acquiring firm’s 
managers on its intrinsic value relative to the stock price (Travlos, 1987; Agrawal, Jaffe, & 
Mandelker, 1992; Walker, 2000; Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001). Particularly, stock 
issues to finance M&A are associated with the negative capital market reaction and thus have 
a negative impact on M&A performance. The relative size of the target firm affects the 
magnitude of the synergy, overpayment and capital market reaction effects. Leverage is 
argued to mitigate agency problems and thus to reduce the managerial incentives to invest in 
value-destroying M&A, which has a positive impact on M&A performance (Maloney, 
McCormick, & Mitchell, 1993). 
The arguments mentioned above lead to the conceptual model presented on Figure 2. 
This conceptual model provides a unifying framework for the three studies M&A 
performance in the following sections. The central elements of the suggested conceptual 
model are the type of M&A (technological or non-technological), the ownership (industrial or 
private equity acquirer) and the origin of the focal firms (cross-border M&A or domestic 
M&A). In the three independent empirical sections that follow, I will further develop and test 
the arguments A-H that these variables are associated with the potential synergies and the 
propensity of the acquiring to overpay in M&A, two major drivers of M&A performance. 
Doing this, I will control for relatedness, experience, the method of payment, relative size and 
leverage that are commonly used explanatory and control variables in earlier studies on M&A 
performance. 
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2. Technological vs. non-technological M&A 
 
2.1. The definitions of technological and non-technological M&A used in this 
study 
 Earlier studies define M&A where technology is a component of the acquired firm’s 
assets as technological (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). This definition requires two further 
clarifications. First, M&A are transactions through which the acquiring firms obtains a 
controlling equity interest in the target firm (Chang & Moore, 2012). Second, though 
technology on the firm level can be defined in general terms as an assemblage of any 
practices and components used by the firm to produce products or provide services (Arthur, 
2009), the literature on technological M&A (Granstrand & Sjolander, 1990; Ahuja & Katila, 
2001; Kohers & Kohers, 2001; Ranft & Lord, 2002; Graebner, 2004; Puranam, Singh,& Zollo, 
2006; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010) focuses on high-technology, i.e. technology assets 
developed through R&D projects with specific commercial purposes (Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 
2010). Such technology assets encompass high-technology embodied in products and 
processes as well as “disembodied technology”, i.e. the aggregate technical knowledge of 
inventors (Dosi, 1982; Teece, 1986; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010). We 
follow the same approach to defining technology as the prior studies on technological M&A. 
Since technological M&A provide, among other things, technology inputs for the 
acquiring firm’s innovation process (Ahuja & Katila, 2001), they are a means of technology 
sourcing (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003) or an external R&D strategy (Hitt, Hoskisson, 
Johnson, & Moesel, 1996) aimed at gaining and sustaining superior performance through 
continuous product innovations in high-technology industries (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Graebner, 2004; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 
2010). 
Consistent with the prior literature mentioned above, we define technological M&A as 
acquisitions of the controlling interest in high-technology firms with technology being a part 
of the acquired assets. Further, we consider M&A that cannot be classified as technological 
following the above definition as non-technological. 
2.2. The unique mechanisms for value-creation in technological M&A 
The major distinction between technological and non-technological M&A is that 
technological deals provide technology inputs for the acquiring firm while non-technological 
M&A do not (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). These technological inputs allow the acquiring firm in 
technological M&A to benefit from two types of synergies unavailable in non-technological 
deals: (1) leveraging the acquirer’s ability to innovate continuously by combining the 
technology assets of the two firms(Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Graebner, 2004; Makri et al., 2010; 
Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Ranft & Lord, 2002) and (2) profiting from commercializing 
technology developed by the target firm (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999; Puranam, Singh, & 
Zollo, 2006). We consider both in more detail below. 
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Leveraging innovation capabilities 
 Technological M&A allow the acquiring firms to “graft the knowledge base of the 
target firm” (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Cloodt, Hagedoorn, & Van Kranenburg, 2006; Desyllas 
& Hughes, 2010), through access to its people, practices and intellectual property (Kapoor & 
Lim, 2007). This expansion of the knowledge base provides scale, scope and recombination 
benefits and improves the absorptive capacity of the acquiring firm increasing the number of 
elements of external knowledge that becomes available (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Makri et al., 
2010). These effects enhance the ability of the acquiring firm to introduce innovations 
continuously in the future. 
The potential risks of this strategy are (1) disruption of the routines of the target firm 
(Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Graebner, 2004; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007), (2) 
monitor replacement and thus aggravated moral hazard problems (Kapoor & Lim, 2007), and 
(3) excessive absorption of the managerial attention by the integration rather than innovation 
process (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, & Harrison, 1991; Hitt et al., 1996). 
However, empirical literature (Cassiman, Colombo, Garrone, & Veugelers, 2005; Makri et al., 
2010) finds that combining complementary technology assets of the acquiring and target firms 
has a positive impact on the innovation output of the acquirer. In addition, leveraging 
technological capabilities by combining the two knowledge bases can also create 
serendipitous value in the forms of new strategic ideas, improved product development 
techniques and unexpectedly useful technologies (Graebner, 2004). 
Technology commercialization 
 Another source of gains unique for technological M&A is profitable 
commercialization of the technology developed by the target firm by combining it with the 
specialized complementary non-technology assets of the acquiring firm. In order to 
understand the nature of this synergy, we first need to consider competitive dynamics and 
strategic choices available for different types of competitors in R&D-intensive industries. 
Competition in high-technology industry revolves around R&D policies, successes and 
failures (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Here, successful innovations followed by  technology 
commercialization enables firms to achieve growth and profitability through capturing 
existing and developing new markets, reducing costs, improving quality, learning from 
customers and accumulating the knowledge necessary for future innovation (Zahra & Nielsen, 
2002). Failure to do this quickly and on a large scale, makes the competitive position 
vulnerable in the face of imitators and new entrants (Dosi, 1988; Henderson & Clark, 1990; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986). 
 Abernathy and Utterback (1978) model of technological development suggests that 
there are two stages of product competition in R&D-intensive industries. First, there is 
competition around prospective product designs. This is essentially the competition among 
inventors who envisage and develop an innovative product or service with substantial market 
opportunity. Competing companies make a number of irreversible investment and design 
decisions facing substantial uncertainty regarding the future of the product in the market. 
Once the dominant product design emerges, the focus of competition shifts towards gaining 
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scale in order to capture maximum value from the product innovation in the mass market. At 
this second stage of product competition, access to complementary manufacturing, 
distribution, service and finance are crucial (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986; Zahra & 
Nielsen, 2002). 
We commonly observe that the are two major groups of competing inventors in high-
technology industries: (1) large established companies and (2) small innovative start-up firms 
(Dosi, 1988). Small technology-based start-ups are better positioned to invent new 
prospective products (Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). Particularly, they have less bureaucratic 
controls (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and associated risk-aversion, stronger links between 
rewards and performance (Kapoor & Lim, 2007), innovative culture (Reve, 2011). By 
contrast, established firms possess the complementary manufacturing, marketing and financial 
assets (Puranam & Srikanth, 2007), access to suppliers and distribution channels, 
complementary technologies.  
 Given the abovementioned, established firms in R&D-intensive industries have to 
choose between three generic innovation strategies: (1) internal R&D, (2) strategic R&D 
alliances and (3) acquisition of targets possessing the needed technology. Internal R&D 
process tends to be time-consuming, path-dependent and uncertain (Puranam & Srikanth, 
2007). Moreover, established firms have the mentioned organizational disadvantages in terms 
of their ability to innovate internally.  
In these circumstances, strategic R&D alliances can be preferred to technological 
acquisitions only as long as the partners can effectively manage the dilemma of knowledge-
sharing and protection (McEvily, Eisenhardt, & Prescott, 2004). This often requires limiting 
the scope of the alliance (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). At the same time, successful technology 
commercialization requires cross-functional teams having some experience of working 
together with gatekeepers disseminating information from other business areas and project 
leaders with significant power in the organization (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995). Such teams 
are problematic to form if the scope of alliance is narrow. Moreover, successful product 
commercialization involves cooperation in R&D, manufacturing, marketing, after-sales 
service (Teece, 1986), which also requires broad alliances. When the opportunities to develop 
new products internally or in alliances are limited, as in the mentioned cases, technological 
M&A become the preferable innovation strategy for established firms in R&D-intensive 
industries. 
Simultaneously, technological M&A add value to the innovations developed by small 
start-up firms that lack the complementary assets needed for their commercialization 
(Granstrand & Sjolander, 1990; Teece, 1986). Once an innovation is developed, the start-up 
firm has several alternative strategies to capture value from it. One strategy is technology 
licensing. However, it is feasible only as long as the start-up can effectively protect the 
technology from imitation by the established firms for a relatively long period and 
complementary assets are in competitive supply. Otherwise, imitators or complementary asset 
suppliers will appropriate most of the profits associated with the innovation. If the 
complementary assets are not in the competitive supply, then the potential hold-up problems 
make the start-up to either build the needed assets, a costly and time-consuming option, or sell 
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the business to capture maximum value from the technology. Otherwise, the suppliers are in a 
better position to appropriate most of the value. If the start-up cannot effectively protect the 
innovation from imitation, then selling the business to an established firm, which has the 
complementary assets needed to commercialize and profit from the technology before 
imitators follow becomes the best strategic option for the start-up company (Teece, 1986). 
Established firms in high-technology industries have two additional strategic options. 
First, they can turn the acquired firm into a relative autonomous subsidiary that will function 
as a long-run research engine (Puranam et al., 2006). This will create long-term economies of 
scope arising from the relative advantages of the parent company and its R&D-subsidiary in 
commercializing and developing new technologies provided that the acquiring firm can 
minimize adverse selection problems when picking the targets (Graebner, 2004) as well as 
retain and motivate the key inventors in the target firm (Ernst & Vitt, 2000; Kapoor & Lim, 
2007). Second, the acquiring firm does not necessarily have to develop the target’s technology. 
It can simply run it to the “grave” and in this way remove a potential competitor. This is likely 
to result in the increased market power of the acquiring firm. 
2.3. Hypotheses 
Since non-technological M&A do not provide technology inputs for the acquiring firm, 
the latter cannot benefit from the economies of scope and scale in technology development 
and commercialization discussed in previous section. At the same time, nothing prevents the 
acquiring firms in technological M&A from benefiting on average from the productive 
efficiency gains, increased market power and financial synergies available for their 
counterparts in non-technological deals. 
Further, given that the degree of asset complementarity varies across the potential 
bidders due to the path dependent process of developing capabilities and different market 
positioning, the value of the target’s technology should also vary for different bidders. This 
leads to an asymmetrically competitive bidding process, where the acquiring firm is able to 
capture the value of synergies. Hence, the acquiring firms are better positioned to create and 
capture value for their shareholders in technological than in non-technological M&A. This 
leads to Hypothesis T1. 
Hypothesis T1. Acquirers in technological M&A are expected to create higher 
shareholders’ value than acquirers in non-technological M&A 
 This increase in the shareholder’s value created by technological M&A comes 
primarily from the economies of scope and scale in the R&D function of the combined firm 
that manifest in the improved operating performance. By contrast, the opportunities to 
improve operating performance in non-technological M&A through the economies of scale, 
the economies of scope and increase in the market power are limited. First, the opportunities 
to benefit from the increased market power are limited by antitrust regulations (Eckbo, 1983) 
and disappear quickly due to competitive entries, product-market redefinitions and regulatory 
changes that happen continuously in many modern industries (Capron, Dussage, & Mitchell, 
1998). Consistently, numerous empirical studies (Eckbo, 1983; Seth, 1990; Fee & Thomas, 
2004; Shahrur, 2005) do not find significant market power effects on the M&A performance. 
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Second, the economies of scale and scope in production, marketing and distribution require 
persistent underutilization of these assets, a condition that holds predominantly in declining 
industries and makes these sources of gains in non-technological M&A generally scarce 
(Anand & Singh, 1997). Consistently, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) in their study of 
manufacturing industries do not find significant improvements in the operating performance 
following M&A. This leads to Hypothesis T2. 
Hypothesis T2. Acquirers in technological M&A have larger improvements in 
operating performance than acquirers in non-technological M&A after the deal 
completion. 
 The above differences in the realized operating performance should lead to 
corresponding differences in the realized overall financial performance: 
Hypothesis T3. Acquirers in technological M&A realize higher overall financial 
performance than acquirers in non-technological M&A after the deal completion. 
Prior research on technological M&A generally views them as a means for leveraging 
innovation capabilities of the acquiring firm and in this way achieve superior performance 
(Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Graebner, 2004; Puranam et al., 2006). However, Hitt et al. (1991) 
argue that technological M&A merely substitute the internal R&D of the acquiring firm. 
Comparing the changes in the R&D intensity of the acquiring firms in technological and non-
technological M&A after the deal completion allows testing whether acquirers in 
technological M&As invest in further technology development. If the acquiring firms use 
technological M&A as purely a means to substitute internal R&D and merely exploit the 
technology developed by the target firm, we should not expect any difference in the changes 
in the R&D-intensity between the acquirers in technological and non-technological M&A 
after the deal as the first will invest in M&A instead of R&D. In the previous section, we 
argued that both leveraging innovation and the target’s technology exploitation are important 
sources of value creation in technological M&A. Hence, we advance the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis T4. Acquirers in technological M&A spend more on R&D than acquirers 
in non-technological M&A after the deal completion. 
2.4. Methods 
2.4.1. Sample 
 My sample of M&A comes from Zephyr database of M&A provided by Bureau van 
Dijk. It contains detailed deal and company information, including: announcement and 
completion dates, deal type, deal value, deal financing, method of payment, deal rationale, 
initial and acquired stakes, company identifying information such as ticker symbols, SIC 
codes and country codes. Zephyr database encompasses M&A that have been announced in 
the period from January 1997.  
I extract all transactions characterized by Zephyr as acquisitions, M&A and 
institutional buy-outs that were announced between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2012 
and that had been completed by US acquirers before December 31, 2012. This results in a 
preliminary sample of 75246 observations. However, I need a five year history of M&A 
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activity to measure M&A experience, which reduces my sample to the period from January 1, 
2002 to December 31, 2012 with 61428 observations. 
I am interested only in the transactions that result in obtaining the controlling interest 
in the target firm, i.e. those with the initial stake of less than 50% and the stake after the deal 
of 51% or more. 55787 transactions satisfy the criteria. 
 Further, I require the acquirer be a publicly traded company with the stock price data 
available in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database 252 trading days 
before deal announcement and 10 days after the deal announcement. To match data with 
Zephyr database I use company ticker symbols. This procedure leaves 2889 observations. 
 In addition, I require the acquirer have data available from COMPUSTAT one fiscal 
year before the announcement and at least one fiscal year following the announcement. Again, 
I use ticker symbols for matching databases. This trims the sample further to 2000 
observations. 
 Finally, I restrict the sample to deals whose value exceeds 1% of the market cap of the 
acquiring firms 11 trading days before announcement (Harford, Humphery-Jenner, & Powell, 
2012). As a result, 1004 observations remain in the effective sample (see Table 3.1 for an 
overview of the sampling procedure). 
TABLE 3.1 
The Number of M&A Announced and Completed by US Publicly Traded Acquirers 
The column labeled “Announced” lists the number of M&A announced in the given year by 
US publicly traded companies. The column labeled “Completed” lists the number of 
transactions completed in the given year. The column labeled “Data” indicates the number of 
M&A that resulted in gaining the controlling interest in the target firm and satisfy the data 
availability criteria for the acquirers. The column labeled “Sample” lists the 1271 transactions 
that also satisfy the other sampling criteria. The columns labeled “Data” and “Sample” are 
based on the announcement year. 
Year Announced Completed Data Sample 
2002 298 217 2 1 
2003 369 333 51 22 
2004 420 423 316 161 
2005 433 418 324 162 
2006 472 446 307 143 
2007 520 563 269 140 
2008 323 386 211 92 
2009 276 260 151 71 
2010 325 309 201 115 
2011 315 311 168 97 
2012 254 300 0 0 
     
Total 4005 3966 2000 1004 
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2.4.2. Distinction between technological and non-technological M&A 
 Following the prior research, I define technological M&A as acquisitions of high-
technology targets with technology being a part of the acquired assets (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; 
Graebner, 2004; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). I operationalize this 
definition using the following algorithm. 
 Firstly, I identify high-technology targets using the three-digit SIC code combinations 
recommended by Kile and Phillips (2009) for sampling high-technology firms. These include: 
283 (drugs), 357 (Computer and Office Equipment), 366 (Communication Equipment), 367 
(Electronic Components and Accessories), 382 (Laboratory, Optic, Measure, Control 
Instruments), 384 (Surgical, Medical, Dental Instruments), 481 (Telephone Communications), 
482 (Miscellaneous Communication Services), 489 (Communication Services, NEC), 737 
(Computer Programming, Data Processing), 873 (Research, Development, Testing Services). 
Kile and Phillips (2009) have shown that these codes, commonly used to identify high-tech 
firms in empirical research, most closely match their classification benchmark based on the 
descriptions of the firms’ revenue generating processes and business operations. 354 targets in 
my sample satisfy this criterion. 
 Secondly, prior research argues that technology manifests in patents, which represent 
its outcomes (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 2010). Thus, I require 
that targets in technological M&A have registered at least 1 patent before the announcement 
date. This requirement is consistent with prior research on technological M&A (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001; Puranam et al., 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007) and reflects the requirement 
that technology be part of the acquired assets. I use Orbis database provided by Bureau van 
Dijk for tracking the patenting activity of the target firm. I match the data on patents with the 
sample using the unique target BvD ID numbers common for Zephyr and Orbis databases. In 
my sample, 187 targets had registered at least 1 patent before the acquisition. 
 Finally, Ahuja and Katila (2001) recognize that not all technologies are patentable and 
use news stories associated with the M&A in their sample to check whether some non-
patented technology was a part of the acquired assets. I follow a similar approach and check 
the deal rationales provided by Zephyr database mention “technology”, “R&D”, or 
“innovation” of the target firm as motivating factors for or components of the acquired assets. 
Then I classify M&A as technological if the target has a high-technology SIC code and either 
has some patenting activity before the announcement or technology was reported to be part of 
the deal motivation or acquired assets. 356 out of 1106 transactions in the sample report 
technology, R&D, and innovation capabilities as a motivation or part of the acquired assets. 
The total number of M&A classified as technological is 249 (see Table 3.2 for a more detailed 
sample distribution). 
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TABLE 3.2 
Sample Distribution by Year and Type of M&A 
This table contains the time-series distribution of a sample of M&A conducted by US publicly 
traded companies in 2002-2011 from Zephyr. The transactions are classified into years based 
on announcement dates. The column labeled “All deals” lists the number of M&A in a given 
year that are included into the sample. The column labeled “Technological” lists the number 
of deals from the sample where the target operated in a high-tech industry, as defined by (Kile 
& Phillips, 2009) based on its 3-digit SIC code, and either the target had at least one patent in 
the fiscal year preceding the acquisition or “technology”, “R&D”, and “innovation” were 
reported as part of the deal motivation. The column labeled “Non-technological” indicates the 
number of M&A that do not satisfy the abovementioned classification criteria. 
Year All deals Technological Non-
technological 
2002 1 1 0 
2003 22 5 17 
2004 161 28 133 
2005 162 33 129 
2006 143 36 107 
2007 140 38 102 
2008 92 27 65 
2009 71 20 51 
2010 115 32 83 
2011 97 29 68 
    
Total 1004 249 755 
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2.4.3. Measures 
 Table 3.3 provides the list and definition of variables that I use in this study and 
describe below. 
TABLE 3.3 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
CAR (3,5,11) 3(5 or 11)-day cumulative abnormal returns to acquirers, calculated using the 
market model. I estimate the market model parameters over days (-262,-11) 
using an OLS model 
ACAR (3,5,11) 3(5 or 11)-day cumulative abnormal returns to acquirers, calculated using the 
market-adjusted model. 
ROA (1,2,3) Industry- and premerger-adjusted return on assets in fiscal years 1, 2, and 3 
following the completion year 0: item ni (t)/ average item at (t) and at (t-1) 
OCF/S (1,2,3) Industry- and premerger-adjusted operating cash flow to sales in fiscal years 1, 
2, and 3 following the completion year 0: item oancf (t)/ item sale (t) 
EBITDA/S 
(1,2,3) 
Industry- and premerger-adjusted EBITDA to sales in fiscal years 1, 2, and 3 
following the completion year 0: item ebitda (t)/ item sale (t) 
R&D/S Industry and premerger adjusted R&D intensity in years + 1, + 2, + 3 relative to 
the completion year (0): item xrd (t)/ item sale (t) 
  
Independent variable 
Tech Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for technological M&A. The deals 
are classified as technological if the target has the three-digit SIC suggested by 
Kile and Phillips (2009) for sampling high-technology firms ( 283 (drugs), 357 
(Computer and Office Equipment), 366 (Communication Equipment), 367 
(Electronic Components and Accessories), 382 (Laboratory, Optic, Measure, 
Control Instruments), 384 (Surgical, Medical, Dental Instruments), 481 
(Telephone Communications), 482 (Miscellaneous Communication Services), 
489 (Communication Services, NEC), 737 (Computer Programming, Data 
Processing), 873 (Research, Development, Testing Services)) and has either 
registered at least one patent before the announcement date or technology is 
reported as part of the deal motivation. 
  
Control variables 
Experience Number of M&A conducted by the acquirer during five years before the focal 
deal 
All cash Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the consideration has been paid 100% 
with cash 
All stock Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the whole consideration has been paid 
with common shares of the acquiring company 
Relative size Deal value reported by Zephyr to the market cap of the acquiring firm on day – 
11 relative to the announcement date obtained from CRSP 
Leverage The sum of long-term debt (dltt item) and debt in current liabilities (dlc item) to 
the common equity (ceq) of the acquiring firm 
Related Dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if the two-digit SIC codes of the 
acquired and target are the same 
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Dependent variables. Cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CARs) represent 
gains to the shareholders upon M&A announcement. They are commonly used as a measure 
of expected M&A performance (Bargeron et al., 2008; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; 
Harford et al., 2012; Seth et al., 2002; Zollo & Meier, 2008). To construct the variable I use 
daily return data for each of the acquirers from CRSP. Following the event study 
methodology (MacKinlay, 1997), I estimate CARs as sums of the market model residuals 
over a given event window: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ��𝑅𝑖𝑡 − �𝛼�𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡��𝑇
𝑡=𝜏
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖is the cumulative abnormal return for transaction 𝑖, event window 𝑡𝜖[𝜏,𝑇], 𝑅𝑖𝑡  
stands for the acquirer’s return for transaction 𝑖  and day 𝑡 , the term �𝛼�𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡�  is the 
expected return predicted by the market model. I estimate the market model parameters by the 
OLS regression over the estimation window from trading day – 262 to day – 11 relative to the 
deal announcement date (0):  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  stands for the acquirer’s return for transaction 𝑖 and day 𝑡 , 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the daily return 
to the CRSP value-weighted market index. For robustness, I use three event windows (all 
dates are trading days relative to the announcement date (0)): day - 1 to day + 1, day - 2 to day 
+ 2, day - 5 to day + 5. Further, I denote CARs corresponding to the event windows listed 
above as CAR (3), CAR (5) and CAR (11). 
For robustness, I complement the market model based cumulated abnormal returns 
(CARs) with the market-adjusted model based ones. The market adjusted model assumes the 
intercept of 0 and beta value of 1. Inclusion of these abnormal return measures is aimed to 
account for biases in the estimated beta coefficients. I denote the market-adjusted model 
based abnormal returns corresponding to the three event windows as ACAR (3), ACAR (5) 
and ACAR (11). 
CARs and ACARs as measures of M&A performance have the underlying assumption 
that the stock market quickly and rationally infers the future performance of a merger from all 
the public information available at its announcement. As long as this assumption holds, the 
cumulative abnormal returns possess significant advantages over accounting measures of 
performance: (1) they reflect all aspects of performance, (2) they “see through” managerial 
attempts to manage earnings, (3) they are objectively reported and (4) they are adjusted for 
the market performance and the firm’s market risk (Chatterjee et al., 1992). Moreover, they 
have been shown to be correlated with ex post performance measures, which indicates their 
predictive validity (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). However, this performance measure has 
several shortcomings. By construction, CARs and ACARs do not incorporate the material 
information released after the announcement and measure expected rather than actual 
performance. 
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By contrast, return on assets (ROA) captures the realized overall financial performance of 
M&A (Delong & Deyoung, 2007). The data I use to calculate all the accounting measures in 
this study comes from COMPUSTAT. I calculate ROA as the ratio of Net Income (ni item in 
COMPUSTAT) to the average Total Assets (at item) in the fiscal years + 1, + 2, + 3 relative 
to the completion year (0). I normalize both ratios by subtracting industry-average and 
premerger (fiscal year - 1) values of these ratios (Delong & Deyoung, 2007; Healy et al., 
1992). I use 2-digit SIC codes to identify industry for this purpose. 
However, ROA is sensitive to the acquisition accounting methods, capital structure, 
depreciation, the practices to restate earnings and assets (Healy et al., 1992; Kusewitt, 1985). 
When using this measure, it is also difficult to separate the impact of extraneous factors 
(Anand & Singh, 1997). Thus, I use also operating income and operating cash flow based 
measures of performance, which are less sensitive to variations in accounting practices and 
capital structure. 
Operating cash flow to sales (OCF/S) is a measure of operating synergies standardized 
by sales that is unaffected by depreciation, goodwill, interest payments and the method of 
accounting for acquisition (Anand & Singh, 1997; Fee & Thomas, 2004; Heron & Lie, 2002). 
Following prior research (Delong & Deyoung, 2007; Fee & Thomas, 2004; Healy et al., 1992), 
I calculate OCF/S as the industry- and premerger-adjusted ratio of Operating Activities Net 
Cash Flow (oancf) item to Sales (sale) item in the fiscal years + 1, + 2, + 3 relative to the 
completion year (0). 
Operating income (EBITDA) to sales (EBITDA/S) is another measure of operating 
synergies standardized by sales that is used in M&A performance research (Heron & Lie, 
2002). I calculate EBITDA/S as the industry- and premerger-adjusted ratio of EBITDA 
(ebitda) item to Sales (sale) item in the fiscal years + 1, + 2, + 3 relative to the completion 
year (0). 
M&A can be viewed as a source of innovation (Hitt et al., 1991; Hitt et al., 1996; 
Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003), which makes it a critical aspect of performance. In this study, 
I focus on innovation inputs. 
R&D-intensity (R&D/S) is a measure of innovation inputs (Hitt et al., 1991). I 
calculate R&D intensity as industry and premerger adjusted ratio of R&D expenses (xrd item) 
to Sales (sale) item in COMPUSTAT in years + 1, + 2, + 3 relative to the completion year (0). 
Independent variable. I use a dummy variable (Tech) which takes the value of 1 for 
M&A classified as technological following the algorithm developed in the previous section as 
the independent variable in this study. Alternatively, I could have defined the independent 
variable as one taking different discrete values reflecting the relative importance of 
technology as the value driver. But this would require assigning weights to different factors 
like the number of patents, the size of the target firm, etc. In the absence of a valid procedure 
to accomplish this, I follow the established approach of separating two categories of M&A: 
technological and non-technological (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Kohers & Kohers, 2001; 
Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010). 
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Control variables. I control for several acquirer, target and deal characteristics that 
may influence M&A performance. 
Recent M&A experience is the number of M&A conducted by the acquiring firm prior 
to the focal deal. A number of studies (Bruton et al., 1994; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Puranam et al., 2006; Zollo & Singh, 2004) report “learning-
by-doing” effect in M&A that manifests in superior target selection, deal execution and 
integration capabilities of frequent acquirers. I use data from Zephyr to count the number of 
M&A completed by the acquirers over the five year period preceding the focal deal. 
Method of payment classifies deals in the sample into three categories: all cash 
offerings, all stock offerings, and other offerings based on the data from Zephyr. The choice 
of the method of payment can reflect the acquirer’s uncertainty about the value of synergies 
and relative overvaluation of the acquirer’s equity (Martin, 1996; Myers & Majluf, 1984; 
Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). Both lead to more favorable 
valuations of all cash offerings relative to M&A where a part of the consideration is paid in 
stock. Consistently, empirical literature finds a “hierarchy of announcement returns” where 
M&A paid for with stock significantly underperform all cash offerings (Fuller et al., 2002; 
Mitchell et al., 2004; Savor & Lu, 2009; Travlos, 1987; Walker, 2000). 
Relative size is measured as the ratio of the deal value reported by Zephyr to the 
market cap of the acquiring firm on day – 11 relative to the announcement date obtained from 
CRSP (Harford et al., 2012). Prior literature shows that larger acquisitions suffer from worse 
monitoring abilities of the acquiring firm (Kang & Kim, 2008) and are characterized by 
higher risks (Hackbarth & Morellec, 2008). Consistently, it is observed a negative correlation 
between relative size and announcement returns (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). 
Leverage is measured as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt (dltt item in 
COMPUSTAT) and debt in current liabilities (dlc item) to the common equity (ceq) of the 
acquiring firm (Duchin & Schmidt, 2013) in the fiscal year preceding the acquisition. Prior 
literature argues that high leverage serves as an effective monitoring device (Maloney et al., 
1993) and a means to align managerial incentives with shareholder value maximization 
(Jensen, 1986). Empirical studies find a positive relationship between leverage and 
announcement returns to the acquiring company (Harford et al., 2012). 
Relatedness in M&A literature serves as a measure strategic fit between the acquiring 
and target firm (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987) and is 
widely argued to create opportunities for achieving economies of scale and scope (Barney, 
2011; Porter, 1980; Rumelt, 1979; Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1979). Several studies find a 
positive relationship between relatedness and M&A performance (Anand & Singh, 1997; 
Walker, 2000). Following prior literature (Anand & Singh, 1997; Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; 
Chang, 1998; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Eckbo, 1983; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Fuller et al., 
2002; Walker, 2000), I define relatedness as a dummy variable with the value of 1 for related 
M&A and 0 for unrelated ones, where M&A are classified as related if 2-digit SIC codes of 
the acquiring and the target firms coincide. 
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2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Expected performance of technological and non-technological M&A 
 Hypothesis T1 predicts that the cumulative abnormal returns to the acquiring firm 
shareholders around the deal announcement will be higher for technological M&A than non-
technological M&A. Table 3.4 displays means and medians of the cumulated abnormal 
returns to the acquiring firm in the two types of M&A and differences between them. 
Empirical evidence presented in Table 3.4 strongly supports the prediction of the Hypothesis 
T1. 
Generally, means and medians of cumulated abnormal returns are significantly 
different from zero. Exceptions are abnormal returns measured over the event window from -
5 to +5 days around the announcement: CAR (11) and ACAR (11) whose medians are 
positive but not significant. The mean CAR (11) for non-technological M&A is also positive 
but not significant. However, one can expect this in the semi-strongly efficient US stock 
market. 
 More importantly, all the differences between the mean cumulated abnormal returns 
are statistically significant. While the mean and median cumulated abnormal return are all 
positive for technological M&A, they are negative for non-technological M&A over the 
windows from -1 to +1 and from -2 to + 2 trading days. Moreover, the differences in means 
over these two event windows are highly significant at 1% level. Over the event window from 
-5 to +5 trading days around the announcement, the mean abnormal acquirers’ returns are still 
significantly higher (10% level) for technological M&A. The economic magnitude of the 
difference in mean returns ranges from 0.9 to 1.4 percentage points depending on the measure 
and event window used. This indicates that the stock market demonstrates a significantly 
more favorable reaction on the announcement of technological M&A than on the 
announcement of non-technological ones. 
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TABLE 3.4 
Acquirer Cumulated Abnormal Announcement Returns By Merger Type 
This table contains means and medians (in brackets) of various measures of acquirer abnormal 
returns upon merger announcement classified by merger type (“Technological” and “Non-
technological” columns) and their differences between the two types (“Difference” column). 
The column “Variable” lists the measures of the abnormal returns used in this study. CARs 
are the sums of the acquirer’s daily raw market model residuals over a given event window. 
The number of days in the event window is shown in brackets and includes the announcement 
date as the middle day. Market model parameters are estimated by OLS regression over the 
period from -262 to -11 trading days. ACARs are the sums of the acquirer’s daily raw market-
adjusted model residuals over a given event window.***, **, and * indicate that mean, 
median abnormal returns and their differences between the two merger type are significant at 
1, 5 and 10% level correspondently (t-test is used for means, Wilcoxon rank test for medians, 
and Welch F-test for differences in means). Abnormal returns are presented in %. 
 
Further, it is necessary to verify that the significant differences between the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns to the acquiring firm in technological and non-technological 
M&A are not driven by other characteristics of the deal, acquirer or target.  
Prior research indicates that acquirers’ announcement returns are correlated with the 
acquirer’s recent M&A experience, the deal price relative to the acquirer’s market value, the 
acquirer’s leverage, method of payment, relatedness and existence of blockholders. Table 3.5 
compares these characteristics between technological and non-technological M&A. 
Variable Technological Non technological Difference 
CAR(3) 0.894** -0.321*** 1.216*** 
 (0.158*) (-0.215***) (-0.057) 
CAR(5) 0.996*** -0.436*** 1.431*** 
 (0.192**) (-0.239***) (0.430) 
CAR(11) 1.198** 0.000 1.189* 
 (0.322) (0.040) (0.283) 
ACAR(3) 0.996*** -0.223** 1.219*** 
 (0.250**) (-0.110**) (0.360) 
ACAR(5) 1.120*** -0.230* 1.350*** 
 (0.294**) (-0.038) (0.332) 
ACAR(11) 1.405** 0.470** 0.935* 
 (0.364) (0.176) (0.188) 
Number of 
observations 
249 755  
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TABLE 3.5 
Acquirer, Deal and Target Characteristics by Merger Type 
This table contains means and medians (in brackets) for various acquirer deal and target 
characteristics for technological M&A, non-technological M&A and difference between the 
two deal types. The column “Variable” lists characteristics, which are defined in Table 3.*** 
and ** indicate whether the means of the two groups are significantly different based on the 
Welch F-test at 1% and 5% levels correspondently 
 
Table 3.5 shows that acquirers in technological M&A are significantly (at 1% level) 
more experienced with the average of 11.7 acquisitions completed during 5 years before the 
focal deal compared to the mean of 7.73 for the non-technological deals. The difference in 
medians is much smaller though with 50% of acquirers in technological M&A having 
completed 6 deals versus 5 for non-technological. The relative size of the deal is lower for 
technological transactions with the mean of 5.3% versus 7.4% for non-technological deals. 
However, the difference is not statistically significant. Finally, the proportion of related 
transactions of 41.6% is much higher in technological deals than that of 26.8% for non-
technological ones. These three factors potentially can drive the positive difference in 
announcement returns between technological and non-technological M&A. 
Variable Technological Non technological Difference 
Recent M&A 
Experience 
11.710 7.730 3.980*** 
 (6.000) (5.000) (1.000) 
Relative size 0.053 0.074 -0.021 
 (0.018) (0.037) (-0.019) 
Leverage 0.198 0.229 -0.031** 
 (0.180) (0.208) (-0.028) 
All cash 104 343  
% 42.450 46.100  
All stock 5 14  
% 2.040 1.880  
Other 136 387  
% 55.510 52.020  
Related 102 199  
% 41.630 26.750  
Blockholders 239 715  
% 97.550 96.100  
Number of 
observations 
249 755  
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By contrast, acquirers in technological M&A have the average leverage of 20% that is 
significantly (at 5% level) lower than that of 23% for non-technological acquirers. Further, 
there is a lower proportion of all cash financed deals (42.5% vs. 46%) and a higher proportion 
of all stock financed deals (2% vs. 1.9%) among the technological M&A. These differences 
are inconsistent with the finding of significantly higher acquirers’ returns in technological 
M&A. 
Taken together, my univariate comparisons of the above characteristics are 
inconclusive whether the difference in acquirers’ returns can be explained by factors other 
that technological vs. non-technological deal distinction. 
To investigate this possibility further, I estimate ordinary least squares regressions in 
which I use the six return measures defined in Table 3.3 as the dependent variables. The 
indicator variable of interest is whether the merger is technological. Thus, the constant term 
represents the category of non-technological M&A. The other explanatory/control variables 
include: relative size, leverage, recent M&A experience, dummies for relatedness, all cash 
financed, all stock financed M&A, and existence of blockholders among the acquirer’s 
owners. They have all been defined in previous section and are standard in M&A literature. In 
all regressions, I use heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Table 3.6 summarizes the 
results of the regression analysis. 
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TABLE 3.6 
Multivariate Regressions Explaining Acquirer Returns 
This table contains the results of multivariate OLS regressions of acquirer announcement 
returns. All variables are defined in Table 3.3 and explained in the previous section. t- 
statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate that regression coefficients are significantly 
different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level correspondently. 
 CAR (1) CAR (2) CAR (5) ACAR (1) ACAR (2) ACAR (5) 
Const -0.008 -0.021*** -0.033*** -0.002 -0.012* -0.013 
 (-1.557) (-2.856) (-2.880) (-0.471) (-1.756) (-1.278) 
Tech 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.014** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.012* 
 (4.221) (4.076) (2.099) (4.374) (3.968) (1.823) 
Relative size 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.200) (0.884) (-1.927) (0.169) (0.748) (-1.943) 
Leverage 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.005 
 (1.301) (0.658) (0.630) (0.899) (0.447) (0.308) 
Experience -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** 
 (-0.838) (-0.594) (-2.471) (-1.414) (-1.379) (-3.284) 
Related -0.006** -0.007** -0.010* -0.007*** -0.006** -0.009 
 (-2.452) (-2.445) (-1.810) (-2.754) (-2.227) (-1.633) 
All cash 0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.816) (1.133) (-0.607) (0.752) (0.927) (-0.633) 
All stock 0.010 0.010 0.026 0.013** 0.011 0.024 
 (1.508) (0.912) (1.376) (2.208) (1.158) (1.369) 
Blockholders 0.003 0.016** 0.040*** 0.001 0.011* 0.027*** 
 (0.831) (2.455) (3.839) (0.127) (1.730) (2.868) 
Observations 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 
𝑅2 0.038 0.034 0.022 0.041 0.031 0.022 Adjusted 𝑅2 0.030 0.026 0.013 0.033 0.023 0.014 
F-stat 4.680 4.259 2.640 5.085 3.847 2.654 
P(F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.007 
  
All the regression models are highly significant. Moreover, the coefficients on the 
technological M&A indicator variable are significantly positive. They show that acquiring 
firm’s shareholders gain from 1.41% to 1.6% higher returns upon the deal announcement in 
technological than in non-technological deals, and that the differences in the stock returns are 
robust to alternative explanations, the normal return model specifications and different event 
windows. 
The coefficients on the control variables on Table 3.6 generally have signs and 
significance levels that are consistent with the prior research. The two exceptions are the 
coefficients on the experience, which are negative, and relatedness, which are negative and 
generally significant. However, King et al. (2004) show in their meta-analysis that on average 
experience has not been found significant. Also, Hayward (2002) shows that the effect of 
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experience is moderated by time and performance of prior acquisitions. Here I measure 
experience over a five-year period preceding the focal deal, which is shorter than that used in 
previous research. Neither control I for prior acquisition performance. All these factors can 
potentially explain the findings. I identify related deals by the overlap of the two-digit SIC 
codes. This measure is imperfect in at least two ways. First, it enables us to identify primarily 
horizontal M&A. Their major source of synergy is the scale economies, which are shown to 
be limited and generally overvaluated (Seth et al., 2002). Second, it is unable to find the 
acquisitions of firms which operate in different industries but have related technologies (for 
example fish farming and biotech) and complementary products. Such deals can have a good 
strategic fit and yet be classified as unrelated. 
2.5.2. Realized financial performance of technological and non-technological M&A 
 Now I focus attention on the realized operating synergies and overall financial 
performance after the deal completion. Hypothesis T2 predicts that acquirers in technological 
M&A will have higher industry-adjusted operating performance compared to acquirers in 
non-technological M&A after the deal completion. Hypothesis T3 predicts that technological 
M&A will have higher industry-adjusted overall financial performance compared to acquirers 
in non-technological M&A after the deal completion. To test the hypotheses, I use the 
accounting performance measures summarize in Table 3.3. Table 3.7 displays industry-
adjusted means and medians of changes in ROA, Operating Cash Flow to Sales and EBITDA 
to Sales relative to the pre-merger levels. The empirical data presented in Table 3.7. supports 
the predictions. 
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TABLE 3.7 
ROA, Operating Cash Flow and EBITDA Scaled by Sales 
This table displays the industry-adjusted means and medians (reported in brackets) of changes 
in ROA, OCF to Sales and EBITDA to Sales in fiscal years +1, +2, and +3 relative to their 
pre-merger values. (1), (2) and (3) stand for fiscal year +1, +2 and +3 correspondently relative 
to the merger completion year 0. These changes are reported separately for Technological and 
Non-technological M&A. In addition, I report Differences between the two groups. I use t-test 
for significance of means and their differences between Technological and Non-technological 
M&A. I use Wilcoxon signed ranks test for significance of medians and Chi-square test for 
medians for significance of differences of medians between the two groups. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at levels of 1%, 5% and 10% correspondently. 
 
Generally, the means and medians are significantly positive for technological M&A. 
The only exception is the mean of change in ROA between year-1 and +3 relative to the deal 
completion year 0, which is positive but not significant. This indicates that acquirers in 
technological M&A demonstrate significantly higher operating and overall financial 
Variable Technological Non-technological Difference 
ROA(1) 0.013** 0.001 0.013* 
 (0.016***) (0.003***) (0.013***) 
ROA(2) 0.011* -0.001 0.012* 
 (0.021***) (0.003) (0.018**) 
ROA(3) 0.006 -0.001 0.007 
 (0.013***) (0.003**) (0.010**) 
OCF to SALES(1) 0.041*** 0.012 0.029** 
 (0.056***) (0.003) (0.053***) 
OCF to SALES(2) 0.046*** 0.011 0.035*** 
 (0.048***) (-0.000) (0.048***) 
OCF to SALES(3) 0.034*** 0.010 0.024* 
 (0.044***) (0.003) (0.040***) 
EBITDA to 
SALES(1) 
0.050*** 0.046 0.003 
 (0.054***) (0.008***) (0.046***) 
EBITDA to 
SALES(2) 
0.042*** 0.011* 0.031*** 
 (0.046***) (0.006**) (0.040***) 
EBITDA to 
SALES(3) 
0.036*** 0.000 0.035*** 
 (0.038***) (0.007) (0.031***) 
Number of 
observations 
249 755  
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performance than their counterparts from the same industry. Further, they suggest that their 
performance significantly improves relative to pre-merger levels and indicate that acquirers in 
technological M&A realize significant synergies. Moreover, medians are substantially larger 
than means, which strengthens this argument because non-parametric tests are shown to be 
significantly more powerful in studies of operating performance (Heron & Lie, 2002).  
By contrast, the means and medians are generally not significant for non-technological 
M&A. Exceptions are industry-adjusted changes in ROA from year -1 to year +1 and from 
year-1 to year +3 with significantly positive medians of 0.3%, industry-adjusted changes in 
EBITDA to Sales from year-1 to year +1 with the significantly positive median of 0.8% and 
in EBITDA to Sales from year -1 to year +2 with significantly positive mean of 1.1% and 
median of 0.6%. These results suggest that acquirers in non-technological M&A do not 
realize significant synergies and do not demonstrate higher than average industry performance. 
The differences in operating and overall financial performance between acquirers in 
technological and non-technological deals are statistically and economically significant.  The 
differences in the medians of industry-adjusted changes in ROA ranges from 1% to 1.8% 
across fiscal years +1, +2 and +3, in OCF to Sales – from 4% to 5.3%, and in EBITDA to 
Sales – from 3% to 4.5%. All the values are significant at 1% or 5% level. This supports the 
predictions that acquirers in technological M&A realize (1) higher operating synergies and (2) 
higher overall financial performance compared to acquirers in non-technological M&A. 
But I still need to investigate whether the reported differences in the realized financial 
performance are explained by some other deal, acquirer or target characteristics by regressing 
the above financial performance measure against the indicator variable which takes the value 
of 1 for technological M&A and the control variables identified in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.8 displays the results of the regression analyses. Though all the regressions are 
highly significant, the coefficients on the technological M&A indicator variable are not. This 
suggests the absence of significant differences in operating and overall financial performance 
of acquirers in technological and non-technological M&A once we account for alternative 
explanations. The signs and significance levels of the coefficients on the control variables are 
generally consistent with prior literature. Hence, the regression analysis does not provide 
support to Hypotheses T2 and T3. 
One reason behind the non-finding is likely to be that a three-year period is not long 
enough to realize the synergies in technological M&A. An example is the acquisition of 
FAST Search and Transfer company by Microsoft. It took 3 years to embed the enterprise 
search technology developed by FAST into Microsoft Office. This means that Microsoft will 
generate additional revenues only from fiscal year +4. In pharmaceuticals development cycles 
are even longer and may take up to 20 years before a new drug appears on the market. At the 
same time investments in R&D are made already from year +1, which may drag down the 
financial performance. 
However, I follow the prior literature examining the impact of M&A on the 
accounting performance (Heron & Lie, 2002) and do not extend the period beyond year +3 
because of the effects of subsequent corporate events on the financial performance. 
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TABLE 3.8 
Multiple Regressions of ROA, OCF and EBITDA Scaled by Sales 
This table presents the results of the regressions of industry-adjusted changes in ROA, OCF to Sales and EBITDA to Sales in fiscal years +1,+2 
and +3 after the deal completion year relative to their pre-merger levels. All variables are explained in Table 3.3. t-statistics are presented in 
brackets. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. All regressions use OLS estimation method and heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. 
 ROA (1) ROA (2) ROA (3) OCF/S (1) OCF/S(2) OCF/S (3) EBITDA/S(1) EBITDA/S(2) EBITDA/S(3) 
Const 0.009 0.009 0.019 -0.046* -0.021 0.015 -0.089** -0.028 -0.025 
 (0.300) (0.707) (1.098) (-1.754) (-1.101) (0.484) (-2.325) (-0.949) (-0.793) 
Tech 0.001 -0.000 -0.007 0.009 0.012 0.002 -0.000 0.012 0.014 
 (0.164) (-0.015) (-0.701) (0.811) (1.228) (0.171) (-0.013) (1.356) (1.213) 
Relative size 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.182) (-1.920) (-1.699) (-1.720) (0.223) (-1.184) (-0.028) (-0.195) (-0.843) 
Leverage -0.096*** -0.114*** -0.055** -0.051 -0.087* -0.126** 0.203 -0.000 -0.041 
 (-4.569) (-6.130) (-2.294) (-0.850) (-1.777) (-2.321) (1.109) (-0.007) (-0.784) 
Experience 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (6.604) (6.489) (7.204) (5.463) (6.539) (7.636) (1.151) (9.017) (7.376) 
Relatedness 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.032** 0.034*** 0.021* -0.020 0.016* 0.012 
 (1.396) (0.210) (0.002) (2.430) (3.289) (1.687) (-0.639) (1.665) (0.864) 
All cash 0.016** 0.005 0.009 -0.016 -0.008 -0.003 -0.044 -0.021** -0.002 
 (2.240) (0.782) (1.113) (-1.036) (-0.735) (-0.262) (-0.978) (-2.270) (-0.107) 
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All stock 0.019 0.005 -0.020 0.022 0.014 0.086** 0.007 0.074** 0.077** 
 (1.293) (0.259) (-0.513) (0.736) (0.495) (2.097) (0.177) (2.552) (2.429) 
Blockholders -0.010 0.001 -0.031** 0.047* 0.021 -0.014 0.106 0.023 0.009 
 (-0.357) (0.120) (-1.947) (1.659) (1.293) (-0.477) (1.620) (0.823) (0.295) 
Observations 967 828 706 967 827 706 967 827 706 
𝑅2 0.078 0.088 0.072 0.028 0.067 0.081 0.004 0.076 0.049 Adjusted 𝑅2 0.070 0.079 0.062 0.020 0.058 0.070 -0.005 0.067 0.038 
F-statistic 10.077 9.831 6.797 3.401 7.344 7.634 0.437 8.352 4.521 
P(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.899 0.000 0.000 
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2.5.3. Innovation 
Hypothesis T4 predicts that acquirers in technological M&A will have higher post-
merger R&D-intensity relative to the pre-merger levels and industry peers than acquirers in  
non-technological M&A as they will focus on extracting the maximum value from the target’s 
technology assets through innovation. The evidence summarized in Table 3.9 supports the 
prediction. 
For technological M&A the means and medians of industry and pre-merger adjusted 
R&D expenses to Sales ratios are generally positive and significant for year +3 (see Table 
3.9). This means that acquirers in technological M&A invest more in R&D than other 
companies in the same two-digit SIC code industry and themselves prior to the focal M&A. 
The only exception is the non-significant negative median for year +1. For non-technological 
M&A all the medians are negative but not significant. The means are negative and non-
significant for years +1, +2 and significantly positive for year +3. 
The differences in means are positive and significant for years +2 and +3 and positive 
but not significant for year +1, which shows that acquirers in technological M&A invest 
significantly more in technology development after the deal than acquirers in non-
technological M&A and supports the argument that leveraging innovation capabilities is a 
major driver for value creation in technological M&A.  
TABLE 3.9 
Industry and Pre-merger Adjusted R&D to Sales Ratios by Deal Type  
This table displays the industry-adjusted means and medians (reported in brackets) of changes 
in R&D to Sales in fiscal years +1, +2, and +3 relative to their pre-merger values. (1), (2) and 
(3) stand for fiscal year +1, +2 and +3 correspondently relative to the merger completion year 
0. These changes are reported separately for Technological and Non-technological M&A. In 
addition, I report Differences between the two groups. I use t-test for significance of means 
and their differences between Technological and Non-technological M&A. I use Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test for significance of medians and Chi-square test for medians for significance 
of differences of medians between the two groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
levels of 1%, 5% and 10% correspondently. 
 
 
Variable Technological Non-technological Difference 
R&D to SALES(1) 0.411 -0.317 0.728 
 (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.000) 
R&D to SALES(2) 0.743 -0.899 1.642** 
 (0.004) (-0.001) (0.005) 
R&D to SALES(3) 2.050*** 0.721** 1.329** 
 (0.008***) (-0.000) (0.008) 
Number of 
observations 
203 374  
34 
 
To investigate the effects of the control variables, I run OLS regressions of the 
industry and premerger adjusted R&D to Sales ratios in years +1,+2 and +3 on the 
explanatory variables defined in the measurement section. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent. Table 3.10 summarizes the results of the multiple regressions. 
TABLE 3.10 
Multiple Regressions of Industry and Pre-merger Adjusted R&D to Sales Ratios 
by Deal Type  
This table presents the results of the regressions of industry-adjusted changes in R&D to Sales 
in fiscal years +1,+2 and +3 after the deal completion year relative to their pre-merger levels. 
All variables are explained in Table 3.3. t-statistics are presented in brackets. ***, **, * 
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. All regressions use OLS estimation method and 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
 Values R&D/sales (1) R&D/sales (2) R&D/sales (3) 
 Const 0.660 0.138 0.227 
  (0.897) (0.144) (0.270) 
 Tech 0.955 2.083** 1.975** 
  (1.33) (2.260) (2.45) 
 Relative size 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
  (1.977) (1.211) (1.647) 
 Leverage -1.431 0.965 3.189 
  (-0.679) (0.421) (1.842) 
 Experience 0.005 0.017 -0.027* 
  (0.430) (0.946) (-1.681) 
 Relatedness -0.804 -0.768 -1.469*** 
  (-1.503) (-0.940) (-2.633) 
 All cash -0.013 -0.192 -0.312 
  (-0.023) (-0.237) (-0.530) 
 All stock -0.097 0.624 -3.398 
  (-0.184) (0.899) (-1.410) 
 Blockholders -0.708 -1.503** 0.531 
  (-1.788) (-2.376) (0.819) 
 Observations 586 486 407 
 𝑅2 0.036 0.027 0.087 
 Adjusted 𝑅2 0.023 0.011 0.068 
 F-statistic 2.714 1.680 4.725 
 P(F-statistic) 0.006 0.101 0.000 
 
All the regressions are significant. As the Hypothesis T4 predicts, the coefficients on 
the technological M&A indicator variable are positive and significant for years +2 and +3, 
which shows that the finding of significantly higher pre-merger and industry-adjusted R&D 
intensity following technological M&A compared to those following non-technological M&A 
are robust to control variables. 
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2.6. Discussion and conclusions 
The major motivation for this study was to explain the variance in the abnormal 
announcement returns to the acquiring firms’ shareholders by distinguishing deals with 
different value drivers. The empirical results strongly support the prediction by showing 
significantly higher returns to the shareholders of the acquiring firm in technological M&A. 
These deals can create value by facilitating profitable commercialization of the target’s 
technology and leveraging the capability to generate innovations continuously – two value-
creation mechanisms that are unavailable for non-technological M&A. This result is robust to 
both different abnormal return measures and controls for common alternative explanations. I 
have also considered ex post performance effects over a three-year horizon following M&A 
completion. The results partially support the arguments. Particularly, the significant increase 
in industry- and premerger-adjusted R&D-intensity among acquirers in technological M&A 
confirms the hypothesized effect. However, I do not find significant differences in the 
operating and overall financial performance between acquirers in technological and non-
technological deals once controlled for experience and size effects. These findings have 
implications for theory, research and practice, which I discuss below. 
2.6.1. Implications for theory and research 
The major contribution of this section is that it provides empirical evidence that the 
type of M&A (technological or non-technological) is highly significantly related to the 
average cumulative abnormal returns to the acquiring firm shareholders around the deal 
announcement and that this relationship is robust to alternative explanations such as 
relatedness, prior M&A experience, the method of payment, leverage and ownership 
concentration (existence of blockholders). In this way, it also addresses the problem of 
unidentified moderators (King et al.,2004) and shows that the key to explaining the variance 
in M&A performance lies in identifying deals where certain mechanisms for value creation 
and destruction are likely to dominate. 
It shows that access to the technology assets of the target firm is a significant source of 
synergies in M&A. This is consistent with Seth and colleagues (2002) who report that reverse 
internalization of intangible assets is positively related to the gains of the acquiring firm in 
cross-border M&A. But this dissertation goes further in at least three ways. First, it shows that 
the argument holds not only for cross-border M&A, which are in many ways distinct form 
domestic deals (see Section 5 for a detailed discussion). Second, I specify the intangible asset 
(patented and unpatented technology). Third, I provide a more elaborated argument on how 
the economize of scope arise from combining the target’s technology with technological and 
non-technological assets of the acquiring firm and why their value is not lost in the 
competitive bidding process. 
Further, the significant increase in R&D-intensity following technological M&A 
compared to both non-technological M&A and industry peers provides an empirical 
indication that the value creation in technological M&A comes not only from the mere 
exploitation of the target’s technology but also from its further development. Otherwise, 
R&D-related costs would be capitalized, not expensed. Hence, the argument that M&A are 
means for substituting internal R&D (Hitt et al., 1996) does not find empirical support. 
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Finally, this study has implications for measuring performance of technological M&A. 
While prior research in this area focused exclusively on realized innovation outcomes of such 
deals, this analysis emphasizes the importance of financial measures that are more directly 
related to value-creation than the number of patents or product launches. However, 
accounting performance measures may be inferior performance metrics for technological 
M&A. The three-year measurement period is inconsistent with the time needed to develop 
certain types of high-technology products, while its extension may lead to mixing the effects 
of the focal transactions with subsequent corporate events. They are also inappropriate for 
serial technological acquirers. Hence, the use of the announcement stock returns is a better 
complement for the currently dominating innovation measures. 
2.6.2. Implications for practice 
This work shows that the stock market distinguishes deals with different value drivers. 
Thus, it is important for the management team of the acquiring firm to assess the fit of the 
acquired assets with the company’s strategy and specific mechanisms for value-creation 
through the transaction. This implies a disciplined approach to target selection and 
negotiations, resistance to institutional pressures, and careful strategic fit analysis and its 
implications for the transaction’s financial model. 
Further, announcement returns to the acquiring firm are negatively correlated with the 
relative size of the deal. This implies that the stock market is skeptical about the potential 
scale economies and takes into account the larger overpayment risk associated with larger 
deals. Thus, managers should benefit from focusing on smaller, better manageable and more 
pragmatic deals. 
Finally, realized financial performance is positively correlated with M&A experience. 
This implies that post-merger integration (PMI) is a valuable capability that can give a 
company a competitive advantage and that it is important to develop PMI strategy for a 
particular target and secure the qualified managerial resources for managing PMI before deal 
completion. 
2.6.3. Limitations and future research 
This study is not without limitations. The first is the deliberate focus on premerger 
characteristics of the acquiring and target firm, which leaves post-merger integration 
management outside the scope of this study. This choice was driven mainly by research 
design and tractability reasons. Though post-merger integration process affects the realized 
performance, it has no impact on the abnormal announcement returns to the acquiring firm, 
which this study is most concerned. 
Second, I employed a conservative strategy for identifying technological M&A, which 
may have mistakenly classified some transactions where targets owned a non-patentable 
technology and the deal rationale was not included in the database as non-technological. A 
problem this strategy can have caused is a non-significant difference in announcement returns 
between technological and non-technological M&A even if it is significant in reality. 
However, given the strong significance of the results, this identification strategy has no 
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detrimental impact on the validity. Moreover, this methodology is consistent with the prior 
literature on technological M&A, which makes my results comparable. 
Third, I focused on whether the target has technology assets and did not consider 
technology assets of the acquiring firm. I leave this as a prospective area for the future 
research, which can further explain the variance in performance between different types of 
technological M&A. 
Fourth, I used R&D-intensity as the measure of innovation performance. One reason 
behind this choice is the interest in the change of R&D investments following technological 
and non-technological M&A as Hitt and colleagues (1996) predicted that they would decrease 
in both cases but this would be inconsistent with the view of technological M&A as a strategy 
for leveraging internal innovation expressed by many authors (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Ranft & 
Lord, 2002; Puranam et al., 2006). Another reason is that this is a standard measure used in 
the literature (Hitt et al., 1996; Ahuja & Katila, 2001), which makes my results comparable to 
earlier work. The limitation of this measure is that it does not show innovation outputs even 
though prior research shows that it is highly correlated with such innovation output measures 
as patents and new product launches (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). Innovation output measures of 
particular interest in the context of this study would be product innovations and incremental 
revenues from these product innovations after the deal completion. Such a study, however, 
would require a different dataset, richer in terms of available metrics and with a longer time 
horizon. A viable alternative could be using the innovation data for Norwegian companies 
gathered periodically by the Norwegian Central Statistical Bureau (SSB). But the tradeoff of 
conducting a study on a Norwegian dataset would be sacrificing the stock market data as only 
161 companies are currently listed on the Oslo stock exchange. Since the focus of this study is 
on the overall value creation, I leave a more detailed study of the innovation performance as a 
task for the future research. 
It is also worth commenting on the limitations related to the use of SIC codes for the 
classification purposes in this study, particularly for identifying high-technology industries 
and related M&A. The use of SIC codes for identifying high-technology industry is a 
common research practice (Kile & Phillips, 2009), especially in empirical literature on 
technological M&A (Granstrand & Sjolander, 1990; Kohers & bv, 2001; Hagedoorn & 
Duysters, 2002; Cloodt et al., 2006; Kapoor & Lim, 2007). It is based on the research by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics that identifies industries in the US with the above-average number 
of workers engaged in R&D activity as well as the research by Kile & Phillips (2009) that 
matches SIC codes with the classification benchmark based on the revenue generation 
processes and business operations. Although this measure is conservative and may exclude 
some high-technology industries, the significance of the obtained results suggests that the 
predicted relationships can be expected to be even stronger if more fine-grained measures are 
used. Second, the use of SIC codes to identify related M&A is a stand-by practice in M&A 
performance research (Gretland, 1991; Walker, 2000). The shortcomings of this approach is 
that such measures do not capture the distinction between horizontal, vertical and related 
M&A (Reve, 1990) and between asset similarity and complementarity. However, it suits well 
the purposes of this large sample study where relatedness is merely a control variable. The 
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development of more fine-grained measures capturing the different forms of relatedness based 
on the degree of similarity and complementarity of specific assets or businesses of the 
acquiring and target firms and analyzing the impact of the various forms of relatedness on 
M&A performance are other prospective areas for future research. 
Additional insights can be gained by further distinguishing different types of non-
technological M&A according to the dominating drivers for value-creation and destruction. 
Such an effort requires identifying specific sources for the economies of scale, scope and 
other synergies and conditions when they are most likely to apply. Examples can be the 
economies of scale arising from the utilization of the excess production capacity in declining 
industries vs. those from spreading the fixed R&D costs or market power stemming from 
eliminating a competitor vs. that arising from the increased switching costs associated with an 
more comprehensive software solution. This is also a task for the future. 
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3. The impact of ownership in M&A 
 
3.1. The ownership strategies of private equity and industrial acquirers 
Private equity acquirers 
Private equity firms rely on significant debt financing to acquire control in target firms 
with the aim of restructuring and subsequent reselling them at premiums through IPO or 
M&A. Private equity acquirers contribute their managerial and industry expertise (Kaplan & 
Stromberg, 2009) to “unlock” the potential value of the target firm by cutting its costs, re-
positioning in the market, divesting redundant assets and unprofitable businesses (Green, 
1992; Johnson, 1996; Connelly et al., 2010). 
Financial leverage plays a central role in the strategy of private equity firms as the debt 
reaches up to 85% of the financing structure of a leveraged buyout (Jensen, 1989). It 
magnifies the shareholders’ returns at exit, creates stimulus for the restructuring of the target 
firm, and mitigates agency problems. 
In particular, debt increases the probability of default with the resultant reputational 
and employment consequences for the top management. This, in its turn, creates a crisis 
atmosphere in the firm that stimulates the necessary operational improvements. As Jensen 
(1989) writes: 
Companies that assume so much debt they cannot meet the debt service payments out 
of operating cash flow force themselves to rethink their entire strategy and structure. 
Overleveraging creates the crisis atmosphere managers require to slash unsound 
investment programs, shrink overhead, and dispose of assets that are more valuable 
outside the company. The proceeds generated by these overdue restructurings can 
then be used to reduce debt to more sustainable levels, creating a leaner, more 
efficient and competitive organization (Jensen, 1989:12). 
In addition, managers of firms generating cash in excess of its needs to support 
operations and having no positive-NPV investment opportunities have incentives to use these 
free cash flows for value-destroying investments rather than to distribute them among the 
shareholders who then could invest them more productively (Jensen, 1986). The obligatory 
payments associated with debt effectively reduce the free cash flows under the managerial 
control, make the managerial investment decisions subject to the scrutiny of the capital 
markets where they have to raise the capital, and thus curb overinvestment (Jensen ,1986; 
Jensen, 1989). 
Finally, the significant portion of debt in the capital structure allows private equity 
firms to provide more stock to the managers (Jensen, 1989), which mitigates agency problems 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that the total wealth of the 
median public company CEO increases by $3.25 for a $1000 increase in the shareholder value, 
while the median business unit chiefs at private equity firms earn $64 for $1000 increase in 
the shareholder value not including bonuses and incentive plans. Hence, the substantial 
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leverage in private equity provides stronger performance incentives and more severely 
penalizes shirking by managers. 
However, the ownership strategy of private equity firms has substantial shortcomings 
in managing technology assets, which include technology embodied in the products and 
solutions of the target firm, technology embedded in its processes and the human capital of its 
inventors (Dosi, 1982; Teece, 1986; Makri et al, 2010).  
Specifically, the short-term orientation and high financial leverage of private equity 
firms lead to (1) their excessive reliance on financial controls, (2) absorption of managerial 
attention by corporate restructuring, (3) higher managerial risk-aversion, (4) decreased 
funding of R&D projects, (5) loss of tax breaks that turns the NPV of  some R&D projects 
into negative (Hitt et al., 1991; Hitt et al., 1996; Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). Long and 
Ravenscraft (1993) show that, as a result, R&D-intensity drops by 40% following LBOs. 
Further, these forces are likely to demotivate key inventors and force some of them to 
leave the firm, which has a devastating impact on R&D productivity and thus the innovation 
performance of the M&A (Ernst & Vitt, 2000; Kapoor & Lim, 2007).  
Finally, Teece (1986) shows that profits stemming from utilizing technology assets go 
to the companies that possess complementary production, marketing and distribution assets. 
The major assets of private equity firms are managerial competence and financial capital, 
which limits their opportunities to add value to the target’s technology assets. 
Industrial acquirers 
Industrial acquirers encompass acquiring firms for which investment management is 
not the primary business area. They rely on M&A as a corporate growth strategy or as a 
means to pre-empt competition. Industrial acquirers can add value to the target firms by 
realizing different types of synergies including economies of scale (Eckbo, 1983; Reve, 1990; 
Gretland, 1991; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991), economies of scope (Williamson, 1975; Porter, 
1980; Teece, 1982; Reve, 1990), increased market power (Stigler, 1964; Eckbo, 1983; Fee & 
Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005), corporate-level diversification (Williamson, 1975; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1991; Lang & Stulz, 1994), and tax advantages (Amit & Livnat, 1988; Hayn, 1989).  
The key source of the parenting advantage of industrial acquirers relative to private 
equity firms are unique economies of scope based on the complementary assets (Hitt et al., 
1991; Kim & Finkelstein, 2009; Makri et al., 2010; Seth, 1990; Seth et al., 2002) and strategic 
fit between the acquiring and the target firms (Christensen et al., 1976; Datta, 1991; Jemison 
& Sitkin, 1986; Porter, 1980; Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 1982). Since private equity partnerships 
do not bring complementary assets, except for the managerial competence and financial 
capital, to the target firm, this important source of value creation is not available for them. 
However, this synergy-based ownership strategy has several shortcomings. First, 
operational synergies stemming from the economies of scale, the economies of scope and the 
increased market power are generally scarce (Anand & Singh, 1997; Heron & Lie, 2002; Fee 
& Thomas, 2004), difficult to realize through post-merger integration (Seth, 1990), come at 
the cost of its disruptive effects on the business (Homburg & Bucerius, 2006), and are not 
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sustainable (Capron et al., 1998). Second, the corporate level diversification actually destroys 
the value of the target company (Berger & Ofek, 1995) because the acquiring firm lacks the 
competencies necessary to manage the acquired businesses that are not related to its strategic 
core (Reve, 1990; Campbell et al., 1995). Third, the tax advantages are limited. Finally, public 
industrial companies have more severe incentives and monitoring problems than private 
equity firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990), which results in more 
inefficiencies (Jensen, 1989). 
To summarize, private equity acquirers add value to the target firm by better aligning 
managerial incentives with the shareholder wealth maximization and unlocking the potential 
value through operational improvements and restructuring. At the same time, their ownership 
strategy and limited arsenal of complementary assets are likely to have a detrimental impact 
on the target’s innovation performance. While private equity firms attempt to add value to the 
target firm on the stand-alone basis, industrial acquirers focus on leveraging the overlapping 
businesses of the acquiring and the target firms through their integration and optimization. 
Though the ability to contribute a large spectrum of complementary assets in R&D,   
production, marketing, and distribution to the target firm gives a relative parenting advantage 
to industrial acquirers, their ability to add value to the target firm is generally limited by the 
magnitude of the potential gains from economies of scale and increased market power as well 
as the challenges and costs associated with post-merger integration and weaker managerial 
incentives. 
3.2. The role of technology 
Following prior literature (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 
2010; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007), I view technological 
M&A as acquisitions of the controlling interest in target firms operating in high-technology 
industries that possess technology assets. Technology assets include technology embodied in 
products, embedded in processes and the knowledge of inventors that typically manifest in 
patents (Dosi, 1982; Teece, 1986; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 2010).  M&A that do 
not provide such technology inputs to the acquiring firm are defined as non-technological 
(Ahuja & Katila, 2001). 
The acquiring firm can increase the value of the acquired technology assets in two 
ways. First, the acquiring firm can profitably commercialize the technology developed by the 
target by adding the necessary complementary manufacturing, marketing and distribution 
assets (Puranam et al., 2006; Teece, 1986). This can be done continuously if the acquiring 
firm preserves the target firm as a relatively autonomous and highly productive R&D unit 
(Puranam et al., 2006). Second, the acquiring firm can leverage the target’s technology assets 
by combining them with its own and achieving the economies of scale and scope in R&D 
(Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Ernst & Vitt, 2000; Graebner, 2004; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Makri et 
al., 2010). The value creation potential of this second strategy is positively related to the 
degree of complementarity between the technologies of the acquiring and target firms (Makri 
et al., 2010).  
These two mechanism for value creation in technological M&A have two important 
features. First, they require that the acquiring firm contributes complementary technology and 
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non-technology assets. This creates a parenting advantage for industrial acquirers relative to 
private equity firms whose assets are limited primarily to managerial competence and 
financial capital. Further, this advantage is likely to have a tremendos impact on the 
performance of technological M&A because the competition in high-technology indusries 
revolves around continuous innovations (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999; Graebner, 2004; 
McEvily, Eisenhardt, & Prescott, 2004; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Ranft & Lord, 2002).  
Second, these two sources for value-creation are not available in non-technological 
M&A because they do not provide technology inputs to the acquiring firm (Ahuja & Katila, 
2001). At the same time, nothing prevents the acquirers in technological M&A to benefit from 
the synergies offered by the combination of non-technology assets of the two firms that are 
available in non-technological M&A and were described in the previous section. 
3.3. Hypotheses 
 Jensen (1989) argues that private equity firms are superior parents relative to industrial 
companies because they provide stronger performance incentives to the management team 
leading to improved corporate governance and realization of the operational improvements in 
the target firm. At the same time, a number of authors (Anand & Singh, 1997; Capron et al., 
1998; Seth et al., 2002; Fee & Thomas, 2004) argue that the opportunities of the industrial 
acquirers to add value to the target firms in the form of synergies are generally limited. This 
relative advantage of private equity firms should lead to higher abnormal returns to the target 
firm shareholders upon the deal announcement since acquirers possessing parenting 
advantages should be able to offer higher bids, which leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis O1. The returns to the target firm shareholders are higher for M&A 
conducted by private equity firms than for M&A conducted by industrial acquirers. 
Private equity firms have two major disadvantages as acquirers in technological M&A. 
First, they lack complementary R&D, production, distribution, and marketing assets that are 
necessary to leverage and profitably commercialize the target’s technology (Teece, 1986; 
Reve, 2011). Second, their focus on short-term financial performance, higher risk-aversion, 
the absorption of the managerial attention by the restructuring and reduction of R&D 
investments negatively affect the productivity of inventors in the target firm and innovation 
performance (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). Hence, we can suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis O2. The returns to the target firm shareholders are higher for non-
technological M&A conducted by private equity firms than for technological M&A 
conducted by private equity firms. 
Industrial acquirers in non-technological M&A cannot benefit from the economies of 
scope and scale in technology development and commercialization because the target firms in 
such deals do not provide technology assets. By contrast, industrial acquirers in technological 
M&A can on average benefit from the productive efficiency gains, increased market power 
and financial synergies based on the target’s non-technology assets in the same manner as 
their counterparts in non-technological deals. The difference in the value creation potential 
between the two types of M&A leads to Hypothesis 3. 
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Hypothesis O3. The returns to the target firm shareholders are higher for 
technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers than for non-technological 
M&A conducted by industrial acquirers. 
Combining (1) the argument that private equity firms are likely to add more value on 
average to the target through restructuring and realizing operational improvements than 
industrial acquirers through synergies (behind Hypothesis 1) with (2) the argument that 
private equity firms are inferior acquirers in technological M&A (behind Hypothesis 2), 
yields Hypothesis O4: 
Hypothesis O4. The returns to the target firm shareholders are higher for non-
technological M&A conducted by private equity firms than for non-technological 
M&A conducted by industrial acquirers. 
Industrial acquirers are relatively better positioned than private equity firms to add 
value to the targets in technological M&A. First, unlike private equity firms, they can provide 
complementary R&D, production, distribution, and marketing assets to the target’s 
technology and create value through the economies of scale and scope in R&D (Teece, 1986; 
Puranam et al., 2006; Reve, 2011). Second, the industrial acquirers are less subject to the 
pressure to improve the short run financial performance, which is detrimental for innovation. 
This leads to Hypothesis O5. 
Hypothesis O5. The returns to the target firm shareholders are higher for 
technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers than for technological M&A 
conducted by private equity firms. 
3.4. Methods 
3.4.1. Sample 
 The sample of observations comes from Zephyr database of M&A provided by Bureau 
van Dijk. It includes transactions from January 1, 1996. I select transactions classified as 
M&A, acquisitions and institutional buyouts of publicly traded US companies that were 
announced and completed between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2012. I require the deal 
value exceed US$1 million. In addition, I control that the deals in the sample result in gaining 
controlling interest in the target firm, i.e. the initial equity stake of the acquiring firm is less 
than 50% and the resulting equity stake is more than 51%. This process yields an initial 
sample of 2955 deals. Further, I match the dataset with CRSP database to ensure that I have 
stock price data available for each target for the period of at least 252 trading days before and 
10 trading days after the announcement date. This leaves 2147 observations in the effective 
sample. 
 Institutional buy-out indicator reported by Zephyr allows me to separate non-industrial 
acquirers in the sample, leaving 1851 industrial acquirers. Further, I separate investment 
companies and holdings from other institutional investors by requiring that their two-digit SIC 
equals 67, and eliminate transactions characterized by Zephyr as “angel investment”, 
“development capital”, “venture capital”, and “capital increases” to remove non-private 
equity investors. Finally, I check the business description of each remaining acquirer provided 
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by Zephyr to ensure that it is a private equity firm. This procedure leaves 186 deals completed 
by private equity firms. 
Further, I distinguish technological and non-technological M&A. Following prior 
literature, I define technological M&A as acquisitions of high-technology targets with 
technology being a part of the acquired assets (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Graebner, 2004; Kapoor 
& Lim, 2007; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). I operationalize this definition using the following 
algorithm. 
Firstly, I identify high-technology targets using the two-digit SIC code combinations 
commonly used for sampling high-technology firms (Kile & Phillips, 2009). These include: 
28 (Chemicals and Allied Products), 35 (Industrial Machinery and Equipment), 36 
(Communication Equipment), 38 (Instruments and Related Products), 48 (Communications), 
73 (Business Services, incl. Computer Programming, Data Processing), 87 (Engineering, 
Accounting, Research, Management and Related Services). 
Secondly, prior research argues that technology manifests in patents, which represent 
its outcomes (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 2010). Thus, I require 
that targets in technological M&A have registered at least 1 patent before the announcement 
date. This requirement is consistent with prior research on technological M&A (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001; Puranam et al., 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007) and reflects the requirement 
that technology be part of the acquired assets. I use Orbis database provided by Bureau van 
Dijk for tracking the patenting activity of the target firm. I match the data on patents with the 
sample using the unique target BvD ID numbers common for Zephyr and Orbis databases. 
Finally, Ahuja and Katila (2001) recognize that not all technologies are patentable and 
use news stories associated with the M&A in their sample to check whether some non-
patented technology was a part of the acquired assets. I follow a similar approach and check 
the deal rationales provided by Zephyr database mention “technology”, “R&D”, or 
“innovation” of the target firm as motivating factors for or components of the acquired assets. 
Then I classify M&A as technological if the target has a high-technology SIC code and either 
has some patenting activity before the announcement or technology was reported to be part of 
the deal motivation or acquired assets.  
This procedure leaves 435 technological M&A, 396 of which were conducted by 
industrial acquirers and 32 by private equity ones. Table 4.1 summarizes the sample 
distribution by year, acquirer and deal type.  There is an increase in the number of 
acquisitions of publicly traded US companies from 2000 to 2007 followed by a dramatic 
decline in 2008-2009 related to the “credit crunch”, especially in the number of deals 
conducted by private equity firms, followed by a moderate corporate control market recovery 
in 2010-2013. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Sample distribution by year, acquirer type and deal type 
This table presents the time-series distribution of a sample of M&A of publicly traded US 
companies from Zephyr database. The deals are classified into years based on the 
announcement date. The classification into industrial and private equity acquirers is based on 
the deal and acquirer description provided by Zephyr. Deals are classified as technological if 
the target has the two-digit SIC code of 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products), 35 (Industrial 
Machinery and Equipment), 36 (Communication Equipment), 38 (Instruments and Related 
Products), 48 (Communications), 73 (Business Services, incl. Computer Programming, Data 
Processing), or 87 (Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management and Related Services) 
and has either registered at least one patent before the announcement date or technology is 
reported as part of the deal motivation. 
Year All deals Industrial acquirers Private equity acquirers 
Tech Non-tech Tech Non-tech Tech Non-tech 
2000 4 44 4 41 0 1 
2001 40 174 40 159 0 6 
2002 40 112 39 101 1 7 
2003 33 149 30 132 1 5 
2004 25 162 23 144 2 8 
2005 47 173 41 144 3 14 
2006 39 184 35 144 4 28 
2007 43 192 37 142 4 36 
2008 40 88 39 77 1 7 
2009 30 93 28 85 2 6 
2010 39 131 35 106 4 21 
2011 24 124 17 103 6 11 
2012 32 85 28 77 4 4 
Total 436 1711 396 1455 32 154 
  
3.4.2. Measurement 
I use cumulative abnormal returns to target shareholders around the deal 
announcement date to provide evidence on the expected value creation by private equity and 
industrial acquirers in technological and non-technological M&A. The argument is that 
acquirers possessing parenting advantages in the forms of higher potential operational 
improvements and synergies can offer higher bids. An alternative argument can be that higher 
announcement returns to the target shareholders are associated with overpayment by the 
acquirer. Thus, I control for variables that are associated with a higher propensity to overpay. 
I discuss the control variables later in this section. 
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To construct the variable I use daily return data for each of the acquirers from CRSP. 
Following the event study methodology (MacKinlay, 1997), I estimate CARs as sums of the 
market model residuals over a given event window:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ��𝑅𝑖𝑡 − �𝛼�𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡��𝑇
𝑡=𝜏
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖is the cumulative abnormal return for transaction 𝑖, event window 𝑡𝜖[𝜏,𝑇], 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  stands for the acquirer’s return for transaction 𝑖 and day 𝑡, the term �𝛼�𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡� is the 
expected return predicted by the market model. I estimate the market model parameters by the 
OLS regression over the estimation window from trading day – 262 to day – 11 relative to the 
deal announcement date (0): 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  stands for the acquirer’s return for transaction 𝑖 and day 𝑡 , 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the daily 
return to the CRSP value-weighted market index. For robustness, I use four event windows 
(all dates are trading days relative to the announcement date (0)): day - 1 to day + 1, day - 2 to 
day + 2, day - 5 to day + 5, and day -10 to day +10. Further, I denote CARs corresponding to 
the event windows listed above as MCAR (-1,1), MCAR (-2,2), MCAR (-5,5) and MCAR (-
10,10). 
In addition, I use two alternative normal return model specifications: market-adjusted 
model and Fama-French three factor model. The market adjusted model assumes the intercept 
of 0 and beta value of 1. Inclusion of these abnormal return measures is aimed to account for 
biases in the estimated beta coefficients. I denote the market-adjusted model based abnormal 
returns corresponding to the four event windows as ACAR (-1,1), ACAR (-2,2), ACAR (-5,5) 
and ACAR (-10,10). 
To estimate the parameters of the Fama-French three-factor model, I regressed the 
daily excess returns from trading day – 262 to day – 11 relative to the deal announcement date 
(0) on the market, size and book-to-market factors from CRSP: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡� + 𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡  stands for the acquirer’s excess return for transaction 𝑖 and day 𝑡 , 
𝑅𝑓𝑡  is the one-month Treasury bill rate,�𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡� is the market factor, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 – size factor, 
and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 – book-to-market factor. I denote the cumulative abnormal returns based on the 
Fama-French three-factor model as FCAR (-1,1), FCAR (-2,2), FCAR (-5,5) and FCAR (-
10,10) corresponding to the event windows from day -1 to day +1, from day -2 to day +2, 
from day -5 to day +5 and from day -10 to day +10. 
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3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Target returns by acquirer type 
 Hypothesis O1 predicts that the cumulative abnormal returns to the target firm 
shareholders will be higher in M&A conducted by private equity firms than in M&A 
conducted by industrial acquirers. Table 4.2 displays the averages and medians of cumulative 
abnormal returns to the target shareholders by the acquirer type as well as the differences 
between them. This data does not support the prediction. 
The means and medians are generally significantly positive for industrial acquirers. 
The only exception is MCAR (-1,1) which has a not significant negative median. The means 
and medians are also generally positive and significant for private equity acquirer with the 
exceptions of MCAR (-1,1), MCAR (-2,2), which are insignificant and negative, and MCAR 
(-5,5), which has a positive but not significant median. An explanation of  not significant 
values of these measures can be either biases related to the estimation of beta or the inferior 
ability of the market model to explain the cross-sectional variance in daily stock return series 
documented in prior studies (Barber & Lyon, 1997). 
 However, the means and medians of cumulative abnormal returns are generally lower 
for private equity acquirers. The difference in means is statistically significant for all 
measures and event windows except for MCAR (-1,1), MCAR (-2,2) and MCAR (-5,5). In 
terms of size, the differences in means between industrial and private equity acquirers range 
depending on the chosen event window from 0% to 7.4% for MCARs, 7.2% to 9.2% for 
ACARs, and from 0.7% to 6.4% for FCARs. This means that differences are also 
economically significant. This finding is opposite to the prediction of Hypothesis O1 and 
suggests that industrial acquirers are expected to add more value to the target firms than 
private equity firms. 
Further, I investigate whether the difference in returns is explained by other observable 
variables. First, I take into account variables that indicate a higher propensity to overpay. Free 
cash flow hypothesis suggests that managers of public companies having excess cash are 
more likely to spend it on value-destroying M&A than distribute to the shareholders (Jensen, 
1986). Thus, I expect acquirers paying with cash to be more prone to overpay. Hubris 
hypothesis (Roll, 1986) suggests that managers may overpay because of their inability to 
correctly valuate the target. It is natural to suggest that the more uncertain the target value is, 
the more likely it is that the acquirer will not be able to properly valuate the deal. To account 
for these effects, I use to variables: All cash and Prior 12-month volatility. All cash is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for all cash financed M&A. Prior 12-month 
volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock returns of the target firm from day -262 
to day -11 relative to the announcement day 0. It reflects uncertainty of the target’s value. 
Consistent with prior literature, I also control for target size, industry-adjusted 
EBITDA to Assets, leverage, prior 12-month BHAR and beta (Officer et al., 2010). Target 
size (Size) is measured as the market value of equity of the target firm (from CRSP) on day -
11 relative to the announcement date. There is abundant evidence that target size is negatively 
related to target’s returns (Officer et al., 2010). 
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TABLE 4.2 
Target cumulative abnormal returns by acquirer type 
This table displays the means and medians (in brackets) of cumulative abnormal returns to the 
target shareholders in M&A conducted by industrial and private equity acquirers as well as 
the differences in means and medians between these two groups. MCARs are sums of the 
market model residuals over the event windows shown in brackets. ACARs are sums of the 
market-adjusted model residuals over the event windows shown in brackets. FCARs are sums 
of the Fama-French three-factor model residuals over the event windows shown in brackets. 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level correspondently. Abnormal returns 
are presented in %. 
Return measure Industrial Private equity Industrial – Private 
equity 
MCAR (-1,1) 0.331** -0.068 0.294 
 (-0.092) (-0.358) (-0.111) 
MCAR (-2,2) 0.694*** -0.002 0.696 
 (0.066*) (-0.385) (0.451) 
MCAR (-5,5) 2.098*** 1.283* 0.816 
 (0.530***) (0.894) (-0.365) 
MCAR (-10,10) 21.872*** 14.261*** 7.611*** 
 (14.879***) (13.709***) (1.170) 
ACAR (-1,1) 23.574*** 16.181*** 7.392*** 
 (16.809***) (10.460***) (6.348) 
ACAR (-2,2) 24.073*** 16.814*** 7.259*** 
 (17.570***) (10.992***) (6.578) 
ACAR (-5,5) 25.262*** 18.108*** 7.154*** 
 (19.142***) (15.184***) (3.958) 
ACAR (-10,10) 26.575*** 17.415*** 9.160*** 
 (21.109***) (14.937***) (6.172) 
FCAR (-1,1) 23.094*** 16.149*** 0.695*** 
 (16.848***) (10.742***) (6.106) 
FCAR (-2,2) 23.012*** 16.599*** 6.413*** 
 (17.356***) (10.834***) (6.523) 
FCAR (-5,5) 22.667*** 17.163*** 5.504** 
 (18.535***) (15.118***) (3.417) 
FCAR (-10,10) 21.616*** 15.355*** 6.262** 
 (19.517***) (13.549***) (5.968) 
Number of 
observations 
1851 186  
 
Industry-adjusted EBITDA to Assets and prior 12-month BHAR are two measures of 
the target’s pre-merger performance which can be correlated with the announcement returns. 
We can expect a more positive market reaction for M&A announcement for underperforming 
targets. I calculate industry-adjusted EBITDA to Assets by dividing the targets EBITDA 1 
fiscal year prior to announcement (ebitda item in COMPUSTAT) by the average Total Assets 
1 fiscal year prior to the announcement (at item in COMPUSTAT) and subtracting the 
industry-average ratio for the fiscal year preceding the announcement. I use two-digit SIC 
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codes to identify the industry. I calculate the prior 12-month BHAR as the market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold target stock return (from CRSP) from day -262 to day -11 relative to the 
announcement.  
The difference in announcement returns can also be explained by the different 
systematic risk of the targets, which I measure with beta. I estimate the beta using the market 
model over the window from day -262 to day -11.  
Finally, leverage is measured as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt (dltt item in 
COMPUSTAT) and debt in current liabilities (dlc item) to the common equity (ceq) of the 
target firm (Duchin & Schmidt, 2013) in the fiscal year preceding the acquisition. Prior 
literature argues that high leverage serves as an effective monitoring device (Maloney et al., 
1993) and a means to align managerial incentives with shareholder value maximization 
(Jensen, 1986). Thus, managers of the target firms with higher leverage should have stronger 
incentives to negotiate for the higher bid. 
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TABLE 4.3 
Target and deal characteristics by acquirer type 
This table contains the means and medians (in brackets) of the control variables defined 
earlier in this section for industrial acquirers, private equity acquirers and differences between 
them. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Control variable Industrial Private equity Industrial – Private 
equity 
Size ($ thousands) 1371056 1359679 11377 
 (202559) (358419.4) (-155860.4) 
Industry-adjusted 
EBITDA/assets 
-0.117 -0.103 -0.014 
 (-0.018) (-0.024) (0.006) 
Leverage 0.393 0.182 0.211* 
 (0.283) (0.210) (0.073) 
Prior 12-month 
BHAR 
0.113 0.113 -0.000 
 (-0.012) (0.050) (-0.062) 
Prior 12-month 
return volatility 
0.037 0.032 0.005*** 
 (0.030) (0.024) (0,006) 
Beta 0.600 0.546 0.054 
 (0.501) (0.502) (-0.001) 
All cash 676 107  
% (36.38) (56.61)  
Number of 
observations 
1851 186  
 
 Table 4.3 displays the abovementioned target and deal characteristics split by the 
acquirer type. The only two significantly different means are in leverage and prior 12-month 
return volatility. The difference in mean leverage has the positive value of 21% and the 
difference in mean prior 12-month volatility has the positive value of 0.5%. Hence, both can 
contribute to the higher returns to the targets in acquisitions conducted by industrial acquirers. 
Moreover, the significant positive difference in volatility can suggest higher likelihood of 
overpayment. 
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 To further investigate the impact of these control variables, I regress the twelve return 
measures on them and the indicator variable Industrial, which takes the value of 1 for 
industrial acquirers. The results of the regression analysis are summarized in Table 4.4. 
 All the regressions in Table 4.4, except for those using MCAR (-1; 1) and MCAR (-
2;2), are highly significant. The insignificant results for MCAR (-1;1) and MCAR (-2;2) are 
likely to be driven by the choice of the market model to measure the normal returns. Prior 
studies show that the three factor Fama-French model that accounts also for the market cap 
and book-to-market better explains the stock returns (Fama & French, 1992; Barber & Lyon, 
1997). Further, as the beta of the target firm becomes more volatile close to the announcement 
date (Hackbarth & Morellec, 2008), the market-adjusted model, which sets the beta value 
equal to 1, becomes superior to the market model (McKinlay, 1997). The coefficients on the 
industrial acquirer indicator variable remain positive and generally significant even after 
controlling for the method of payment, uncertainty and other target characteristics. Moreover, 
the coefficients indicate that the difference in returns is economically significant. It ranges 
from 1% to 12.5% for MCARs, from 11.9% to 14.7% for ACARs and from 11.6% to 14% for 
FCARs. The signs and significance levels of the control variables are consistent with the 
predictions and prior literature. This evidence suggests that Hypothesis O1 predicting that 
private equity firms add more value to the target firm than industrial acquirers must be 
rejected. Moreover, the difference in the returns to the target firm shareholders is not simply 
driven by the higher propensity of the industrial acquirers to overpay, but rather parenting 
advantages.
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TABLE 4.4 
Multivariate regressions of returns to target shareholders 
This table contains multivariate ordinary least squares regressions of the cumulative abnormal returns to target shareholders to the indicator 
variable Industrial (takes the value of 1 for industrial acquirers and 0 for private equity ones), Cash (takes the value of 1 for all cash financed 
M&A), Size (target size measured as the market cap on day -11 in $ thousands), Ind.-adjusted EBITDA to Assets (measured as the ratio of the 
target’s EBITDA to average Total Assets in fiscal year -1 and normalized by industry-average value based on two-digit SIC codes), Leverage 
(measured as the ratio of the sum of the long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to the common equity of the target firm in fiscal year -1), 
Prior 12-month BHAR (buy-and-hold market adjusted returns of the target firm from day-262 to day -11), Prior 12-month volatility (standard 
deviation of the daily target stock returns from day -262 to day -11), Beta (estimated by the market model from day -262 to day -11). Standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent. t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 MCAR 
(-1;1) 
MCAR 
(-2;2) 
MCAR 
(-5;5) 
MCAR 
(-10;10) 
ACAR 
(-1;1) 
ACAR 
(-2;2) 
ACAR 
(-5;5) 
ACAR 
(-10;10) 
FCAR 
(-1;1) 
FCAR 
(-2;2) 
FCAR 
(-5;5) 
FCAR 
(-10;10) 
Const -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.042 0.041 0.047 0.049 0.024 0.035 0.039 0.029 -0.018 
 (-1.198) (-0.975) (-0.405) (-1.109) (1.426) (1.616) (1.640) (0.736) (1.156) (1.247) (0.769) (-0.328) 
Industrial 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.147*** 0.124*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.140*** 
 (1.388) (1.591) (1.243) (5.437) (5.649) (5.337) (5.638) (6.684) (5.530) (4.999) (4.584) (3.831) 
Cash 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.114*** 0.109*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0,105*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.148*** 0.190*** 
 (1.069) (0.486) (1.125) (5.485) (5.718) (5.495) (5.323) (5.156) (5.769) (5.203) (4.035) (3.058) 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.630) (0.613) (-0.304) (-0.332) (-2.719) (-3.108) (-3.194) (-2.574) (-2.698) (-3.101) (-3.008) (-1.546) 
Ind.-adj. 
EBITDA 
to Assets 
-0.004 0.003 -0.023 -0.036 -0.025 -0.030 -0.059* -0.049 -0.048 -0.068 -0.130* -0.196 
 (-0.345) (0.356) (-0.861) (-1.000) (-0.578) (-0.705) (-1.715) (-1.424) (-0.913) (-1.139) (-1.677) (-1.493) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.008 0.021 0.038 
 (-0.552) (-0.829) (-1.013) (-0.451) (-0.237) (-0.349) (-0.215) (-0.359) (0.434) (0.646) (1.064) (1.165) 
Prior 12-m 
BHAR 
0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.032*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.016** -0.022** -0.026** -0.032** -0.040** 
 (1.604) (0.657) (-1.876) (-3.568) (-2.815) (-2.785) (-2.686) (-2.251) (-2.496) (-2.472) (-2.230) (-1.976) 
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Prior 12-m 
volatility 
0.016 0.069 0.283 3.101** 1.242** 1.353** 1.584** 2.065*** 1.133* 1.127* 1.079 1.068 
 (0.109) (0.375) (0.910) (3.286) (2.272) (2.400) (2.494) (2.863) (1.914) (1.767) (1.301) (0.892) 
Beta 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.011 0.016 0.018 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.002 -0.021 -0.051 
 (0.278) (-0.421) (-0.129) (0.647) (1.119) (1.313) (0.804) (0.453) (0.356) (0.124) (-0.683) (-0.950) 
N 1318 1318 1318 1318 1314 1312 1312 1310 1314 1312 1312 1310 
𝑅2 0.007 0.004 0.016 0.109 0.066 0.069 0.074 0.078 0.056 0.045 0.026 0.014 Adj.𝑅2 0.001 -0.002 0.010 0.104 0.060 0.064 0.069 0.072 0.050 0.039 0.020 0.008 
F-stat 1.081 0.633 2.680 20.104 11.531 12.118 13.064 13.678 9.615 7.694 4.266 2.316 
P(F-stat) 0.374 0.750 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 
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3.5.2. Target returns by acquirer and deal type 
 In this sub-section I proceed further to the analysis of the expected value-creation by 
industrial and private equity acquirers in technological and non-technological M&A. As 
before, I use the twelve cumulative abnormal returns measures for the purpose. 
 Table 4.5 displays the means and medians of MCARs, ACARs and FCARs for the 
four categories of M&A: technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers, non-
technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers, technological M&A conducted by 
private equity acquirers and non-technological M&A conducted by private equity acquirers. It 
also reports differences in means and medians between these categories. 
 The average and median values of the cumulative abnormal returns to target 
shareholders are generally positive and significant for technological M&A conducted by 
industrial acquirers. The only exception is MCAR (-1,1) with a not significant positive mean 
of 0.5% and a not significant negative median of -0.08%. They are also economically 
significant with mean MCARs ranging from 0.5% to 31% across event windows, mean 
ACARs – from 33.1% to 37.5%, and mean FCARs - from 27.4% to 32.7%. 
 We observe the same pattern for non-technological M&A conducted by industrial 
acquirers.
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TABLE 4.5 
Target cumulative abnormal returns by acquirer and deal type 
This table displays the means and medians (in brackets) of cumulative abnormal returns to the target shareholders in four categories of M&A: 
technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers, non-technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers, technological M&A 
conducted by private equity acquirers and non-technological M&A conducted by private equity acquirers. It also reports differences in means 
and medians between these categories. MCARs are sums of the market model residuals over the event windows shown in brackets. ACARs are 
sums of the market-adjusted model residuals over the event windows shown in brackets. FCARs are sums of the Fama-French three-factor model 
residuals over the event windows shown in brackets. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level correspondently. Abnormal returns 
are presented in %. 
Return 
measure 
Ind Tech Ind Non-tech PE Tech PE Non-tech Ind Tech – 
Ind Non-tech 
PE Tech – 
PE Non-tech 
Ind Tech – 
PE Tech 
Ind Non-tech 
– PE Non-
tech 
MCAR  
(-1,1) 
0.585 0.262 0.136 -0.110 0.324 0.246 0.449 0.371 
 (-0.077) (-0.095) (0.218) (-0.520) (0.018) (0.738) (-0.295) (0.425) 
MCAR  
(-2,2) 
1.480*** 0.481** 0.694 -0.144 0.999* 0.838 0.786 0.625 
 (0.594**) (0.010) (0.187) (-0.677) (0.584) (0.865) (0.406) (0.687) 
MCAR  
(-5,5) 
3.288*** 1.776*** 2.571 1.020 2.199* 1.552 0.717 0.756 
 (1.483***) (0.349***) (1.970**) (0.502) (1.135) (1.468) (-0.487) -0.154 
MCAR  
(-10,10) 
31.080*** 19.377*** 13.239*** 14.469*** 11.703*** -1.230 17.841*** 4.908*** 
 (23.416***) (13.056***) (5.883***) (14.806***) (10.360) (14.806) (17.533) (-1.751) 
ACAR  
(-1,1) 
33.117*** 21.001*** 12.879*** 16.859*** 12.116*** -3.980 20.239*** 4.142** 
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 (23.492***) (15.222***) (5.521***) (11.435***) (8.271) (-5.914) (17.972) (3.787) 
ACAR  
(-2,2) 
33.482*** 21.540*** 13.541*** 17.485*** 11.941*** -3.944 19.940*** 4.055** 
 (23.991***) (15.826***) (6.922***) (11.592***) (8.166) (-4.671) (17.070) (4.234) 
ACAR  
(-5,5) 
35.278*** 22.564*** 13.809*** 19.001*** 12.714*** -5.193 21.469*** 3.562* 
 (0.2668***) (17.375***) (7.910***) (15.503***) (9.305) (-7.593) (18.771) (1.873) 
ACAR 
(-10,10) 
37.485*** 23.623*** 11.950*** 18.558*** 13.863*** -6.608* 25.536*** 5.065*** 
 (28.934***) (18.369***) (11.601***) (15.677***) (10.566) (-4.077) (17.333) (2.691) 
FCAR 
(-1,1) 
32.171*** 20.615*** 12.745*** 16.844*** 11.556*** -4.099 19.426*** 3.771** 
 (23.821***) (15.007***) (6.598***) (11.676***) (8.814) (-5.078) (17.223) (3.331) 
FCAR 
(-2,2) 
31.375*** 20.730*** 14.048*** 17.119*** 10.645*** -3.071 17.328*** 3.611* 
 (23.675***) (15.613***) (6.838***) (11.390***) (8.062) (-4.552) (16.837) (4.223) 
FCAR 
(-5,5) 
30.242*** 20.598*** 13.848*** 17.848*** 9.645* -4.000 16.394** 2.750 
 (26.790***) (16.530***) (7.838***) (15.757***) (10.260) (-7.919) (18.952) (0.773) 
FCAR 
(-10,10) 
27.381*** 20.036*** 11.165*** 16.226*** 7.345 -5.062 16.216 3.810 
 (27.741***) (16.987***) (9.298***) (14.047***) (10.754) (-4.749) (18.443) (2.940) 
 
57 
 
However, the mean and median values are lower in this category.  Particularly, the 
mean MCARs range from 0.3% to 19.4% across the four event windows, the mean ACARs – 
from 21% to 23.6%, and the mean FCARs – from 20% to 20.7%. Further, Table 4.5 shows 
that these positive differences in means between the two categories are generally significant. 
The two exceptions are MCAR (-1,1) and FCAR (-10,10). This evidence indicates that 
industrial acquirers are expected to add more value to the target firms in technological M&A 
than in non-technological M&A and thus supports Hypothesis O3. 
The means and medians of the cumulative abnormal return measures are all positive 
and generally significant for technological M&A conducted by private equity firms. 
Exceptions are MCAR (-1,1), MCAR (-2,2) and MCAR (-5,5) which have not significant 
positive means and medians. The values are also economically significant. The mean values 
range from 0.1% to 13.2% for MCARs, from 11.9% to 13.8% for ACARs and from 11.2% to 
14% for FCARs. However, they are generally economically and significantly lower than 
means for technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers, which supports Hypothesis 
O5. 
 The means and medians of the cumulative abnormal returns in non-technological 
acquisitions conducted by private equity firms are generally significantly positive. The 
exceptions are mean and median values of MCAR (-1,1) and MCAR (-2,2) which are not 
significantly negative and MCAR (-5,5) which are not significantly positive. The mean values 
range from -0.1% to 14.5% for MCARs, from 16.9% to 19% for ACARs, and from 16.2% to 
17.8% for FCARs. The differences between the means for technological and non-
technological M&A conducted by private equity firms are not significant and generally 
negative. Only the differences in the mean MCAR (-1,1), MCAR (-2,2) and MCAR (-5,5) are 
positive. Thus, the signs of the differences are generally consistent with Hypothesis O2. The 
differences in means between non-technological M&A conducted by industrial and private 
equity firms are all positive and significant for MCAR (-10,10), ACAR (-1,1), ACAR (-2,2), 
ACAR (-5,5), ACAR (-10,10), FCAR (-1,1) and FCAR (-2,2). This is inconsistent with 
Hypothesis O4. 
 As in the previous sub-section, I further investigate whether the differences in return 
measures are driven by the method of payment, uncertainty and other target characteristics 
identified earlier. Table 4.6 reports the target and deal characteristics and their differences 
across the four categories of interest. 
 There are significant negative differences between technological and non-
technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers in the mean target size (-979872 
$ thousand), industry-adjusted EBITDA to assets (-0.2), leverage (-0.33) and prior 12-month 
BHAR (-0.15).  
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TABLE 4.6 
Target and deal characteristics by acquirer and deal type 
This table contains the means and medians (in brackets) of the control variables defined earlier in this section for four categories of M&A: 
technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers, non-technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers, technological M&A 
conducted by private equity acquirers and non-technological M&A conducted by private equity acquirers. It also reports differences in means 
and medians between these categories. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Control variable Ind Tech Ind Non-tech PE Tech PE Non-tech Ind Tech – Ind 
Non-tech 
PE Tech – PE 
Non-tech 
Ind Tech – PE 
Tech 
Ind Non-tech 
– PE Non-tech
  
Size ($ thousands) 599585.9 1579457 894136 1459661 -979872*** -565525 -294550.1 119796 
 (151371.5) (225735) (324113) (358419) (-74363.5) (-34306) (-172741.5) (-132684) 
Ind.-adj. 
EBITDA/Assets 
-0.268 -0.067 -0.368 -0.028 -0.201*** -0.340 0.100 -0.038 
 (-0.120) (-0.009) (-0.073) (-0.003) (-0.111) (-0.070) (-0.047) (-0.006) 
Leverage 0.143 0.472 0.278 0.302 -0.329*** -0.024 -0.135 0.170 
 (0.009) (0.403) (0.210) (0.307) (-0.393) (-0.097) (-0.201) (0.095) 
Prior 12-m BHAR -0.005 0.146 0.017 0.133 -0.151* -0.116 -0.022 0.013 
 (-0.173) (0.018) (0.032) (0.058) (-0.191) (-0.026) (-0.206) (-0.041) 
Prior 12-m 
volatility 
0.048 0.035 0.036 0.031 0.013*** 0.031 0.011** 0.003* 
 (0.040) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) (0.013) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) 
Beta 0.819 0.540 0.558 0.544 0.279*** 0.014 0.262 -0.004 
 (0.775) (0.424) (0.521) (0.483) (0.351) (0.038) (0.255) (-0.059) 
All cash 204 472 26 81     
% (51.52) (32.28) (81.25) (51.59)     
N 396 1462 32 157     
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There are also significant positive differences between technological and non-
technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers in the mean prior 12-month volatility 
(0.013) and beta (0.28). All of these, except for the difference in leverage, can potentially 
explain the observed positive differences in mean returns. 
 In addition, there are significant positive differences in the mean prior 12-month 
volatility between technological M&A conducted by industrial and private equity firms (0.01) 
and between non-technological M&A conducted by industrial and private equity firms (0.003). 
These can lead to positive differences in the mean returns. 
 To further examine whether the differences in the mean returns between the four 
M&A categories are explained by differences in some other variables I do multiple regression 
analysis. The return measures discussed earlier are the dependent variables in the OLS 
regressions. The dummy variables Industrial Tech (takes the value of 1 for technological 
M&A conducted by industrial acquirers), PE Tech ( takes the value of 1 for technological 
M&A conducted by private equity firms) and PE Non-tech ( takes the value of 1 for non-
technological M&A conducted by private equity firms) are the three independent variables 
that identify the four categories of interest. The other explanatory/control variables were 
discussed earlier. Finally, I use heterskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
 Table 4.7 displays the results of the multiple regression analysis where the non-
technological M&A by industrial acquirers are the omitted category represented by the 
intercept. This model specification allows testing Hypothesis O3 and O4 and controlling for 
alternative explanations. All the regression models presented in the table, except for those 
where the dependent variables are MCAR (-1;1) and MCAR (-2; 2), are highly significant. 
The finding of non-significant regression models for MCAR (-1;1) and MCAR (-2; 2) are 
consistent with the results presented in Table 4.4 and are likely to be explained by the 
shortcomings of the use of the market model discussed earlier.  
 Hypothesis O3 predicts that the coefficient for the Industrial Tech dummy variable is 
positive, which shows higher average cumulative abnormal returns to the target firm 
shareholders in technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers than in non-
technological M&A conducted by industrial acquirers. Table 4.7 shows that this coefficient is 
positive for all definitions of the average cumulative abnormal returns, except for FCAR (-5;5) 
and FCAR (-10;10), but not statistically significant. Thus, the data provides only partial 
support to Hypothesis O3, and the results are sensitive to the chosen normal return model and 
event window. 
 Hypothesis O4 predicts that the coefficient for the PE Non-tech dummy variable is 
positive. But the regression analysis presented in Table 4.7 shows that it is significantly 
negative for all the specifications of the average cumulative abnormal returns, except for the 
models with the dependent variables MCAR (-1;1), MCAR (-2;2) and MCAR (-5;5) where it 
is not significant. Hence, Hypothesis O4 should be rejected. This shows that private equity 
firms generally pay significantly less for non-technological targets than industrial acquirers. 
But this is not explained solely by the lower propensity of the private equity firms to overpay 
as the agency theory-based literature suggests. This  evidence indicates that industrial 
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acquirers are expected to add more value to the target firms than the private equity ones in 
non-technological M&A. 
 It is also worth noting that the coefficients for the PE Tech variable are generally 
negative and highly significant. The exceptions are the regressions using the market model as 
the normal return model with the event windows from -5 days to +5 days, -2 days to +2 days 
and -1 day to +1 day., where these coefficients are not significant. These results suggest that 
industrial acquirers in non-technological M&A are expected to add more value to the target 
firm than  private equity firms in technological M&A. 
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TABLE 4.7 
Multivariate regressions of returns to target shareholders 
This table contains multivariate ordinary least squares regressions of the cumulative abnormal returns to target shareholders to the indicator 
variables Industrial Tech, PE Tech, PE Non-tech (defined earlier), Cash (takes the value of 1 for all cash financed M&A), Size (target size 
measured as the market cap on day -11 in $ thousands), Ind.-adjusted EBITDA to Assets (measured as the ratio of the target’s EBITDA to 
average Total Assets in fiscal year -1 and normalized by industry-average value based on two-digit SIC codes), Leverage (measured as the ratio 
of the sum of the long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to the common equity of the target firm in fiscal year -1), Prior 12-month BHAR 
(buy-and-hold market adjusted returns of the target firm from day-262 to day -11), Prior 12-month volatility (standard deviation of the daily 
target stock returns from day -262 to day -11), Beta (estimated by the market model from day -262 to day -11). The omitted category is industrial 
non-technological M&A Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent. t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
 MCAR 
(-1;1) 
MCAR 
(-2;2) 
MCAR 
(-5;5) 
MCAR 
(-10;10) 
ACAR 
(-1;1) 
ACAR 
(-2;2) 
ACAR 
(-5;5) 
ACAR 
(-10;10) 
FCAR 
(-1;1) 
FCAR 
(-2;2) 
FCAR 
(-5;5) 
FCAR 
(-10;10) 
Const 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.079*** 0.161*** 0.163*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.149*** 0.130** 
 (0.201) (0.534) (0.839) (2.572) (8.153) (8.083) (7.722) (6.875) (7.229) (6.539) (4.499) (2.460) 
Industrial 
Tech 
0.004 0.012* 0.008 0.040 0.042 0.034 0.041 0.055** 0.026 0.007 -0.020 -0.069 
 (0.606) (1.710) (0.736) (1.443) (1.644) (1.344) (1.642) (2.057) (0.763) (0.159) (-0.235) (-0.445) 
PE Tech -0.008 0.003 -0.010 -0.166*** -0.165*** -0.166*** -0.182*** -0.215*** -0.177*** -0.174*** -0.203*** -0.262*** 
 (-0.634) (0.178) (-0.353) (-3.929) (-4.207) (-4.135) (-4.783) (-5.722) (-4.156) (-3.729) (-3.412) (-2.837) 
PE Non-tech -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.108*** -0.099*** -0.097*** -0.100*** -0.130*** 
 (-1.168) (-1.484) (-1.060) (-3.836) (-3.927) (-3.697) (-3.692) (-4.340) (-3.910) (-3.605) (-3.154) (-2.817) 
Cash 0.004 0.001 0.008 0.110*** 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.119*** 0.125*** 0.152*** 0.199*** 
 (0.984) (0.191) (0.992) (5.248) (5.383) (5.211) (5.060) (4.818) (5.326) (4.706) (3.502) (2.611) 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (0.644) (0.658) (-0.254) (-0.253) (-2.639) (-3.041) (-3.103) (-2.479) (-2.647) (-3.090) (-3.062) (-1.701) 
Ind.-adj. 
EBITDA to 
Assets 
-0.003 0.007 -0.021 -0.029 -0.018 -0.026 -0.053 -0.041 -0.045 -0.070 -0.139 -0.218 
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 (-0.261) (0.690) (-0.745) (-0.788) (-0.432) (-0.600) (-1.616) (-1.216) (-0.833) (-1.069) (-1.486) (-1.328) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.007 0.019 0.035 
 (-0.485) (-0.621) (-0.935) (-0.350) (-0.139) (-0.288) (-0.141) (-0.252) (0.472) (0.636) (1.025) (1.107) 
Prior 12-m 
BHAR 
0.002 0.001 -0.004* -0.032*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.015** -0.021** -0.026** -0.033** -0.041* 
 (1.627) (0.767) (-1.801) (-3.499) (-2.726) (-2.718) (-2.605) (-2.139) (-2.445) (-2.446) (-2.213) (-1.926) 
Prior 12-m 
volatility 
0.011 0.055 0.272 3.035*** 1.175** 1.295** 1.513** 1.973** 1.085* 1.106* 1.091 1.142 
 (0.076) (0.298) (0.868) (3.236) (2.167) (2.315) (2.379) (2.738) (1.864) (1.782) (1.405) (1.054) 
Beta 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.020 -0.047 
 (0.215) (-0.574) (-0.198) (0.515) (0.955) (1.174) (0.650) (0.261) (0.281) (0.118) (-0.715) (-1.000) 
N 1318 1318 1318 1318 1314 1312 1312 1310 1314 1312 1312 1310 R2 0.007 0.007 0.017 0.112 0.069 0.072 0.078 0.083 0.057 0.046 0.026 0.015 
𝐴𝑑𝑗. R2 -0.001 -0.000 0.009 0.105 0.062 0.065 0.071 0.076 0.050 0.038 0.018 0.007 
F-stat 0.911 0.957 2.226 16.458 9.700 10.058 10.987 11.742 7.893 6.218 3.461 1.926 
P(F-stat) 0.522 0.479 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 
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Table 4.8 displays the results of the multiple regression analysis where the 
technological M&A by private equity firms are the omitted category represented by the 
intercept. Consequently, I substitute the dummy variable PE Tech with the dummy variable 
Industrial Non-tech, which takes the value of 1 for non-technological M&A conducted by 
industrial companies. This model specification allows testing Hypothesis O2 and O5 and 
controlling for alternative explanations. All the regression models presented in the table, 
except for those where the dependent variables are MCAR (-1;1) and MCAR (-2; 2), are 
highly significant. The finding of non-significant regression models for MCAR (-1;1) and 
MCAR (-2; 2) are consistent with the results presented in Table 4.4 and Table 4.7 and are 
likely to be explained by the shortcomings of the use of the market model discussed earlier.  
 Hypothesis O2 predicts that the coefficient for the PE Non-tech dummy variable is 
positive, which shows higher average cumulative abnormal returns to the target firm 
shareholders in non-technological M&A conducted by private equity firms than in 
technological M&A conducted by private equity acquirers. Table 4.8 shows that this 
coefficient is positive for all definitions of the average cumulative abnormal returns, except 
for MCAR (-1;1), MCAR (-2;2), and MCAR (-5;5), and generally statistically significant. 
Thus, the data generally supports to Hypothesis O2 suggesting that private equity acquirers 
are better positioned to add value to non-technological targets. However, the significance of 
the results depends on the chosen normal return model and event window.  
 Hypothesis O5 predicts that the coefficient for the Industrial Tech dummy variable is 
positive. Consistently, Table 4.8 shows that it is positive for all the specifications of the 
average cumulative abnormal returns and generally significant at 1% level, except for the 
models with the dependent variables MCAR (-1;1), MCAR (-2;2) and MCAR (-5;5) where it 
is positive but not significant as well as FCAR(-10;10) where it is significant at 5% level. 
Hence, Hypothesis O5 predicting that industrial acquirers are expected to add more value to 
the target firms in technological M&A that private equity acquirers is strongly supported. 
Moreover, the finding is robust to control variables, alternative normal return models and 
event windows. 
 For completeness, it is also interesting to look at the coefficient for the Industrial Non-
tech variable. It is generally positive and highly significant. The exceptions are the non-
significant coefficients for the regressions using the market model and short event windows, 
which are most likely to be driven by the imperfections of the average cumulative abnormal 
returns based on the market model. These results further support the argument that private 
equity firms face substantial disadvantages in technological M&A. 
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TABLE 4.8 
Multivariate regressions of returns to target shareholders 
This table contains multivariate ordinary least squares regressions of the cumulative abnormal returns to target shareholders to the indicator 
variables Industrial Tech, PE Tech, PE Non-tech (defined earlier), Cash (takes the value of 1 for all cash financed M&A), Size (target size 
measured as the market cap on day -11 in $ thousands), Ind.-adjusted EBITDA to Assets (measured as the ratio of the target’s EBITDA to 
average Total Assets in fiscal year -1 and normalized by industry-average value based on two-digit SIC codes), Leverage (measured as the ratio 
of the sum of the long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to the common equity of the target firm in fiscal year -1), Prior 12-month BHAR 
(buy-and-hold market adjusted returns of the target firm from day-262 to day -11), Prior 12-month volatility (standard deviation of the daily 
target stock returns from day -262 to day -11), Beta (estimated by the market model from day -262 to day -11). The omitted category is 
technological M&A conducted by private equity firms. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent. t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 MCAR 
(-1;1) 
MCAR 
(-2;2) 
MCAR 
(-5;5) 
MCAR 
(-10;10) 
ACAR 
(-1;1) 
ACAR 
(-2;2) 
ACAR 
(-5;5) 
ACAR 
(-10;10) 
FCAR 
(-1;1) 
FCAR 
(-2;2) 
FCAR 
(-5;5) 
FCAR 
(-10;10) 
Const -0.007 0.006 -0.001 -0.087* -0.004 -0.003 -0.015 -0.050 -0.021 -0.019 -0.054 -0.133 
 (-0.529) (0.361) (-0.052) (-1.722) (-0.089) (-0.067) (-0.350) (-1.147) (-0.462) (-0.395) (-0.907) (-1.537) 
Industrial 
Tech 
0.012 0.009 0.018 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.200*** 0.223*** 0.269*** 0.203*** 0.181*** 0.184*** 0.194** 
 (0.796) (0.520) (0.622) (4.480) (4.764) (4.543) (5.277) (6.561) (4.329) (3.594) (2.857) (1.996) 
Industrial 
Non-Tech 
0.008 -0.003 0.010 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.182*** 0.215*** 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.203*** 0.262*** 
 (0.634) (-0.178) (0.353) (3.929) (4.207) (4.135) (4.783) (5.722) (4.156) (3.729) (3.412) (2.837) 
PE Non-
Tech 
-0.001 -0.017 -0.004 0.066 0.067 0.073* 0.092** 0.107*** 0.078* 0.077 0.103* 0.133 
 (-0.085) (-0.940) (-0.124) (1.447) (1.552) (1.639) (2.222) (2.595) (1.704) (1.570) (1.785) (1.572) 
Cash 0.004 0.001 0.008 0.110*** 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.119*** 0.125*** 0.152*** 0.199*** 
 (0.984) (0.191) (0.992) (5.248) (5.383) (5.211) (5.060) (4.818) (5.326) (4.706) (3.502) (2.611) 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (0.644) (0.658) (-0.254) (-0.253) (-2.639) (-3.041) (-3.103) (-2.479) (-2.647) (-3.090) (-3.062) (-1.701) 
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Ind.-adj. 
EBITDA 
to Assets 
-0.003 0.007 -0.021 -0.029 -0.018 -0.026 -0.053 -0.041 -0.045 -0.070 -0.139 -0.218 
 (-0.261) (0.690) (-0.745) (-0.788) (-0.432) (-0.600) (-1.616) (-1.216) (-0.833) (-1.069) (-1.486) (-1.328) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.007 0.019 0.035 
 (-0.485) (-0.621) (-0.935) (-0.350) (-0.139) (-0.288) (-0.141) (-0.252) (0.472) (0.636) (1.025) (1.107) 
Prior 12-m 
BHAR 
0.002 0.001 -0.004* -0.032*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.015** -0.021** -0.026** -0.033** -0.041* 
 (1.627) (0.767) (-1.801) (-3.499) (-2.726) (-2.718) (-2.605) (-2.139) (-2.445) (-2.446) (-2.213) (-1.926) 
Prior 12-m 
volatility 
0.011 0.055 0.272 3.035*** 1.175** 1.295** 1.513** 1.973*** 1.085* 1.106* 1.091 1.142 
 (0.076) (0.298) (0.868) (3.236) (2.167) (2.315) (2.379) (2.738) (1.864) (1.782) (1.405) (1.054) 
Beta 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.020 -0.047 
 (0.215) (-0.574) (-0.198) (0.515) (0.955) (1.174) (0.650) (0.261) (0.281) (0.118) (-0.715) (-1.000) 
N 1314 1312 1312 1310 1314 1312 1312 1310 1314 1312 1312 1310 
𝑅2 0.007 0.007 0.017 0.112 0.069 0.072 0.078 0.083 0.057 0.046 0.026 0.015 
𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅2 -0.001 -0.000 0.009 0.105 0.062 0.065 0.071 0.076 0.050 0.038 0.018 0.007 
F-stat 0.911 0.957 2.226 16.458 9.700 10.058 10.987 11.742 7.893 6.218 3.461 1.926 
P(F-stat) 0.522 0.479 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 
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3.6. Discussion and conclusions 
In this study, I analyzed the role of ownership in value creation in M&A, both in 
general and when distinguishing technological and non-technological M&A in particular. 
Doing this I considered two types of acquirers - industrial firms and private equity firms – as 
new parents for the target company. While the agency theory predicts that private equity firms 
are superior parents for the target firm relative to industrial acquirers in general, I argued that 
restructuring undertaken and performance incentives created by private equity partnerships 
have higher potential to add value in non-technological M&A. By contrast, adding value to 
the acquired technology requires access to complementary assets, willingness to take risk and 
longer-term R&D investments, which are inconsistent with the investment strategy and assets 
available to private equity firms and make them inferior acquirers in technological M&A 
relative to industrial companies. 
The results show that the target firm shareholders earn significantly higher returns in 
M&A conducted by industrial acquirers than in M&A where the acquirer is a private equity 
firm. This finding does not support the argument that industrial acquirers add on average less 
value to the target than private equity firms. It is highly unlikely to be driven solely by the 
propensity of the managers of the industrial companies with excess free cash flow to overpay 
in M&A as the differences in the abnormal returns remain significantly positive when we 
control for all-cash deals. The results are also robust to controls for the target’s pre-merger 
performance and uncertainty. The evidence indicates that the synergies expected by industrial 
acquirers justify the higher price paid for the target firm. 
The finding of generally highly significant positive differences between the average 
cumulative abnormal announcement returns to the target firm shareholders in technological 
M&A conducted by industrial acquirers and those in technological M&A conducted by 
private equity firms provides a strong empirical support for the argument that private equity 
firms are relatively worse positioned to add value to high-technology target firms. The finding 
holds when controlling for all cash deals where industrial acquirers avoid the scrutiny of the 
stock market and thus are more likely to overpay. The finding of the generally significant 
positive differences between the average cumulative abnormal announcement returns to the 
target firm shareholders in non-technological M&A conducted by private equity firms and 
those in technological M&A conducted by private equity firms further supports the argument 
by indicating that the difference in abnormal returns in technological M&A by industrial and 
private equity firms is unlikely to be driven by the superior ability of the latter to negotiate 
lower deal prices. In addition, the analysis shows that private equity firms add generally 
significantly less value to the target firm in technological M&A than industrial acquirers do in 
non-technological M&A. This additional evidence is also consistent with the argument that 
private equity firms are not positioned well to add value in technological M&A. 
The generally significant positive differences between the abnormal returns to the 
target firm shareholders in non-technological M&A by private equity firms and technological 
M&A by private equity firms provide a strong support for our prediction that private equity 
firms add more value to the target firm in non-technological M&A than in technological ones. 
These differences are robust to the control variables, which suggest that the ownership 
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strategy of the private equity firms makes them inferior parents for high-technology targets. 
Further, the results lead us to reject the hypothesis that private equity firms are expected to 
add more value to the target firm in non-technological M&A than industrial acquirers. This is 
unlikely to be explained by the systematic overpayment by industrial acquirers because the 
differences in the abnormal returns remain significant when controlling for all-cash financed 
M&A, which are associated with the higher likelihood of overpayment. The result is robust to 
other alternative explanations such as the differences in the target’s pre-merger performance 
and uncertainty. 
We find weak support to the hypothesis that industrial acquirers add more value to the 
target firm in technological M&A than in non-technological ones as the difference in the 
abnormal returns to the target firm shareholders between the two groups of M&A are 
generally positive but non-significant when we control for alternative explanations. If we look 
at this finding together with the evidence of significantly higher abnormal returns to the 
acquiring firm shareholders in technological M&A conducted by public companies presented 
in section 3 of this dissertation, the most reasonable explanation for non-significant results is 
that industrial acquirers manage to capture the additional synergies offered by the technology 
assets of the target firms. This can happen because the value of these synergies depends on the 
asset complementarity between the acquiring and target firms and thus is not equal across the 
competing bidding firms. To explore the argument further we would need to look at the 
announcement returns to the corresponding acquiring firm shareholders. However, many of 
the acquiring firms in our sample are private and thus do not have stock return data, which 
prevents us from conducting such an analysis. 
It should be noted that while the obtained results are generally highly significant for 
the regression models using the market-adjusted and Fama-French models for measuring 
abnormal returns across all the event windows, they are generally not significant for the 
regressions where we use the market model for measuring abnormal returns. There are two 
possible explanations for these non-significant results. First, beta may be an inadequate 
measure of the systematic risk. Prior studies show that the three factor Fama-French model 
that accounts also for the market cap and book-to-market better explains the stock returns 
(Fama & French, 1992) and thus should be preferred as the normal return model in event 
studies (Barber & Lyon, 1997). Second, as the beta of the target firm becomes more volatile 
close to the announcement date (Hackbarth & Morellec, 2008), the market-adjusted model, 
which sets the beta value equal to 1, becomes superior to the market model (McKinlay, 1997). 
Otherwise, the obtained results are robust to different approaches to estimating abnormal 
stock returns. I discuss below their implications for theory and practice. 
3.6.1. Implications for theory and research 
The significant differences in the abnormal returns to the target firm shareholders 
across the type of M&A and acquirer (industrial or private equity) reported in this study show 
that the typical ownership strategy of private equity firms is adds more value for non-
technological targets than for technological ones. This essentially provides a boundary 
condition to the agency theory based argument dominating in the literature on LBO 
performance that stronger performance incentives associated with debt financing combined 
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with the competent restructuring undertaken by private equity firms makes them “best owners” 
for the target firm. The evidence provided in this study indicates that the complementary 
assets of industrial acquirers dramatically increase the value-creation potential of 
technological M&A and make them superior parents relative to private equity firms in such 
deals. 
Further, this work extends the literature on technological M&A by bringing into the 
discussion the impact of ownership on performance. Prior research on technological M&A 
focuses predominantly on the impact of the chosen integration strategy on the innovation 
outcomes of the deal. While this is a very important issue for industrial acquirers that add 
value by complementing the targets’ technology assets with their manufacturing, distribution, 
marketing and other resources, it is less relevant for private equity firms that merely 
contribute with capital and management team. Effectively this category of acquirers remains 
outside the scope of the prior literature on technological M&A, even though they account for 
a substantial portion of M&A activity in high-technology sectors. Hence, by considering both 
private equity and industrial acquirers this work contributes to building a more comprehensive 
theory that takes into account different types of acquirers and shows the contingent impact of 
different ownership strategies on M&A performance. 
In addition, this study emphasizes the importance of analysis of ex ante M&A 
performance. While prior studies that focus on longitudinal innovation effects of 
technological M&A show their effectiveness as means for leveraging R&D, this analysis of 
announcement returns shows the expected total value-added by industrial and private equity 
firms to targets in technological and non-technological M&A. This shift of focus from the ex 
post innovation performance to ex ante value-creation also makes feasible comparison of 
private equity and industrial acquirers and study of performance effects not confounded by 
subsequent events like further M&A and changes of leadership. 
3.6.2. Implications for practice 
This work emphasizes the role of the so-called “best owner” mind-set for value-
creation in M&A. The results show that gains to the shareholders of the target company vary 
significantly across different types of acquirers. This makes a disciplined process of strategic 
selection of potential acquirers key for maximizing gains in the transactions. Moreover, the 
obtained results indicate that the difference in the shareholder returns is driven largely by the 
availability of complementary assets. This implies that assessment of the acquirer’s asset mix 
and the fit of the target’s technology to the overall strategy of the acquiring firm should be 
important criteria for selection of acquirers. Similar arguments hold for acquiring firms as 
well.
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4. Cross-border vs. domestic M&A 
 
4.1. Value creation in domestic and cross-border M&A 
M&A are expected to create value for the acquiring firm shareholders if the expected 
synergies are greater than the premium paid for the target firm. The abundant literature on 
domestic M&A considers three major groups of synergies: (1) improved productive efficiency 
resulting from the economies of scale and scope (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Seth, 1990; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1991; Singh & Montgomery, 1987), (2) increased market power (Eckbo, 
1983; Shahrur, 2005; Stigler, 1964) and (3) financial synergies such as tax advantages, the 
firm-level diversification benefits, and gains from the market-timing (Amit & Livnat, 1988; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 2003; Williamson, 1975). 
Seth, Song, and Petit (2002) argue that even though most of the sources of synergies in 
cross-border M&A are similar to those in domestic deals, the acquiring firms benefit more 
from particular types of synergies in cross-border M&A than in domestic ones because “there 
exist different types and degrees of frictions across international markets compared with 
domestic markets” (Seth, Song, & Petit, 2002: p.924). Particularly, they argue that the 
acquiring firms benefit from the internalization of the proprietary knowledge and the firm-
level diversification more in cross-border M&A than in domestic ones. 
Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; Hennart, 1982; Teece, 2000) suggests 
that the benefits from the internalization, i.e. internal exploitation, of the proprietary 
knowledge increase as the information, bargaining and enforcement costs associated with the 
market exchange of this proprietary knowledge grow. Higher information asymmetry and 
uncertainty related to selling or licensing, i.e. the market exchange, of the proprietary 
knowledge in international markets than in domestic ones (Hennart, 1982; Kang & Kim, 2010) 
lead to higher transaction costs and thus the higher benefits from the internalization of the 
proprietary knowledge in the cross-border setting (Seth, Song, & Petit, 2002). 
Hence, the higher market frictions associated with the proprietary knowledge 
exchange in international markets create two sources of gains that have higher value in cross-
border M&A than in domestic M&A, namely (1) gains from the internal exploitation of the 
acquirer’s proprietary knowledge in a foreign country and (2) gains from the internal 
exploitation of the target’s proprietary knowledge in the acquirer’s domestic or other foreign 
markets (Seth, Song, & Petit, 2002). Naturally, these two types of synergies are particularly 
relevant in high-technology industries where the proprietary knowledge is the cornerstone of 
the competitive advantage (McEvily, Eisenhardt, & Prescott, 2004). 
The firm-level diversification is another source of value creation in cross-border M&A 
that is commonly referred to in the international business literature (Hisey & Caves, 1985; 
Hymer, 1976; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Seth et al., 2002). Though prior empirical studies 
(Lang & Stulz, 1994; Berger & Ofek, 1995) show that diversified firms significantly 
underperform undiversified ones, Seth and colleagues (2002) argue that the diversification 
benefits should exist in cross-border M&A. The reason is that individual investors can 
diversify their portfolios more efficiently on their own in their domestic but not in foreign 
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capital markets. At the same time, the stock return correlations are much lower across 
countries than within countries, which suggests that it is not possible to obtain the same 
degree of risk reduction with domestic portfolios. This benefit of cross-border M&A relative 
to domestic ones should decrease with the integration of the capital markets though and is 
likely to be limited (Seth, Song, & Petit, 2002). 
In addition, Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) follow Froot and Stein (1991) who argue 
that strong foreign currency creates a purchasing advantage for foreign acquirers relative to 
domestic ones as it increases their relative net wealth. This relative advantage becomes 
particularly important in industries with higher information asymmetries such as high-
technology industries because higher information asymmetries make it more costly to 
purchase assets with external financing and thus make the acquirers rely more on their net 
wealth to pay for the deal. 
To sum up, the literature on foreign direct investment and cross-border M&A suggests 
that the acquiring firms in cross-border M&A should outperform the acquiring firms in 
domestic M&A, especially in high-technology industries where the benefits from the 
internalization of the proprietary knowledge in the international setting and the purchasing 
advantages created by favorable exchange rate movements are likely to be higher. 
The available empirical evidence is, however, mixed. While some authors report 
significant positive returns to foreign acquirers that indicate their superior performance when 
compared to the negative returns to domestic acquirers found in earlier studies (Markides & 
Ittner, 1994; Morck & Yeung, 1992), some find that foreign acquirers experience negative 
stock returns upon the announcement (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Conn et al., 2005; Eckbo & 
Thorburn, 2000), and the others find insignificant returns to foreign acquirers (Eun, Kolodny, 
& Scheraga, 1996; Gregory & McCorriston, 2005). Similarly, some researchers report 
significant positive correlation between the R&D intensity and the returns to foreign acquirers 
(Conn et al., 2005; Eun et al., 1996; Morck & Yeung, 1992), whereas others do not find a 
significant relationship (Markides & Ittner, 1994). This indicates the need to revise the 
arguments discussed above in the light of forces that may have a detrimental impact on the 
acquiring firm performance in cross-border M&A.  
4.2. The impact of institutional differences on cross-border M&A 
performance 
Cultural distance: incentives and monitoring problems vs. routines upgrading 
 Prior literature in international business argues that institutional differences between 
the countries where the acquiring and target firms are located may present substantial 
challenges for cross-border M&A (Dikova, Sahib, & van Witteloostuijn, 2010; Jandik & Kali, 
2009; Kang & Kim, 2010; Kogut & Singh, 1988). Researchers generally distinguish two types 
of institutional differences: informal and formal. In this subsection, I focus on the impact of 
informal institutions on the cross-border M&A performance leaving the discussion of the 
effects of formal institutions for the next subsection.  
 Informal institutions are those embedded in the national culture (Dikova et al., 2010; 
Kang & Kim, 2010; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). Morosini et al. 
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(1998) define the national cultural distance as the discrepancy in “norms, routines and 
repertoires for organizational design, new product development, and other aspects of 
management that are found in the acquirer’s and the target’s countries of origin”. Following 
the early work by Kogut and Singh (1988), researcher operationalize national cultural distance 
through Hofstede’s (1993) model and focus particularly on: (1) the “individualism-
collectivism” polarity related to innovation, inventiveness and entrepreneurship and (2) 
“uncertainty avoidance” and “power distance” associated with decision-making practices and 
control routines (Morosini et al., 1998). 
 The two major challenges associated with the national culture distance are: (1) 
incentives problem (Chari & Chang, 2009) and (2) monitoring problem (Kang & Kim, 2010).  
Chari and Chang (2009) argue that significant cultural distance necessitates the use of 
local managers for running the target firm operations after the deal completion because they 
can better manage relationships with the local suppliers, customers, employees and the 
government. However, after the deal completion local managers are not directly subject to the 
stock market discipline, have a much weaker linkage between performance and reward, and 
can potentially hold up the transfer of valuable tacit assets.  
This problem of providing performance incentives to the local managers is aggravated 
by the monitoring disadvantages of foreign acquirers. Kang and Kim (2010) show that 
cultural distance combined with the physical distance and language barriers makes it difficult 
and expensive for the headquarters to obtain accurate information about the foreign subsidiary, 
which compromises performance monitoring.  
By contrast, Morosini et al. (1998) argue that significant cultural distance makes cross-
border M&A a superior strategy for achieving human capital-based resource advantages by 
quickly accessing a set of routines and repertoires, particularly those related to new product 
development,  that are different from those of the acquirer and are not easily imitable by 
competitors. Consistently, Bjorkman, Stahl, and Vaara (2007) show that a certain degree of 
cultural differences is positively related to complementary capabilities and Chakrabarti, 
Gupta-Mukherjee, and Jayaraman (2009) report a positive relationship between cultural 
distance and cross-border M&A performance. 
Formal institutions: uncertainty and adverse selection vs. institutional arbitrage 
 Dikova et al. (2010) define formal institutions as the hierarchical system of rules or 
laws that jointly regulate business transactions. They argue that large differences in formal 
institutions lead to higher deal costs, time needed for completion, and uncertainty around the 
deals. Following Homburg and Bucerius (2006), I can further argue that the resultant 
prolonged period of  uncertainty negatively impacts relationships with customers and 
employees and thus has a detrimental impact on M&A performance.  
 Jandik and Kali (2009) focus on the differences in the legal and accounting systems. 
The authors argue that these differences negatively affect the ability to evaluate the 
performance of the target firm. The absence or inferiority of the objective performance 
metrics exacerbates the adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970) due to the increased 
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information asymmetry between the acquiring and target firm and the resultant higher 
prescreening and valuation costs. This adverse selection problem can make cross-border 
M&A an inferior strategy for accessing complementary assets located abroad (Chari & Chang, 
2009; Chen & Hennart, 2004).  
 The adverse impact of institutional differences is mitigated by cross-border acquisition 
experience institutionalized in the acquirers routines for screening, selecting, taking over and 
integrating a foreign company (Nadolska & Barkema, 2007). 
 Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, and Paunescu (2010) add a twist into the previous 
discussion by arguing that certain combinations formal institutional conditions such as poor 
employment protection, weak collective bargaining, extensive university training and a large 
stock market are necessary for competing in high-tech industries with radical innovations. As 
a result, multinationals competing in high-technology industries can engage in cross-border 
M&A to benefit from the available opportunities for “institutional arbitrage”.  
4.3.Technological and non-technological M&A 
Technological M&A encompass transactions in which technology is a component of 
acquired firm’s assets (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). We can distinguish technology realized in 
products, technology embedded in processes and technological skills and experience of 
inventors. Prior literature argues that technology embodied in products and processes (Makri, 
Hitt, & Lane, 2010) as well as the aggregate technical knowledge of inventors (Kapoor & Lim, 
2007) manifests in patents, which serve as an empirical indicator of technology among the 
assets of the target firm (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 2010; 
Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). 
Technological M&A are a means of gaining a competitive advantage in high-tech 
industries by facilitating continuous product innovation (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999; 
Graebner, 2004; McEvily, Eisenhardt, & Prescott, 2004; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Ranft & 
Lord, 2002). Technological M&A enable the acquiring firm to: (1) benefit from the target’s 
technology by adding the complementary manufacturing, marketing and financial assets 
necessary for its successful commercialization (Puranam et al., 2006; Teece, 1986)  and (2) 
leverage its innovation capabilities by integrating the two knowledge bases (Ahuja & Katila, 
2001; Ernst & Vitt, 2000; Graebner, 2004; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 2010). 
These two sources for value-creation are not available in non-technological M&A. 
Instead, the latter can potentially create value through operating synergies resulting from the 
economies of scale (Eckbo, 1983; Fee & Thomas, 2004; Heron & Lie, 2002; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1991) and scope (Barney, 2011; Porter, 1980; Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1985), 
increased market power (Eckbo, 1983; Fee & Thomas, 2004; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; 
Sapienza, 2002; Shahrur, 2005),economies of internal capital markets (Williamson, 1975), tax 
advantages (Amit & Livnat, 1988; Hayn, 1989; Jensen & Ruback, 1983) and market-timing 
(Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). 
However, the value-creation potential of M&A for the acquiring firm is limited by the 
competitive bidding process that allows the target firm capture most of the gains (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983; Walker, 2000) and managerial failures in the deal process (Haspeslagh & 
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Jemison, 1991; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) and post-merger integration (Cording, Christmann, & 
King, 2008; Datta, 1991; Datta & Grant, 1990; Zollo & Singh, 2004). In addition, some M&A 
are driven by managerial self-interest seeking (Jensen, 1986) and hubris (Roll, 1986) rather 
than synergy-seeking motives (Seth et al., 2002). 
4.4. Hypotheses 
The acquiring firms in non-technological domestic M&A cannot gain from 
commercialization of the target’s technology assets or leveraging its own innovation 
capabilities by grafting the target’s technology into its own technology base similarly to the 
acquiring firms in technological domestic M&A because the targets in non-technological 
domestic M&A do not provide technology inputs for the acquiring firm (Ahuja & Katila, 
2001). However, nothing prevents the acquiring firms in technological domestic M&A from 
benefitting on average from the economies of scale and scope, the increased market power 
and financial synergies offered by the deal to the same extent as the acquiring firms in non-
technological M&A do. Hence, there should exist two additional sources of gains for 
acquirers in technological M&A based on the target’s technology assets. 
The earlier empirical evidence of the significant positive abnormal returns to the target 
firms and non-significant returns to the acquiring firms upon the M&A announcement (Jensen 
& Ruback, 1983) suggested that the acquiring firms transfer the expected value of the 
synergies offered by the combination of the two firms to the shareholders of the target firm in 
the competitive market for corporate control. The value of the technology assets of the target 
firm for a potential bidder depends on the degree of their complementarity with the bidder’s 
own technology, production, distribution and marketing assets. Given that the degree of asset 
complementarity varies across the bidding firms due to the path dependent process of 
developing capabilities and the different market positioning, the value of the target’s 
technology assets should vary for different bidders. Hence, the bidding process in 
technological M&A should be asymmetrically competitive with the different value of the 
target firm for different potential acquirers. This asymmetrically competitive market for 
corporate control allows the acquiring firm to capture the value of the unique synergies 
offered by the target’s technology assets. This reasoning leads to Hypothesis L1. 
Hypothesis L1. Acquirers in technological domestic M&A are expected to create 
higher shareholders’ value than acquirers in non-technological domestic M&A. 
 Prior research in international business has established that institutional differences 
between the countries where the acquiring and target firms are located has a substantial 
impact on cross-border M&A performance (Chari & Chang, 2009; Kang & Kim, 2010; Kogut 
& Singh, 1988; Morosini et al., 1998; Schneider et al., 2010). Further, I argue that 
technological cross-border M&A are better positioned to take advantages of the institutional 
differences. First, Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998) provide a strong empirical support to 
their argument that cross-border M&A give multinational companies access to diverse 
routines and repertoires that enhance the performance of the combined firm over time. 
Particularly, they find that it is routines and repertoires “related to inventiveness, innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and decision-making practices” (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998: p. 153) 
that are relevant for the performance improvements following cross-border M&A. These 
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routines and repertoires facilitate new product development and are difficult to develop and 
imitate across national cultures (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). Further, the positive 
impact of these diverse, location-embedded routines and repertoires accessed through cross-
border M&A should be particularly significant in high-technology industries where the 
capabilities to develop new products are key for survival (McEvily, Eisenhardt, & Prescott, 
2004). Though we could argue that the cultural distance may also have a negative effect on 
the M&A performance by impeding the transfer of these routines and repertoires related to 
new product development, Morosini and colleagues (1998) provide evidence that this 
argument does not hold in practice. The acquiring firms use rotations, training and 
communications to successfully transfer the routines and repertoires of the target firm. This is 
consistent with more recent studies (Bjorkman et al., 2007; Brannen & Peterson, 2009) that 
suggest that the acquiring firms mitigate the disruptive effects of the cultural distance on 
performance by using a number of available social integration tools. In addition, Bjorkman 
and colleagues (2007) find that the cultural distance is positively related to complementarity 
of capabilities and Makri et al. (2010) show that the latter is positively related to the post-
merger innovation performance, a major value-driver in technological M&A. 
Second, Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop and Paunescu (2010) show that cross-border 
M&A in high-tech industries “act as a functional equivalent to institutions that support 
knowledge production in the home economy” (p. 246). Essentially, the cross-border 
technological M&A give the acquiring firm access to foreign cluster “systems of innovation” 
where it can benefit from knowledge spillovers and access to the specialized complementary 
assets that are not available in the home economy (Nachum & Wymbs, 2005; Schneider, 
Schulze-Bentrop, & Paunescu, 2010; Reve, 2011). 
Hypothesis L2. Acquirers in technological cross-border M&A are expected to create 
higher shareholders’ value than acquirers in non-technological cross-border M&A. 
Prior literature shows that cross-border M&A suffer from adverse selection, incentives 
and monitoring problems. Kapoor and Lim (2007) that these problems are equally present for 
technological M&A in the domestic context. First, information asymmetry surrounding the 
value of the target technology and its R&D capabilities combined with the absence of the long 
track-record make technological targets difficult to valuate ex-ante. Second, the ability to 
unlock value in technological M&A depends on the performance of the key inventors from 
the target firm who now get less of the value created and can opportunistically hold up the 
transfer of valuable tacit knowledge. Thirdly, monitoring inventors is both difficult due to 
their work nature and may be counter productive. At the same time, cross-border M&A 
provide access to a more diverse pool of valuable technology assets. In addition, developed in 
the local context these assets are more likely to be heterogeneous and thus complementary to 
those already possessed by the acquiring firm (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). This creates 
a larger potential for value-creating in cross-border technological M&A relative to domestic 
ones. 
Hypothesis L3. Acquirers in technological cross-border M&A are expected to create 
higher shareholders’ value than acquirers in technological domestic M&A. 
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 Following Seth, Song, and Petit (2002), we suggest that the sources and value of 
synergies in cross-border and domestic non-technological M&A are not identical. Particularly, 
the benefits of the firm-level diversification are larger in non-technological cross-border 
M&A than in domestic ones due to the more segmented international capital market and the 
inability of the individual investors to replicate the international diversification benefits with 
domestic portfolios. Further, the acquiring firms can benefit from the favorable currency 
movements in non-technological cross-border M&A but not in non-technological domestic 
M&A (Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991). In addition, Hennart (1982) suggests that the internal 
exploitation of intangible assets such as brand name leads to higher benefits relative to its 
market exchange through, for example, franchising in the cross-border setting relative to the 
domestic because of the higher monitoring and enforcement costs. Thus, the acquirers in 
cross-border non-technological M&A have these three sources of additional value creation 
relative to the acquirers in domestic non-technological M&A. 
Some authors suggest (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Chari & Chang, 2009; Jandik & Kali, 
2009; Kang & Kim, 2010; Dikova et al., 2010), however, that the additional gains available 
for the acquiring firm in non-technological cross-border M&A relative to non-technological 
domestic M&A may be lost due to additional managerial problems created by the national 
differences, namely the cultural distance and the differences in the legal accounting systems. 
At the same time, Bjorkman and colleagues (2007) and Brannen & Peterson (2009) suggest 
that the social integration tools used by the foreign acquirers mitigate the negative impact of 
the cultural distance. Consistently, Morosini and collegues (1998) provide evidence that the 
acquiring companies successfully overcome the obstacles for managing the target firm in a 
culturally distant locations through social integration. Further, the adoption of IFRS 
accounting standards and the international proliferation of best practices make the differences 
in the legal and accounting systems lower. Thus, the negative effects of the national 
differences on the performance of non-technological cross-border M&A are likely to be 
limited. This leads to Hypothesis L4. 
Hypothesis L4. Acquirers in non-technological cross-border M&A are expected to 
create higher shareholders’ value than acquirers in non-technological domestic M&A. 
4.5. Methods 
4.5.1. Sample 
 My sample of M&A comes from Zephyr database of M&A provided by Bureau van 
Dijk. It contains detailed deal and company information, including: announcement and 
completion dates, deal type, deal value, deal financing, method of payment, deal rationale, 
initial and acquired stakes, company identifying information such as ticker symbols, SIC 
codes and country codes. Zephyr database encompasses M&A that have been announced in 
the period from January 1997. 
 I extract all transactions characterized by Zephyr as acquisitions, M&A and 
institutional buy-outs that were announced between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2012 
and that had been completed by US acquirers before December 31, 2012. This results in a 
preliminary sample of 75246 observations. However, I need a five year history of M&A 
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activity to measure M&A experience, which reduces my sample to the period from January 1, 
2002 to December 31, 2012 with 61428 observations. 
 I am interested only in the transactions that result in obtaining the controlling interest 
in the target firm, i.e. those with the initial stake of less than 50% and the stake after the deal 
of 51% or more. 55787 transactions satisfy the criteria. 
 Further, I require the acquirer be a publicly traded company with the stock price data 
available in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database 252 trading days 
before deal announcement and 10 days after the deal announcement. To match data with 
Zephyr database I use company ticker symbols. This procedure leaves 2889 observations. 
 In addition, I require the acquirer have data available from COMPUSTAT one fiscal 
year before the announcement and at least one fiscal year following the announcement. Again, 
I use ticker symbols for matching databases. This trims the sample further to 2000 
observations. 
 Finally, I restrict the sample to deals whose value exceeds 1% of the market cap of the 
acquiring firms 11 trading days before announcement (Harford, Humphery-Jenner, & Powell, 
2012). As a result, 1004 observations remain in the effective sample (see Table 5.1 for an 
overview of the sampling procedure). 
TABLE 5.1 
The Number of M&A Announced and Completed by US Publicly Traded Acquirers 
The column labeled “Announced” lists the number of M&A announced in the given year by 
US publicly traded companies. The column labeled “Completed” lists the number of 
transactions completed in the given year. The column labeled “Data” indicates the number of 
M&A that resulted in gaining the controlling interest in the target firm and satisfy the data 
availability criteria for the acquirers. The column labeled “Sample” lists the 1271 transactions 
that also satisfy the other sampling criteria. The columns labeled “Data” and “Sample” are 
based on the announcement year. 
Year Announced Completed Data Sample 
2002 298 217 2 1 
2003 369 333 51 22 
2004 420 423 316 161 
2005 433 418 324 162 
2006 472 446 307 143 
2007 520 563 269 140 
2008 323 386 211 92 
2009 276 260 151 71 
2010 325 309 201 115 
2011 315 311 168 97 
2012 254 300 0 0 
     
Total 4005 3966 2000 1004 
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4.5.2. Distinction between technological and non-technological M&A 
 Following the prior research, I define technological M&A as acquisitions of high-
technology targets with technology being a part of the acquired assets (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; 
Graebner, 2004; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). I operationalize this 
definition using the following algorithm. 
 Firstly, I identify high-technology targets using the three-digit SIC code combinations 
recommended by Kile and Phillips (2009) for sampling high-technology firms. These include: 
283 (drugs), 357 (Computer and Office Equipment), 366 (Communication Equipment), 367 
(Electronic Components and Accessories), 382 (Laboratory, Optic, Measure, Control 
Instruments), 384 (Surgical, Medical, Dental Instruments), 481 (Telephone Communications), 
482 (Miscellaneous Communication Services), 489 (Communication Services, NEC), 737 
(Computer Programming, Data Processing), 873 (Research, Development, Testing Services). 
Kile and Phillips (2009) have shown that these codes, commonly used to identify high-tech 
firms in empirical research, most closely match their classification benchmark based on the 
descriptions of the firms’ revenue generating processes and business operations. 354 targets in 
my sample satisfy this criterion. 
 Secondly, prior research argues that technology manifests in patents, which represent 
its outcomes (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010). Thus, 
I require that targets in technological M&A register at least 1 patent before the announcement 
date. This requirement is consistent with prior research on technological M&A (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007) and reflects the 
requirement that technology be part of the acquired assets. I use Orbis database provided by 
Bureau van Dijk for tracking the patenting activity of the target firm. I match the data on 
patents with the sample using the unique target BvD ID numbers common for Zephyr and 
Orbis databases. In my sample, 187 targets had registered at least 1 patent before the 
acquisition. 
 Finally, Ahuja and Katila (2001) recognize that not all technologies are patentable and 
use news stories associated with the M&A in their sample to check whether some non-
patented technology was a part of the acquired assets. I follow a similar approach and check 
the deal rationales provided by Zephyr database mention “technology”, “R&D”, or 
“innovation” of the target firm as motivating factors for or components of the acquired assets. 
Then I classify M&A as technological if the target has a high-technology SIC code and either 
has some patenting activity before the announcement or technology was reported to be part of 
the deal motivation or acquired assets. 356 out of 1106 transactions in the sample report 
technology, R&D, and innovation capabilities as a motivation or part of the acquired assets. 
The total number of M&A classified as technological is 249 (see Table 5.2 for a more detailed 
sample distribution). 
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TABLE 5.2 
Sample Distribution by Year and Type of M&A 
This table contains the time-series distribution of a sample of M&A conducted by US publicly 
traded companies in 2002-2011 from Zephyr. The transactions are classified into years based 
on announcement dates. The column labeled “All deals” lists the number of M&A in a given 
year that are included into the sample. The column labeled “Technological” lists the number 
of deals from the sample where the target operated in a high-tech industry, as defined by (Kile 
& Phillips, 2009) based on its 3-digit SIC code, and either the target had at least one patent in 
the fiscal year preceding the acquisition or “technology”, “R&D”, and “innovation” were 
reported as part of the deal motivation. The column labeled “Non-technological” indicates the 
number of M&A that do not satisfy the abovementioned classification criteria. 
Year All deals Technological Non-
technological 
2002 1 1 0 
2003 22 5 17 
2004 161 28 133 
2005 162 33 129 
2006 143 36 107 
2007 140 38 102 
2008 92 27 65 
2009 71 20 51 
2010 115 32 83 
2011 97 29 68 
    
Total 1004 249 755 
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4.5.3. Distinction between domestic and cross-border M&A 
In this paper I identify domestic and cross-border M&A by matching the acquirer and 
target country codes reported by Zephyr. If both are US, then the deal is classified as domestic. 
Otherwise, I classify the deal as cross-border. This procedure results in 534 domestic and 470 
cross-border deals. Table 5.3 displays the time series sample distribution by the target origin 
(domestic vs. cross-border) and deal type (technological vs. non-technological).  
TABLE 5.3 
Sample Distribution by Year, Target Origin and Deal Type 
This table contains the time-series distribution of a sample of M&A conducted by US publicly 
traded companies in 2002-2011 from Zephyr. The transactions are classified into years based 
on announcement dates. The column labeled “All deals” lists the number of M&A in a given 
year that are included into the sample. The columns labeled “Domestic” list the number of 
deals from the sample where the target has the country code “US” (from Zephyr). The 
columns labeled “Cross-border” list the number of deals from the sample where the target 
does not have the country code “US” (from Zephyr). The column labeled “Tech” lists the 
number of deals from the sample where the target operated in a high-tech industry, as defined 
by (Kile & Phillips, 2009) based on its 3-digit SIC code, and either the target had at least one 
patent in the fiscal year preceding the acquisition or “technology”, “R&D”, and “innovation 
capabilities” were reported as part of the deal motivation. The column labeled “Non-tech” 
indicates the number of M&A that do not satisfy the abovementioned classification criteria. 
Year All deals Domestic Cross-border 
Tech Non-tech Tech Non-tech Tech Non-tech 
2002 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2003 5 17 4 9 1 8 
2004 28 133 22 62 6 71 
2005 33 129 22 66 11 63 
2006 36 107 22 54 14 53 
2007 38 102 32 48 6 54 
2008 27 65 16 29 11 36 
2009 20 51 16 19 4 32 
2010 32 83 23 38 9 45 
2011 29 68 23 29 6 39 
Total 249 755 180 354 69 401 
 
4.5.4. Measures 
Dependent variables. Cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CARs) represent gains to 
the shareholders upon M&A announcement. They are commonly used as a measure of 
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expected M&A performance (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, & Zutter, 2008; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Harford et al., 2012; Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2002; Zollo & Meier, 2008). To 
construct the variable I use daily return data for each of the acquirers from CRSP. Following 
the event study methodology (MacKinlay, 1997), I estimate CARs as sums of the market 
model residuals over a given event window: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ��𝑅𝑖𝑡 − �𝛼�𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡��𝑇
𝑡=𝜏
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖is the cumulative abnormal return for transaction 𝑖, event window 𝑡𝜖[𝜏,𝑇], 𝑅𝑖𝑡  
stands for the acquirer’s return for transaction 𝑖  and day 𝑡 , the term �𝛼�𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡�  is the 
expected return predicted by the market model. I estimate the market model parameters by the 
OLS regression over the estimation window from trading day – 262 to day – 11 relative to the 
deal announcement date (0): 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  stands for the acquirer’s return for transaction 𝑖 and day 𝑡 , 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the daily return 
to the CRSP value-weighted market index. For robustness, I use four event windows (all dates 
are trading days relative to the announcement date (0)): day - 1 to day + 1, day - 2 to day + 2, 
day - 5 to day + 5, and day -10 to day +10. Further, I denote CARs corresponding to the event 
windows listed above as CAR (1), CAR (2), CAR (5) and CAR (10).  
In addition, I complement the market model based cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) 
with the market-adjusted model based ones. The market adjusted model assumes the intercept 
of 0 and beta value of 1. Inclusion of these abnormal return measures is aimed to account for 
biases in the estimated beta coefficients. I denote the market-adjusted model based abnormal 
returns corresponding to the four event windows as ACAR (1), ACAR (2), ACAR (5) and 
ACAR (10). 
Independent variable. I use three dummy variables identifying the four categories of 
interest as independent variables. Domestic tech is a dummy variable which takes the value of 
1 for M&A classified as domestic technological. Cross-border tech is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 for M&A classified as cross-border technological. Cross-border 
non-tech is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for M&A classified as cross-border 
non-technological. Thus the reference category is the domestic non-technological M&A. 
Control variables. I control for several acquirer, target and deal characteristics that 
may influence M&A performance. 
Recent M&A experience is the number of M&A conducted by the acquiring firm prior 
to the focal deal. A number of studies (Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994; Fowler & Schmidt, 
1989; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Puranam et al., 2006; Zollo & Singh, 2004) report 
“learning-by-doing” effect in M&A that manifests in superior target selection, deal execution 
and integration capabilities of frequent acquirers. I use data from Zephyr to count the number 
of M&A completed by the acquirers over the five year period preceding the focal deal. 
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Method of payment classifies deals in the sample into three categories: all cash 
offerings, all stock offerings, and other offerings based on the data from Zephyr. The choice 
of the method of payment can reflect the acquirer’s uncertainty about the value of synergies 
and relative overvaluation of the acquirer’s equity (Martin, 1996; Myers & Majluf, 1984; 
Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). Both lead to more favorable 
valuations of all cash offerings relative to M&A where a part of the consideration is paid in 
stock. Consistently, empirical literature finds a “hierarchy of announcement returns” where 
M&A paid for with stock significantly underperform all cash offerings (Fuller, Netter, & 
Stegemoller, 2002; Mitchell, Pulvino, & Stafford, 2004; Savor & Lu, 2009; Travlos, 1987; 
Walker, 2000). 
Relative size is measured as the ratio of the deal value reported by Zephyr to the 
market cap of the acquiring firm on day – 11 relative to the announcement date obtained from 
CRSP (Harford et al., 2012). Prior literature shows that larger acquisitions suffer from worse 
monitoring abilities of the acquiring firm (Kang & Kim, 2008) and are characterized by 
higher risks (Hackbarth & Morellec, 2008). Consistently, it is observed a negative correlation 
between relative size and announcement returns (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). 
Leverage is measured as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt (dltt item in 
COMPUSTAT) and debt in current liabilities (dlc item) to the common equity (ceq) of the 
acquiring firm (Duchin & Schmidt, 2013) in the fiscal year preceding the acquisition. Prior 
literature argues that high leverage serves as an effective monitoring device (Maloney, 
McCormick, & Mitchell, 1993) and a means to align managerial incentives with shareholder 
value maximization (Jensen, 1986). Empirical studies find a positive relationship between 
leverage and announcement returns to the acquiring company (Harford et al., 2012). 
Relatedness in M&A literature serves as a measure strategic fit between the acquiring 
and target firm (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987) and is 
widely argued to create opportunities for achieving economies of scale and scope (Barney, 
2011; Porter, 1980; Rumelt, 1979; Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1979). Several studies find a 
positive relationship between relatedness and M&A performance (Anand & Singh, 1997; 
Walker, 2000). Following prior literature (Anand & Singh, 1997; Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; 
Chang, 1998; Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992; Eckbo, 1983; Fowler & 
Schmidt, 1989; Fuller et al., 2002; Walker, 2000), I define relatedness as a dummy variable 
with the value of 1 for related M&A and 0 for unrelated ones, where M&A are classified as 
related if 2-digit SIC codes of the acquiring and the target firms coincide. 
4.6. Results 
Table 5.4 displays the means and medians of the cumulative abnormal returns to the 
acquiring firm classified by the target origin and the deal type as well as the differences in the 
means and medians of the cumulative abnormal returns between the four resultant groups of 
M&A: (1) domestic technological M&A, (2) domestic non-technological M&A, (3) cross-
border technological M&A and (4) cross-border non-technological M&A. 
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Hypothesis L1 predicts that the mean cumulative abnormal returns will be 
significantly higher for domestic technological M&A than domestic non-technological M&A. 
The data presented in Table 5.4 supports the hypothesis. 
The mean cumulative abnormal returns are all positive for domestic technological 
M&A and generally negative for domestic non-technological M&A. The only two exceptions 
are the mean cumulative abnormal returns in domestic non-technological M&A measured 
with the market-adjusted normal return model and the event windows from -5 to +5 days and 
-10 to +10 days around the announcement (ACAR (5) and ACAR (10)), which are non-
significantly positive, but still smaller than the corresponding mean returns in domestic 
technological M&A. Thus, we obtained positive differences between the mean cumulative 
returns in domestic technological and domestic non-technological M&A as predicted by 
Hypothesis L1. Moreover, these differences are strongly significant for the event windows 
from -1 to +1 and from -2 to +2 trading days around the M&A announcement. 
Consistently, the differences in median cumulative abnormal returns are generally 
positive between domestic technological and domestic non-technological M&A. The 
exceptions are CAR (1), CAR (5) and ACAR (5) that are negative but non-significant. 
Hypothesis L3 predicts that the mean cumulative abnormal returns will be 
significantly lower to acquirers in domestic technological M&A than to acquirers in 
technological cross-border M&A. The empirical evidence presented in Table 5.4 strongly 
supports the prediction.  
Specifically, the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns to the acquiring firm 
in cross-border technological M&A are positive and highly significant across all the used 
normal return models and event windows. Further, they are both statistically and 
economically significantly larger than the corresponding returns to the acquiring firm in 
domestic technological M&A. This suggests that the acquiring firms create significantly more 
value for their shareholders in technological cross-border M&A than in technological 
domestic deals. 
Hypothesis L2 predicts that the acquiring firms in technological cross-border M&A 
have higher abnormal returns to their shareholders upon the deal announcement than the 
acquirers in non-technological cross-border M&A. The evidence in Table 5.4 strongly 
supports the prediction. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Acquirer Cumulated Abnormal Announcement Returns By Target Origin and Deal Type 
This table contains means and medians (in brackets) of various measures of acquirer abnormal returns upon merger announcement classified by 
the target origin and deal type: domestic technological, domestic non-technological, cross-border technological and cross-border non-
technological. It also shows differences between the groups. The column “Variable” lists the measures of the abnormal returns used in this study. 
CARs are the sums of the acquirer’s daily raw market model residuals over a given event window. The number of days in the event window is 
shown in brackets and includes the announcement date as the middle day. Market model parameters are estimated by OLS regression over the 
period from -262 to -11 trading days. ACARs are the sums of the acquirer’s daily raw market-adjusted model residuals over a given event 
window.***, **, and * indicate that mean, median abnormal returns and their differences between the two merger type are significant at 1, 5 and 
10% level correspondently (t-test is used for means, Wilcoxon rank test for medians, and Welch F-test for differences in means). Abnormal 
returns are presented in %. 
Variable Domestic 
tech 
Domestic non-
tech 
Cross border 
tech 
Cross border 
non-tech 
Domestic tech 
– Domestic 
non-tech 
Cross border 
tech – Cross 
border non-
tech 
Domestic tech 
– Cross border 
tech 
Domestic non-
tech – Cross 
border non-
tech 
CAR(1) 0.343 -0.341** 2.278*** -0.299** 0.683** 2.577*** -1.935** -0.0414 
 (-0.341) (-0.192*) (0.997***) (-0.247**) (-0.149) (1.244) (-1.337) (0.0553) 
CAR(2) 0.421 -0.480** 2.506*** -0.392** 0.901** 2.899*** -2.085** -0.088 
 (0.045) (-0.373**) (0.718***) (-0.094) (0.417) (0.812) (-0.673) (-0.279) 
CAR(5) 0.151 -0.224 3.867*** 0.200 0.375 3.667*** -3.716*** -0.424 
 (-0.672) (-0.156) (1.778***) (0.175) (-0.516) (1.603) (-2.450) (-0.331) 
CAR(10) 0.392 -0.352 4.046** -0.005 0.744 4.051** -3.654** -0.347 
 (-0.398) (-0.526) (1.949**) (-0.070) (0.128) (2.019) (-2.347) (-0.456) 
ACAR(1) 0.553** -0.296** 2.101*** -0.156 0.849*** 2.257*** -1.548** -0.140 
 (0.002) (-0.090) (0.782***) (-0.148) (0.091) (0.690) (-0.780) (0.058) 
ACAR(2) 0.605* -0.309 2.453*** -0.159 0.915** 2.612*** -1.847** -0.150 
 (0.213) (-0.038) (0.765**) (-0.050) (0.251) (0.815) (-0.552) (0.012) 
ACAR(5) 0.412 0.143 3.913*** 0.745** 0.269 3.169** -3.502** -0.602 
 (-0.512) (-0.137) (1.457***) (0.598**) (-0.375) (0.859) (-1.969) (-0.735) 
ACAR(10) 1.052 0.416 4.516*** 1.008** 0.635 3.508** -3.464** -0.592 
 (0.159) (-0.107) (1.205***) (0.616**) (0.266) (0.589) (-1.046) (-0.723) 
N 180 354 69 401     
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While the mean and median returns are positive and highly significant for 
technological cross-border M&A they are generally negative for non-technological cross-
border M&A. The two exceptions are the significantly positive mean values for ACAR (5) 
and ACAR (10) in non-technological cross-border M&A. But they are significantly smaller 
than the corresponding return measures for technological cross-border M&A. As Hypothesis 
L2 predicts, we find highly significant positive differences in the mean cumulative abnormal 
returns between technological and non-technological cross-border M&A. Consistently, the 
differences in the median cumulative abnormal returns between the two groups of M&A are 
also positive. Further, the finding is robust to the different event windows and normal return 
models used. 
Hypothesis L4 predicts that the acquiring firms in non-technological cross-border 
M&A have higher abnormal returns to their shareholders upon the deal announcement than 
the acquirers in non-technological domestic M&A. Consistently with the prediction, the 
differences in the mean cumulative abnormal returns between the domestic non-technological 
M&A and cross-border non-technological M&A are negative for all the used normal return 
models and event windows. However, the differences are not statistically significant and the 
differences in the median CAR (1), ACAR(1) and ACAR(2) are positive. 
Next, I checked whether the differences in means can be explained by the control 
variables. Table 5.5 compares them across the four groups. 
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TABLE 5.5 
Acquirer, Deal and Target Characteristics by Target Origin and Deal Type 
This table contains means and medians (in brackets) for various acquirer deal and target characteristics for M&A classified by the target origin 
and deal type: domestic technological, domestic non-technological, cross-border technological and cross-border non-technological. It also shows 
differences between the groups.  The column “Variable” lists characteristics, which are defined in earlier.*** and ** indicate whether the means 
of the two groups are significantly different based on the Welch F-test at 1% and 5% levels correspondently 
Variable Domestic tech Domestic non-
tech 
Cross border 
tech 
Cross border 
non-tech 
Domestic tech – 
Domestic non-
tech 
Cross border 
tech – Cross 
border non-tech 
Domestic tech – 
Cross border 
tech 
Domestic non-
tech – Cross 
border non-tech 
Recent M&A 
Experience 
11.840 7.340 11.380 8.030 4.500*** 3.350** 0.460 -0.690 
 (6.000) (5.000) (7.000) (5.000) (1.000) (2.000) (-1.000) (0.000) 
Relative size 0.107 0.176 0.161 0.123 -0.070 0.038 -0.054 0.054 
 (0.017) (0.035) (0.002) (0.004) (-0.018) (-0.002) (0.015) (0.031) 
Leverage 0.187 0.219 0.227 0.238 -0.032** -0.011 -0.040 -0.018 
 (0.176) (0.186) (0.209) (0.220) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.033) (-0.034) 
All cash 79 159 27 185     
% 43.89 45.43 39.71 46.48     
All stock 5 11 0 3     
% 2.78 3.14 0 0.75     
Other 96 180 41 210     
% 53.33 51.43 60.29 52.76     
Related 81 144 23 57     
% 45 41.14 33.82 14.32     
Blockholders 173 339 68 380     
% 96.11 96.86 100 95.48     
N 180 350 68 398     
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Table 5.5 shows that there significant differences in average recent M&A experience 
between domestic technological and non-technological M&A and cross-border technological 
and non-technological M&A which can be positively related to the positive differences in 
mean returns reported in Table 5.4. 
I did multiple regression analysis to further examine the impact of the variance in the 
control variables. Table 5.6 displays the results of the regression analyses where domestic 
non-technological M&A are the omitted group. These regressions allow testing Hypotheses 
L1 and L4 controlling for alternative explanations. All the regressions presented in Table 5.6 
are highly significant. 
Hypothesis L1 predicts that the cumulative abnormal returns will be significantly 
higher for domestic technological M&A than domestic non-technological M&A. The results 
of the regression analysis provide a strong support to the prediction as the coefficients on the 
Domestic tech variable are all positive and significant for the event windows from day-1 to 
day+1 and from day-2 to day +2. 
Hypothesis L4 predicts that the cumulative abnormal returns will be significantly 
higher for cross-border non-technological M&A than domestic non-technological M&A. The 
coefficients on the cross-border non-tech variable are generally positive (with the exceptions 
of CAR (1) and CAR (10)) but not significant. This does not provide a strong support for the 
prediction. 
The signs and significance of the control variables are generally consistent with 
predicted. However, the negative and significant coefficients on the recent M&A experience 
and relatedness appear unusual. King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004) show in their meta-
analysis that on average experience has not been found significant. Also, Hayward (2002) 
shows that the effect of experience is moderated by time and performance of prior 
acquisitions. Here, I measure experience over a five-year period preceding the focal deal, 
which is shorter than that used in previous research. Neither control I for prior acquisition 
performance. All these factors can potentially explain the findings. I identify related deals by 
the overlap of the two-digit SIC codes. This measure is imperfect in at least two ways. First, it 
enables us to identify primarily horizontal M&A. Their major source of synergy is the scale 
economies, which are shown to be limited and generally overvalued (Seth et al., 2002). 
Second, it is unable to find the acquisitions of firms that operate in different industries but 
have related technologies (for example fish farming and biotech) and complementary products. 
Such deals can have a good strategic fit and yet be classified as unrelated. 
Table 5.7 displays the results of the regression analyses where cross-border 
technological M&A are the omitted group. These regressions allow testing Hypotheses L2 
and L3 controlling for alternative explanations. All the regressions presented in Table 5.6 are 
highly significant. 
Hypothesis L2 predicts that the cumulative abnormal returns will be significantly 
higher for cross-border technological M&A than cross-border non-technological M&A. The 
results of the regression analysis provide a strong support to the prediction as the coefficients 
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on the Cross-border non-tech indicator variable are negative and highly significant in all the 
regressions in Table 5.7. 
Hypothesis L3 predicts that the cumulative abnormal returns will be significantly 
higher for cross-border technological M&A than domestic technological M&A. The 
coefficients on the Domestic tech variable are negative and significant regardless the chosen 
abnormal return measure and the included control variables. This provides a strong empirical 
support for the prediction. The signs and significance of the control variables are generally 
consistent with predicted. 
To summarize, the regression analysis provides a strong empirical support to the 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 predicting that (1) the acquirers in domestic technological M&A create 
more value to their shareholders than the acquirers in domestic non-technological M&A; (2) 
the acquirers in cross-border technological M&A significantly outperform those in both 
domestic technological M&A and cross-border non-technological M&A. Moreover, these 
results are robust to the alternative measures of the abnormal returns as well as the control 
variables. 
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TABLE 5.6 
Multivariate Regressions Explaining Acquirer Returns 
This table contains the results of multivariate OLS regressions of acquirer announcement returns. All variables are explained in the previous 
section. t- statistics are in brackets. The omitted category is domestic non-technological M&A. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent 
***, **, * indicate that regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level correspondently. 
 CAR (1) CAR (2) CAR (5) CAR (10) ACAR (1) ACAR (2) ACAR (5) ACAR (10) 
Const -0.007 -0.021*** -0.036*** -0.031* -0.002 -0.013* -0.018 0.006 
 (-1.323) (-2.777) (-2.928) (-1.699) (-0.422) (-1.770) (-1.570) (0.443) 
Domestic tech 0.009*** 0.010** 0.005 0.004 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.005 0.005 
 (2.705) (2.505) (0.677) (0.444) (3.321) (2.625) (0.643) (0.534) 
Cross-border tech 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 
 (3.372) (3.710) (3.336) (2.700) (3.179) (3.582) (3.166) (2.783) 
Cross-border non- tech -0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.003 
 (-0.405) (0.115) (0.879) (-0.061) (0.002) (0.405) (1.398) (0.539) 
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (-0.260) (0.422) (-2.500) (-1.933) (-0.295) (0.351) (-2.628) (-2.322) 
Leverage 0.010 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (1.234) (0.567) (0.474) (0.331) (0.824) (0.348) (0.130) (0.050) 
Experience -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-0.853) (-0.615 (-2.596) (-1.842) (-1.448) (-1.427) (-3.439) (-3.141) 
Relatedness -0.006** -0.006** -0.008 -0.019** -0.006** -0.006* -0.006 -0.014** 
 (-2.276) (-2.186) (-1.480) (-2.524) (-2.501) (-1.912) (-1.176) (-2.052) 
All cash 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.883) (1.193) (-0.540) (-0.273) (0.804) (0.981) (-0.570) (-0.283) 
All stock 0.011 0.011 0.029 -0.006 0.014** 0.012 0.028 0.003 
 (1.628) (1.017) (1.574) (-0.201) (2.318) (1.276) (1.585) (0.125) 
Blockholders 0.003 0.016** 0.041*** 0.039** 0.000 0.011* 0.028*** 0.012 
 (0.756) (2.448) (3.786) (2.501) (0.099) (1.728) (2.831) (0.991) 
N 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 
𝑅2 0.052 0.046 0.035 0.026 0.050 0.041 0.036 0.027 
𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅2 0.042 0.036 0.025 0.016 0.040 0.031 0.026 0.017 
F-stat 5.187 4.589 3.494 2.516 5.010 4.049 3.544 2.619 
P(F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
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TABLE 5.7 
Multivariate Regressions Explaining Acquirer Returns 
This table contains the results of multivariate OLS regressions of acquirer announcement returns. All variables are explained in the previous 
section. t- statistics are in brackets. The omitted category is cross-border technological M&A. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent 
***, **, * indicate that regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level correspondently. 
 
CAR (1) CAR (2) CAR (5) CAR (10) ACAR (1) ACAR (2) ACAR (5) ACAR (10) 
Const 0.020** 0.010 0.007 0.013 0.022*** 0.016* 0.023 0.050** 
 
(2.423) (0.987) (0.399) (0.587) (2.774) (1.677) (1.346) (2.487) 
Domestic tech -0.018** -0.020** -0.038*** -0.039** -0.014* -0.018** -0.036*** -0.038** 
 
(-2.225) (-2.339) (-2.726) (-2.267) (-1.806) (-2.128) (-2.611) (-2.301) 
Domestic non-tech -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.041*** -0.043*** 
 
(-3.372) (-3.710) (-3.336) (-2.700) (-3.179) (-3.582) (-3.166) (-2.783) 
Cross-border non- tech -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.034*** -0.040** 
 
(-3.398) (-3.597) (-2.969) (-2.702) (-3.091) (-3.360) (-2.619) (-2.545) 
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 
 
(-0.260) (0.422) (-2.500) (-1.933) (-0.295) (0.351) (-2.628) (-2.322) 
Leverage 0.010 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 
(1.234) (0.567) (0.474) (0.331) (0.824) (0.348) (0.130) (0.050) 
Experience -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-0.853) (-0.615) (-2.596) (-1.842) (-1.448) (-1.427) (-3.439) (-3.141) 
Relatedness -0.006** -0.006** -0.008** -0.019** -0.006** -0.006* -0.006 -0.014** 
 
(-2.276) (-2.186) (-1.480) (-2.524) (-2.501) (-1.912) (-1.176) (-2.052) 
All cash 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.883) (1.193) (-0.540) (-0.273) (0.804) (0.981) (-0.570) (-0.283) 
All stock 0.011 0.011 0.029 -0.006 0.014** 0.012 0.028 0.003 
 
(1.628) (1.017) (1.574) (-0.201) (2.318) (1.276) (1.585) (0.125) 
Blockholders 0.003 0.016** 0.041*** 0.039** 0.000 0.011* 0.028*** 0.012 
 
(0.756) (2.448) (3.786) (2.501) (0.099) (1.728) (2.831) (0.991) 
N 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 
𝑅2 0.052 0.046 0.035 0.026 0.050 0.041 0.036 0.027 
𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅2 0.042 0.036 0.025 0.016 0.040 0.031 0.026 0.017 
F-stat 5.187 4.589 3.494 2.516 5.010 4.049 3.544 2.617 
P(F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
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4.7. Discussion and conclusions 
In this study, I assessed the extent to which the interactions between the type of M&A 
(technological or non-technological) and the target’s origin (domestic or foreign) affect the 
acquiring firm’s performance. Particularly, I argued that the combination of the target’s 
technology with complementary assets of the acquiring firm and higher potential to benefit 
from sharing complementary assets in cross-border deals drove the differences in acquirers’ 
performance across the four types of transactions. The obtained results confirm the 
hypothesized relationships for technological deals. However, I found no significant difference 
in performance between acquirers in domestic and cross-border non-technological 
transactions. The results are robust to different measures of abnormal announcement returns 
and alternative explanatory variables. Below I discuss the implications of these findings for 
theory and practice. 
4.7.1. Implications for research 
This analysis provides empirical evidence that the acquiring firms in cross-border 
technological M&A earn statistically and economically significant positive abnormal returns 
to their shareholders upon the deal announcement. In addition, this study shows that the 
abnormal returns to the acquiring firm in cross-border technological M&A are significantly 
larger than in cross-border non-technological M&A and domestic technological M&A. These 
significant and robust results obtained from including the interaction effects contrast sharply 
with the insignificant findings of prior studies that rely on the relatedness, experience and the 
method of payment as the explanatory variables (see King and colleagues (2004) for a meta-
analysis). Further, they are important in the context of two ongoing discussions in M&A 
literature. 
First, the finding of the significantly larger returns to the acquiring firm in cross-
border technological M&A than in cross-border non-technological M&A combined with the 
significantly larger returns in domestic technological M&A relative to domestic non-
technological M&A provides empirical evidence that the technology assets of the target firm 
are important sources of synergies. Further, the significantly larger returns in cross-border 
technological M&A than in domestic technological M&A suggest that the cross-border deal 
context increases the opportunities to benefit from the target’s technology. 
Second, these results call for a contingent view on the effects of the institutional 
differences on the cross-border M&A performance instead of the dominating arguments for 
their linear effects. Currently, one stream of research in international business points to the 
liability of foreignness and the negative effects of the institutional differences between 
countries on M&A performance. Another argues that such differences increase the 
opportunities for organizational learning, the degree of asset complementarity and the 
potential to benefit from the local institutional environments. My results suggest that the 
cross-border context and the associated institutional differences are beneficial for 
technological M&A, but have no significant impact on non-technological deals, implying that 
the latter either have less to gain from sharing the locally developed knowledge or are more 
exposed to the liabilities of foreignness. 
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4.7.2. Implications for practice 
The results show that the acquiring firm shareholders gain significantly more from 
cross-boarder than domestic technological M&A. This implies that management of high-
technology companies should not limit the scope of the target selection to the domestic 
context. Systematic screening of potential targets globally increases the chances of identifying 
deals with unique synergies in a larger and more diverse pool of complementary assets. In 
addition, such acquirers can leverage their long-term innovation capabilities by benefiting 
from local knowledge spillovers. This consideration implies that local business context should 
be an important consideration in the choice of targets and post-merger R&D location decision. 
Finally, I find that the stock market prices different types of synergies differently. Hence, both 
management and boards of the acquiring companies should carefully evaluate specific sources 
of value creation and the inherent risks against the offered bid before approving a transaction. 
4.7.3. Limitations and future research 
This study has several limitations, but they do not significantly impair the validity of 
conclusions. First, additional insights can be gained by studying more longitudinal 
performance effects and taking into account post-merger integration. However, the analysis of 
the stock returns to the acquiring firm done in this study gives the advantage of showing 
performance effects that are not confounded by subsequent corporate events not related to the 
focal deal or post-merger integration. At the same time post-merger integration has no impact 
on the market expectations that this work, for the sake of tractability, focuses on. 
Second, I employed a conservative strategy for identifying technological M&A, which 
may have mistakenly classified some transactions where targets owned a non-patentable 
technology and the deal rationale was not included in the database as non-technological. A 
problem this strategy can have caused is a non-significant difference in announcement returns 
between technological and non-technological M&A even if it is significant in reality. 
However, given the significance of the results, this identification strategy has no detrimental 
impact on the validity. Moreover, this methodology is consistent with the prior literature on 
technological M&A, which makes my results comparable. 
Third, this research can be extended in the future by (1) considering a more detailed 
classification of non-technological M&A by value drivers; (2) identifying and controlling for 
specific institutional differences between countries; and (3) adding the interaction effects 
between the origin and the ownership. Though such a research calls for a much larger sample 
size and a richer data set that is presently not available, it would allow further analysis of the 
different sources of gains and losses in M&A that is of particular theoretical and practical 
interest.
92 
 
5. Conclusions 
Companies have spent trillions of US dollars on M&A for the last ten years. While 
some of the deals were successful, many, especially large ones, resulted in significant losses 
for the acquiring firm shareholders. This raises a number of questions from managers and 
shareholders on both sides of the deal. What makes M&A a credible strategy? What kind of 
acquirers are better positioned to add value to a given target company? How can we 
distinguish winners and losers before the event? 
Not surprisingly, an extensive body of strategic management and finance literature 
focuses on explaining M&A performance. The three most popular themes in these works are: 
(1) relatedness between the businesses of the acquiring and target firms that indicates 
potential synergies; (2) prior M&A experience that enhances the skills in target selection, 
valuation, negotiation and post-merger integration; and (3) the chosen method of payment that 
reveals managerial beliefs on the intrinsic values of the assets relative to the market ones. 
Unfortunately, earlier meta-analyses of this literature showed that M&A performance was not 
on average significantly related to those three variables. 
Agency theory points to another shortcoming of the abovementioned literature, 
namely the failure to recognize that self-interest seeking managers will not necessarily pursue 
deals that create value for their shareholders. The management of the acquiring firm may use 
M&A for empire building, creating additional promotion opportunities and reducing their 
own employment risks. The managers of the target firm may be tempted by lucrative 
compensation packages and career opportunities in the combined firm. This literature views 
ownership concentration and managerial ownership on both sides of the deal as means of 
preventing negative-NPV M&A through better monitoring and incentives. Though it provides 
important insights on how value can be destroyed in M&A and why private equity firms can 
be superior acquirers, this agency theory-based research does not give full credit to the role of 
complementary assets and the ownership strategy of industrial acquirers in M&A. 
International business literature focuses on cross-border M&A as a subset of deals 
where the market exchange imperfections and institutional differences between countries are 
major determinants of performance. While there is a relative consensus among researchers 
with respect to the role of market imperfections as a rationale for cross-border M&A, there is 
a disagreement regarding the direction of the influence of the institutional differences on 
cross-border M&A performance. Some authors argue that institutional differences exacerbate 
the adverse selection and monitoring problems. Others suggest that they are sources of 
competitive advantage for the acquiring firms that enrich their organizational repertoires and 
benefit from location-specific knowledge spillovers. I believe that a contingent perspective 
can reconcile the two arguments. 
 In the three empirical sections of this dissertation, I attempted to overcome some of 
the limitations of the three streams of research discussed above. Particularly, I focused on the 
role of technology, ownership and origin as well as the interactions between technology and 
ownership and between technology and origin in explaining the variance of M&A 
performance. 
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A major argument of this dissertation is that splitting the population of M&A by 
relatedness, prior M&A experience, and the method of payment does not allow identifying 
types of M&A with distinct drivers for value creation and, in this way, explaining why some 
acquirers perform better than others do. Instead, I suggest separating M&A according to the 
technology inputs provided by the target firms into two types: (1) technological M&A where 
the target-firm possesses technology assets and (2) non-technological M&A where technology 
is not a part of the acquired assets. The argument underlying this classification is that 
technological M&A have two sources of gains, in addition to those available in non-
technological M&A, that are (1) unavailable in non-technological M&A and (2) produce 
synergies that are not equally available to all bidding firms and, hence, should result in 
superior performance of acquirers in technological M&A. These two mechanisms for value 
creation are (1) more profitable commercialization of the target’s technology by 
complementing it with the acquirers production facilities, distribution channels and marketing 
capabilities and (2) leveraging the innovation capabilities through merging the two 
complementary technology bases. These synergies are not available in non-technological 
M&A because they, by definition, do not give technology inputs to the acquiring firm, and 
their value cannot be easily lost in the bidding process because it depends on the degree of 
complementarity. 
Further, I revise the role of ownership and assess the extent to which private equity 
firms add value to the target firms relative to industrial acquirers in general and when taking 
into account the type of M&A (technological or non-technological) in particular. Recognizing 
the important role played by managerial incentives in M&A performance, I argue that access 
to complementary assets and alignment of the ownership strategy with the type of the deal are 
also critical. Particularly, I suggest that private equity acquirers are better positioned to add 
value in non-technological M&A while industrial parents are superior parents for 
technological targets because (1) profiting from innovations requires access to complementary 
knowledge base, production, marketing and distribution that private equity firms cannot 
provide to the same extent as industrial companies; and (2) focus on the short-term financial 
performance, high risk aversion, and low priority given to R&D investments by private equity 
firms negatively affects innovation performance. 
Finally, I consider the role of origin in M&A performance. I suggest that acquirers 
gain more in cross-border technological M&A than acquirers in cross-border non-
technological M&A and domestic technological M&A. The reason is that acquirers in cross-
border technological M&A benefit from (1) internal exploitation of intangible technology 
assets, (2) access to more diverse repertoires related to new product development, and (3) the 
local knowledge spillovers. Acquirers in domestic M&A cannot benefit from these 
advantages, and they are limited for acquirers in non-technological cross-border M&A.  
I tested the hypotheses on the impact of type of M&A and origin on the sample of 
M&A conducted by US publicly traded companies in 2002-2011 and hypotheses on the 
impact of ownership - on the sample of M&A, acquisitions and leveraged buyouts of US 
publicly traded target companies in the same period. I used abnormal announcement stock 
returns as the primary measure of M&A performance (complemented with accounting and 
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innovation performance measures to assess the impact of the type of M&A). Empirical 
findings provide support to the major arguments and are robust to control variables, 
alternative normal return model specifications and different event windows. 
Consistent with the predictions, I find that acquirers create economically and 
statistically significantly more value for their shareholders in technological M&A than in non-
technological ones. This finding suggests that (1) the economies of scope arising from the 
combination of the target’s technology assets with the assets of the acquiring firm are an 
important source of gains in M&A and (2) that the stock market distinguishes deals with 
different mechanisms for value creation and destruction. Further, the regression analysis 
shows that acquirers gain more when they have accumulated certain M&A experience and 
thus transaction-specific competence and when they select smaller targets and thereby make 
the deal more tractable and reduce the overpayment risk. 
Further, I find that industrial acquirers add significantly more value to technological 
than non-technological targets, while the opposite is true for private equity firms. Moreover, 
the results of my analysis suggest that industrial acquirers have parenting advantages over 
private equity firms in technological M&A. Consequently, access to complementary assets 
and focus of innovation are more important to create value in technological M&A than strong 
managerial incentives and elimination of inefficiencies in the target firms. This shows that 
agency theory-based perspectives on the role of ownership tell only part of the story, though 
an important one, calls for developing a contingent “best owner” perspective that also 
accounts for the complementarity of the strategic cores of the acquiring and target firms. 
Finally, the undertaken analysis shows that acquirers in technological M&A create 
significantly more value for their shareholders in cross-border transactions than in domestic 
ones. This suggests that companies competing in high-technology industries gain a 
competitive advantage by acquiring technological targets abroad and in this way accessing a 
more diverse pool of technology assets and benefiting from the knowledge spillovers in the 
host country. An implication is that the target location should be an important consideration 
for M&A decisions in high-technology industries. 
The analyses done in this dissertation have several limitations, which do not 
undermine the importance of the empirical findings discussed above though. First, the three 
empirical studies focused on the pre-merger characteristics of the target and the acquiring 
firms and left the post-merger integration process outside the scope of the analysis. This 
choice was driven by the research design and tractability reasons, especially the interest in the 
factors that affect the abnormal announcement returns. Moreover, this is a well-established 
approach in the strategic management and finance literature on M&A performance. 
Second, we employed a conservative strategy for identifying technological M&A 
based on the combination of the industry codes, the target’s patents and the reported deal 
rationale. Though this is the conventional approach in the prior literature, we may have 
mistakenly classified some of the M&A where the target possessed unpatented technology 
and the deal rationale was missing as non-technological. However, given the significant 
findings, this strategy did not have a detrimental impact on the validity of our findings. 
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Third, the use of SIC codes to identify high-technology industries and related M&A in 
this dissertation have certain limitations discussed in prior literature that calls for more fine -
grained measures. But, the tradeoff would be the much smaller sample size and data reliability, 
which were of crucial importance for these empirical analysis. Thus, we chose to stick to the 
conventional approaches, despite their apparent imperfections. 
Overcoming these limitations should be a task for future research. In addition, the 
present work can be extended in the future to: 1) include innovation output measures; 2) focus 
on the acquirer’s technology assets in addition to those of the target firm and their relations 
(e.g. relatedness and complementarity); 3) distinguish different types of non-technological 
M&A; 4) control for specific national differences; and 5) consider the interactions between 
the type of M&A, the ownership, and the origin. Such research would give us additional 
insights in M&A performance drivers necessary to improve our theoretical understanding in 
the area as well as the practical decision-making. 
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